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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The past few decades have seen a number of attempts to take musical experience 
seriously.  We now speak of embodiment, temporality, phenomenology, gesture, and 
performance.  While these progressive programs have doubtless begun to move music 
theory and analysis away from an entrenched score-based paradigm, a deep textualism 
persists in even the more forward-looking approaches of the discipline.   
 This dissertation develops a phenomenology of music and analytical method that 
situates musical phenomena in the experience of performance and speaks directly of an 
embodied listener’s engagement with sonic events.   
 Part 1 lays the groundwork for my project with a critical appraisal of cognitive 
musicology, one of the most prominent approaches to musical experience to emerge in 
recent years.  I argue that the two cognitive semantic theories on which most of this 
work is based—George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s conceptual metaphor and image 
schema theories—are beset by various methodological and philosophical problems and 
ultimately reinscribe the dualist epistemology that Lakoff and Johnson purport to 
overcome.   
 Part 2 offers an alternative account of embodied experience, coordinating the 
phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the ecological psychology of J.J. Gibson 
and the philosophy of Eugene Gendlin.  My analyses in chapter 3 delve into the 
nuances of my experience with several recorded performances of short passages of 
 
iv 
piano music by Chopin and Brahms, demonstrating not only that different 
performances can create fundamentally different events from the same notes, but 
events unforeseeable from consideration of the score alone.  Chapter 4 then reflects on 
these analyses and seeks to theorize analysis itself by placing it on a continuum with 
the practice of listening.  This final chapter introduces a notion of “momentum” to 
describe the irreducible flow of experience and the emergent nexus of mutually 
constituting perceptions that is our ongoing determination of sense.  By acknowledging 
the role of description and conceptualization in the very experience they articulate, I 
show how attending to the momentum of experience can challenge and refine the 
established categories of music theory.   
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 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Of course we all knew that life was more a process than a structure, but we tended to 
forget this, because a structure was so much easier to study. 
 
- Robert Becker and Gary Selden1 
 
 
 
 The past few decades have seen a number of attempts to take musical experience 
seriously.  Musicology has come a long way from the arch-positivism and structuralism 
of the postwar era. We now speak of embodiment, temporality, phenomenology, 
gesture, and performance.2  These progressive programs have doubtless begun to 
unseat what Eric Clarke called the “tyranny of the score,”3 yet the work is ongoing to 
establish alternatives to score-based study that can speak to the complexity of 
experience with musical sound.  Despite the challenging of the “work” concept and the 
influence of post-structuralism, a deep textualism—the privileging of score over sound, 
                                                
1 Robert Becker and Gary Selden, The Body Electric: Electromagnetism And The Foundation Of Life (New 
York: William Morrow, 1985), 136. 
2 Lawrence Zbikowski, Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, and Analysis, AMS Studies in 
Music (Oxford!; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Steve Larson, Musical Forces: Motion, 
Metaphor, and Meaning in Music, Musical Meaning and Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2012); Candace Brower, “A Cognitive Theory of Musical Meaning,” Journal of Music Theory 44, no. 
2 (2000): 323–79; Anthony Gritten and Elaine King, eds., Music and Gesture (Aldershot, England!; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); Robert S. Hatten, Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, 
Beethoven, Schubert (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Eric F. Clarke and Nicholas Cook, 
Empirical Musicology: Aims, Methods, Prospects (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); John 
S. Rink, The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Thomas Clifton, Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); David Lewin, “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes 
of Perception,” in Studies in Music with Text (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 53–108. 
3 Eric F. Clarke, “Empirical Methods in the Study of Performance,” in Empirical Musicology Aims, Methods, 
Prospects, ed. Eric F. Clarke and Nicholas Cook (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
99. 
 2 
the visual over the aural—persists in even the more forward-looking paradigms of the 
discipline.   
 David Lewin’s influential phenomenology is illuminating in this regard.4  For all its 
virtues—its incorporation of perceptual pluralism and resisting of hypostatized 
objects—the experience Lewin seeks to capture is imagined.  Performance is 
hypothetical.  As a result, the realm of possible perceptions is in an important sense 
constrained by the score.  I would argue that his phenomenology is more a reading 
back of temporality into the score than an account of music as experienced.  Lewin’s 
“perceiver” is less an embodied subject than a harmonic processer, computing the data 
as given by the score.  And the “perceptions” of this perceiver are necessarily one step 
removed from actual perception: they are a positing of what a theoretically-driven 
processing of notes might be like, rather than the stuff of experience per se.  What 
ends up being “phenomenologized,” perhaps, is not perception but a score-based 
harmonic analysis.  
 The desire to move away from score is a central aim of many performance studies 
of empirical musicology.  The microtiming analyses in particular attempt to confront 
the realities of musical sound directly, extracting timing and often volume data from 
recorded performances.5  Their findings have been illuminating in many ways.  Yet 
performance analysis has often succumbed to a deeper, subtler form of textualism by 
                                                
4 Lewin, “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception.” 
5 See, for example, John S. Rink, Neta Spiro, and Nicolas Gold, “The Form of Performance: Analyzing 
Pattern Distribution in Select Recordings of Chopin’s Mazurka Op. 24 No. 2,” Musicæ Scientiæ 14, no. 2 
(2010): 23–55; John S. Rink, “The Line of Argument in Chopin’s E Minor Prelude,” Early Music 29, no. 
3 (2001): 434–46; Alan Dodson, “Expressive Timing in Expanded Phrases: An Empirical Study of 
Recordings of Rhree Chopin Preludes,” Music Performance Research 4 (2011): 2–29; Daniel Barolsky, 
“Embracing Imperfection In Benno Moiseiwitsch’s Prelude to Chopin,” Music Performance Research 2 
(2008): 48–60; Clarke, “Empirical Methods in the Study of Performance”; Olivier Senn, Lorenz 
Kilchenmann, and Marc-Antoine Camp, “Expressive TIming: Martha Argerich Plays Chopin’s Prelude 
Op.28/4 in E Minor,” International Symposium on Performance Science, 2009, 107–12. 
 3 
regarding recordings as yet another text to be deciphered.  That pitfall has been 
recognized by two of its leading practitioners.6  What is more, the ciphers used to 
decode the data tend to be the established concepts and categories of music theory 
from the score-based paradigm.  Even if comparison plays a large role, there is an 
enduring habit of judging a performance’s “deviation” from benchmarks set by the 
score.  Performance is thus, in many cases, still held up to the ultimate standard of the 
“the piece” and the structures music theory asserts to lie therein.  Such lingering 
“scorism” shows just how deep the textualist bias runs.   
 A more radical rethinking is necessary for music theory and analysis to embrace 
the paradigm of performance.  Taking experience seriously means accepting 
performance as constitutive of, rather than incidental to, the phenomenon of music, in 
turn allowing it to do more than, or simply nothing like, “realize” the structures that 
are posited to inhere in the notation.  By recognizing the categorical difference 
between sound and score we might liberate the former from the latter, enabling it to 
speak for itself rather than through an inadequate textual interpreter.  But how do we 
speak of such experience?       
 In a word, directly.   This dissertation proposes a mode of music analysis and 
phenomenology of music that shows how this is possible.   
 I begin that larger project with a critique of one of the most popular and promising 
approaches to musical experience to emerge in the last two decades: cognitive 
musicology.  Drawing on cognitive psychology, with special attention to cognitive 
semantics, cognitive musicologists have sought to ground various aspects of musical 
                                                
6 Clarke, “Empirical Methods in the Study of Performance,” 99; Nicholas Cook, “Between Process and 
Product: Music And/as Performance,” Music Theory Online 7, no. 2 (2001): 22. 
 4 
meaning in the embodied patterns of understanding that ground meaning generally.7 
The work of cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson figures 
prominently, in particular their theories of “conceptual metaphor” and “image 
schemas.”8  The former describes our pervasive structuring and understanding of more 
abstract domains of experience (e.g. emotions) in terms of more concrete domains (e.g. 
spatial orientation), giving rise to systematic conceptual metaphors (e.g. HAPPY IS UP) 
and countless correlative expressions (e.g. “I’m feeling up.”).  Because conceptual 
metaphors are grounded in experiential correlation (e.g. upright posture is associated 
with positive mood), our conceptual/linguistic system can be said to be thoroughly 
embodied.  Image schema theory focuses further on the basic gestalt-like dynamic 
patterns (e.g. VERTICALITY, CONTAINMENT) that emerge in early embodiment and 
structure all manner of experience, from the physical to the purely conceptual.  With 
its central focus on embodiment, Lakoff and Jonhson’s project aims to challenge and 
overcome an entrenched dualistic tradition by explicating the fundamental role of the 
body in human behavior and understanding.   
 My focus in part 1 is not on the varied musicological applications of these theories, 
but the theories themselves.  Chapter 1 presents an overview of Lakoff and Johnson’s 
broader philosophical program and then focuses on the original exposition of 
                                                
7  Zbikowski, Conceptualizing Music; Lawrence Zbikowski, “Musicology, Cognitive Science, and 
Metaphor: Reflections on Michael Spitzer’s Metaphor and Musical Thought,” Musica Humana 1, no. 1 
(2009): 81–104; Larson, Musical Forces; Brower, “A Cognitive Theory of Musical Meaning”; Janna K. 
Saslaw, “Forces, Containers, and Paths: The Role of Body-Derived Image Schemas in the 
Conceptualization of Music,” Journal of Music Theory 40, no. 2 (1996): 217–43; Janna K. Saslaw, “Far 
Out: Intentionality and Image Schema in the Reception of Early Works by Ornette Coleman,” Current 
Musicology, no. 69 (2000): 97–117. 
8 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Of Chicago 
Press, 2003); Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: 
The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
 5 
conceptual metaphor theory in their seminal Metaphors We Live By.  Combining 
previous scholarship and original argumentation, I expose various methodological and 
philosophical shortcomings of their approach.  Ultimately I argue that conceptual 
metaphors are not a fundamental basis of thought but a post-hoc artifact of linguistic 
analysis.  Chapter 2 takes up image schema theory as promulgated by Johnson in The 
Body in the Mind with later elaborations by both scholars.  Building on and adding to 
extant critical scholarship, I argue that Johnson’s theory is beset by contradiction and 
his evidence marred by methodological and interpretational flaws.  Like conceptual 
metaphor theory, image schema theory mistakes a conceptualization of experience for 
its process.  Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s critique of “intellectualism,” I contend that 
Johnson’s notion of embodiment, though put forward as an antidote to the mind-body 
dichotomy, remains entrenched in a dualistic epistemology.9   Though image schemas 
putatively emerge from bodily engagement, once abstracted therefrom, they operate, 
not unlike classical mental representations, as mediators between subjects (inner) and 
the world (outer).  It is this “mediational epistemology,” as Charles Taylor put it, that 
lies at the heart of traditional dualistic thinking.10   
 Part of what is lost in this mentalization of embodiment is the essential situatedness 
and emergence of experiential meaning.  I do not simply (or at all) apply fairly 
determinate categories or schemas to a current situation, but navigate its unique 
features and contours, making sense of it as I go.  It is this navigation, the ongoing 
process of skillful coping, that is the subject of part 2.  My analyses in chapter 3 delve 
                                                
9  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London!; New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
10 Charles Taylor, “Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 26–49. 
 6 
into the nuances of my experience with multiple performances of short passages from 
Chopin and Brahms, demonstrating several key features of my approach.  First, that 
introspective description of musical experience is not only viable and communicable 
but a rich source of exploration.  Second, that performance is not incidental to music, 
actualizing or not the transcendent structures of music theory, but rather essential, 
capable of fashioning events unforeseeable from a consideration of the score alone.  
Third, that reflection on musical experience, being inherently more specific and 
complex than music theoretical concepts, can challenge and ultimately refine our 
established categories and labels.  
 Chapter 4 situates my analytical method in the thought of Merleau-Ponty, the 
ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson, and the philosopher Eugene Gendlin.   Common 
to all three thinkers is the supposition that the basic determination of experiential sense 
is irreducibly processual, that the temporal flow of experience is not ancillary, but 
essential, to its meaning.  For Merleau-Ponty, embodied perception fundamentally 
involves the perpetual attainment of a “best grip” on a situation, the very clarification 
of the perceptual scene and the specific ways it solicits our engagement.11  Gibson 
describes a similarly exploratory process when he writes of an organism’s “attunement” 
to the affordances of the environment.12  For Gendlin, meaning resides precisely in the 
way that the “implicit intricacy” of a situation is “carried forward” to the next.13  
Understanding experience as process in this way obviates the need for an account of 
                                                
11 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 292. 
12 James J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 271; 
James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Hillsdale (N.J.): Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1986), 127. 
13 Eugene Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological Approach to the 
Subjective (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1997); Eugene Gendlin, “The New 
Phenomenology of Carrying Forward,” Continental Philosophy Review 37 (2004): 127–51. 
 7 
memory as stored representations that are somehow brought to bear on the current 
situation.  What I have learned in the past shows up in the very way the environment 
now appears to me, as the finer discriminations I can now make.14   
 Momentum describes the irreducible flow of experiences that, as Merleau-Ponty 
writes, “imply and explain each other both simultaneously and successively,”15 the 
emergent nexus of mutually constituting perceptions that is our ongoing determination 
of sense.  By inextricably implicating the past (as potential) and the future (as 
anticipation) in the trajectory of the present, momentum allows us to speak of the flow 
of experiences and the experience of that flow as a meaning unto itself.  My analyses in 
chapter 3 are an attempt at describing the momentum of my experience with those 
recorded performances.   It is not a reconstruction of that experience, however, but a 
carrying forward of it, a continuing determination of its sense in the form of a written 
analysis.  As Merleau-Ponty and Gendlin stress, description of experience does not 
stand outside the experience, but becomes bound up with it.  Rumination, 
conceptualization, and verbalization, then, are all part of an experience’s ongoing, 
potentially endless, momentum.  By closing the hermeneutic circle in this way, 
acknowledging, indeed harnessing, the inevitable interplay between felt experience 
and conceptualization, I show how a new kind of music theory can emerge naturally 
from experience and, in turn, do better justice to its complexity.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Intelligence Without Representation – Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental 
Representation: The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation,” Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 4 (2002): 367–83. 
15 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 327. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 1 
 
 
Embodying Musical Meaning: A Critique of Cognitive Musicology 
 
 
 
 
 
!
! 9!
CHAPTER 1 
Mistaking Language for Thought: Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
 
Etymology is not epistemology. 
- M.S. McGlone1 
 
The rise of “cognitive musicology” has been among the more notable trends in 
recent scholarship.  Drawing on the discipline(s) of cognitive science, especially the 
cognitive linguistics of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Ron Langacker, Gilles 
Fauconier, and Mark Turner, this emerging field seeks to address questions of music 
perception, cognition, and conceptualization.  Though it in part aims to reveal the 
metaphorical basis of analytical and theoretical discourse,2 its larger ambitions can 
hardly be overstated.  For by subscribing to the fundamental premise of “conceptual 
metaphor” theory—that metaphor is not just a lexical but a mental construct—
ostensibly linguistic insights are elevated to cognitive and epistemological facts.  At 
stake, then, is nothing less than a theory of musical meaning.  More ambitious still is 
Lawrence Zbikowski’s claim that “the value of this approach…lies in better 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Matthew S. McGlone, “What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?,” 
Language & Communication 27, no. 2 (2007): 12. 
2 See, for example, Janna Saslaw, “Forces, Containers, and Paths: The Role of Body-Derived 
Image Schemas in the Conceptualization of Music,” Journal of Music Theory 40, no. 2 (1996): 
217–243; Lawrence  Zbikowski, “Conceptual Models and Cross-Domain Mapping: New 
Perspectives on Theories of Music and Hierarchy,” Journal of Music Theory 41, no. 2 (1997): 
193–225. 
! 10!
understanding what it means to be human and what it means to have culture.”3  The 
implied reconciliation between nature and nurture is no accident.  Cognitive 
musicology, as a descendant of the “second cognitive revolution” of the 1980s, 
promises to mediate between scientific and humanistic paradigms, to align the 
traditionally inharmonious searches for hard truth and hermeneutic insight.4 
The nexus of this synthesis is the embodied mind, or a particular conception of it 
based largely on the “image schemas” developed concurrently by Lakoff and Johnson 
(hereafter L&J) in their 1987 publications.5  Defined by the latter as “structures for 
organizing our experience and comprehension,” these “recurrent pattern[s], shape[s], 
and regularit[ies]…emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our 
bodily movements through space, our manipulations of objects, and our perceptual 
interactions.” 6  These basic, cross-modal “experiential gestalts” 7 —e.g. CONTAINER, 
SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, VERTICALITY—are deployed via metaphorical projection, or 
“cross-domain mapping,” in the experiencing, understanding, and conceptualization of 
other, typically more abstract, domains of experience.8  For example, the CONTAINER 
schema, which purportedly arises from early experiences interacting with containers of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  Lawrence Zbikowski, “Musicology, Cognitive Science, and Metaphor: Reflections on 
Michael Spitzer’s Metaphor and Musical Thought,” Musica Humana 1, no. 1 (2009): 84. 
4 For an overview of the various interests of the field, see Lawrence Zbikowski, “Metaphor 
and Music,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought (2008): 510–512. 
5 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason 
(Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous 
Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).  
6 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 29. 
7 Ibid., 41. 
8 For consistency I have adopted Lakoff and Johnson’s use of caps to denote conceptual 
domains or image schemas. 
! 11!
all kinds (rooms, cups, our bodies, etc.), is used as a “source domain” to structure our 
understanding of arguments (among many other “target domains”) in the conceptual 
metaphor ARGUMENTS ARE CONTAINERS, giving rise to expressions like “I’m tired of 
your empty arguments” and “that argument has holes in it.”9  Or, more pertinently, 
VERTICALITY, emerging naturally from the orientation of our bodies in our 
environment, then structures our experience and conceptualization of, inter alia, PITCH, 
yielding the (verbalizable) perception and comprehension of, for instance, an ascending 
melody.  Though the theories arose from and are evidenced largely by linguistic 
analysis, image schemas are asserted to be “psychologically real”10 and conceptual 
metaphor “one of the chief cognitive structures by which we are able to have coherent, 
ordered experiences that we can reason about and make sense of.”11 
Music scholars of varied stripes have gravitated to these and related findings—
known broadly as “cognitive semantics”—and have steadily incorporated them into 
their research.  Notably, on the heels of Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal Metaphors We 
Live By, Steven Feld applied this new brand of linguistic-cum-cognitive analysis to his 
study of the language used by the Kaluli of Papa New Guinea to refer to their music.12  
Interest and work in cognitive semantic applications to musicology burgeoned in the 
mid-90s: an influential article by Janna Saslaw uncovering the image-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live by (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980), 92. Throughout, emphasis is original unless otherwise noted. 
10 Raymond W. Gibbs and Herbert. L. Colston, “The Cognitive Psychological Reality of Image 
Schemas and Their Transformations,” Cognitive Linguistics 6, no. 4 (1995): 347–378. 
11 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xv. 
12 Steven Feld, “‘Flow like a Waterfall’: The Metaphors of Kaluli Musical Theory,” Yearbook for 
Traditional Music 13 (1981): 22. 
! 12!
schematic/conceptual metaphor underpinnings of Riemann’s theory of modulation, a 
special session at the Society for Music Theory’s annual conference, and a dedicated 
issue of Theory and Practice signaled the emergence of cognitive musicology proper.  In 
the past decade and a half, scholars have extended the purview of these twin 
paradigms to semiotics and gesture (Hatten, Lidov), musical force and space (Larson, 
Cox), music-text relationships (Zbikowski), music analysis (Brower, Bauer, Bhogal), 
history of theory (Saslaw, Zbikowski), musical ontology (Butterfield, Zbikowski), 
ethnomusicology (Naroditskaya), musical meaning (Chuck, Borgo, Cox), and the 
psychology of music perception (Eitan et al.).13 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Robert S. Hatten, “A Theory of Musical Gesture and Its Application to Beethoven and 
Schubert,” in Music and Gesture, eds. Anthony Gritten and Elaine King (Ashgate Publishing, 
Ltd., 2006), 1-23; Robert S. Hatten, Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, 
Beethoven, Schubert (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); David Lidov, “Emotive 
Gesture in Music and Its Contraries,” in Music And Gesture, ed. Anthony Gritten and Elaine 
King (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 24-44; Mark Johnson and Steve Larson, “‘Something 
in the Way She Moves’: Metaphors of Musical Motion,” Metaphor and Symbol 18, no. 2 (2003): 
63–84; Steve Larson, Musical Forces: Motion, Metaphor, and Meaning in Music (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2012); Candace Brower, “Pathway, Blockage, and Containment in 
Density 21.5,” Theory and Practice 22/23 (1997-8): 35–54; Janna  Saslaw, “Far out: 
Intentionality and Image Schema in the Reception of Early Works by Ornette Coleman,” 
Current Musicology, no. 69 (2000): 97–117; Janna Saslaw, “Life Forces: Conceptual Structures 
in Schenker’s Free Composition and Schoenberg’s The Musical Idea,” Theory and Practice 22–
23 (1997): 17–33; Saslaw, “Forces, Containers, and Paths”; Zbikowski, “Musicology, 
Cognitive Science, and Metaphor”; Zbikowski, “Metaphor and Music”; Lawrence Michael 
Zbikowski, Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, and Analysis, AMS Studies in Music 
(Oxford!and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Zbikowski, “Conceptual Models and 
Cross-Domain Mapping”; Matthew Butterfield, “The Musical Object Revisited,” Music 
Analysis 21, no. 3 (2002): 327 – 380; Feld, “‘Flow like a Waterfall’”; Inna Naroditskaya, 
“Azerbaijani Mugham and Carpet: Cross-Domain Mapping,” Ethnomusicology Forum 14, no. 1 
(2005): 25–55; Arnie Cox, “Embodying Music: Principles of the Mimetic Hypothesis,” Music 
Theory Online 17, no. 2 (2011); Arnie Cox, “The Mimetic Hypothesis and Embodied Musical 
Meaning,” Musicae Scientiae 5, no. 2 (2001): 195–212; Zohar Eitan and Roni Y. Granot, “How 
Music Moves,” Music Perception 23, no. 3 (2006): 221–248. 
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Despite this popularity and widespread influence, the adoption of image schema 
and conceptual metaphor theory has been all but uncritical.14  To wit, the substantial 
“disagreement, and even confusion, about what image-schemas are, and what the term 
refers to”15 even among its leading proponents, as well as trenchant challenges by 
experts in related fields, have not been represented or accounted for. In what follows I 
offer a critique of the two focal theories of cognitive musicology—conceptual metaphor 
theory in chapter 1, and image schema theory in chapter 2.16   After reprising, 
extending, and at times refining incisive criticisms leveled by other cognitive linguists, 
cognitive scientists, and philosophers, I offer a phenomenological appraisal.  Though 
my proximate objective is critique, my deeper concerns as a theorist are largely 
sympathetic with those of cognitive musicology, chief among which is to stress the 
fundamentally embodied nature of musical meaning.  My claim is that image schema 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 To my knowledge, the only traces of critical engagement are in David Lidov, “Emotive 
Gesture in Music and Its Contraries,” in Music And Gesture, ed. Anthony Gritten and Elaine 
King (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 38–39., where he suggests two minor alterations to 
Johnson’s theory, Deanna Kemler, “Music and Embodied Imaging: Metaphor and Metonomy 
in Western Art Music” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2001), where she questions the 
appropriateness of metaphor (i.e. “transfer”) as the right metaphor for the phenomenon, 
suggesting metonymy instead, and in Saslaw, “Forces, Containers, and Paths,” 237–38, where 
she defends Lakoff against  an anthropological critique by Quinn (see fn. 52 below). 
15 Joseph E. Grady, “Image Schemas and Perception: Refining a Definition,” in From Perception 
to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics, ed. Beate Hampe and Joseph E. Grady 
(Berlin!; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 36. Grady is a proponent of image schema 
theory.  Consider also the assertion of one of the field’s leading figures, Raymond Gibbs: “I 
recently attended a conference on empirical methods in cognitive linguistics…and there was 
little consensus as to what these things were and how they functioned in linguistic structure 
and behavior.” Raymond W. Gibbs, “The Pyschological Status of Image Schemas,” in From 
Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics, ed. Beate Hampe and Joseph E. 
Grady, 29 (Berlin!; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 114. 
16 I emphasize that this is not a comprehensive account of the many and varied endeavors 
subsumed by cognitive musicology, only a focused critique of two theories which form the 
foundation of much work so labeled.   
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and conceptual metaphor theory fail to provide a theoretically or phenomenologically 
sound ground on which to build an embodied theory of meaning.     
 
* 
 
Though the centerpiece of Lakoff and Johnson’s (hereafter L&J) joint work began as 
conceptual metaphor, the implications of their findings have grown into an entire 
theory of mind, body, and meaning.  Since their seminal Metaphors We Live By (1980, 
hereafter MWLB), the linguist and philosopher have framed their thought as a radical 
break from and critique of the long-dominant “objectivist” tradition in Western 
philosophy.  Tenets of that paradigm include: 
 
• “The world is made up of objects that have properties independent of observers.”17 
• “Meaning is an abstract relation between symbolic representations (either words or mental 
representations) and objective (i.e. mind-independent) reality.  These symbols get their 
meaning solely by virtue of their capacity to correspond to things, properties, and relations 
existing objectively in the world.”18 
• “Thought is abstract and disembodied, since it is independent of any limitations of the human 
body, the human perceptual system, and the human nervous system.”19  
• “It is…incidental to the nature of meaningful concepts and reason that human beings have 
the bodies they have and function in their environment in the way they do.”20 
• “Concepts are ‘disembodied’ in the sense that they are not tied to the particular mind that 
experiences them...”21 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 186. 
18 Johnson, The Body in the Mind., xxii. 
19 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, xiii. 
20 Ibid. 
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• “The most basic or fundamental level of description of reality is that of literal terms and 
propositions…. It follows that metaphorical statements cannot constitute a basic or 
fundamental level.”22  
 
Contra this orthodoxy that has ruled Western culture and philosophy “from the 
Presocratics to the present day,”23 L&J champion an approach alternately called 
“embodied realism” and “experientialism,” principles of which include: 
 
• “Reason is embodied in that our fundamental forms of inference arise from sensorimotor 
and other body-based forms of inference. 
• Reason is imaginative in that bodily inference forms are mapped onto abstract modes of 
inference by metaphor. 
• Mental structures are intrinsically meaningful by virtue of their connection to our bodies 
and our embodied experience. 
• Conceptual structure arises from our sensorimotor experience and the neural structures 
that give rise to it.”24 
 
Before considering the details of these and related philosophical commitments, 
several observations on the general program and posture of L&J are worth noting.  
Given the consciously controversial, at times even polemical, nature of their 
enterprise,25 along with its broad impact, it is curious that few philosophers have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xxii. 
22 Ibid., 66. 
23 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 195. 
24 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge 
to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 66. 
25 For example, the subtitle of the their 1999 Philosophy in the Flesh reads  “The Embodied Mind 
and its Challenge to Western Thought”, and a subchapter of MWLB is titled “The Irrelevance 
of Objectivist Philosophy to Human Concerns.” Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh; 
Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 217.  
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seriously taken up their challenge.  Though L&J would probably attribute this 
absence to the very subversiveness of their claims, predictably ignored or reflexively 
dismissed by the academic establishment,26 it is possible, and I will argue likely, that it 
is rather the result of various fundamental inadequacies of their theory.  One of these 
concerns the characterization of the putative tradition that is their foil.  As Michiel 
Leezenberg summarizes in Contexts of Metaphor: 
 
Much of its argument against “objectivist semantics”…is phrased in such sweeping 
terms as to be hardly worth taking seriously.  Lakoff and Johnson often resort to straw 
man argumentation, and rarely explicitly ascribe specific doctrines to specific authors; 
worse, where they do, they seriously distort the views they criticize by numerous errors 
of a rather elementary nature.  The “objectivist tradition” they fulminate against is not 
“fundamentally misguided” or “humanly irrelevant” but simply nonexistent.27 
 
Of greater concern is a lack of systematic and terminological clarity in their theory: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 “It is not surprising that someone raised with the traditional view would continue to deny or 
ignore this evidence, since to accept it would require large-scale revisions of the way she 
understands not only metaphor but concepts, meaning, language, knowledge, and truth as 
well.” Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 245-6. 
27 Michiel Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor (Amsterdam!; New York: Elsevier, 2001), 137. See 
also Verena Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy: Challenging Cognitive 
Semantics (Berlin!; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), ch.4; Ray Jackendoff and David 
Aaron, “Review Article: More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor, by 
George Lakoff an Mark Turner.,” Language 67, no. 2 (1991): 321–322; Leezenberg, Contexts of 
Metaphor, 139–140; Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, ch.5.  Alongside 
their misrepresentation of foregoing scholarship is a neglect of both precursors to their 
approach and other versions of their basic critique.  See Michael K. Smith, “Metaphor and 
Mind,” American Speech 57, no. 2 (1982): 130–32.  
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On the whole… cognitive semantics is hardly satisfactory as a theory.  To begin with, 
central notions like “meaning,” “culture,” “rationality,” and “imagination” are largely left 
undefined, or are defined rather carelessly.28  
 
Indeed, an ambiguous notion of “structure” will be seen to subtend a central difficulty 
in L&J’s account of metaphorical mapping.  Issues considered essential to any 
semantic theory—e.g. how listeners arrive at particular interpretations of metaphors 
from among numerous possibilities—are handled unsatisfactorily or not at all.  
Further, the psychological necessity of image schemas and conceptual metaphors is 
never sufficiently motivated.  Finally, I will argue that as a result of the above 
problems, the at best vague criteria for both positing and substantiating particular 
conceptual metaphors, and the dependence on just-so stories of experiential grounding, 
the theories afford no possibility of negative evidence, that is, they are non-falsifiable.  
To support these admittedly weighty accusations, let us turn to L&J’s original 
exposition of conceptual metaphor.  
The mission of MWLB is to demonstrate that metaphor is an underlying mental 
phenomenon and only derivatively a linguistic one, that it is grounded in experience, 
and that it is a basic structuring principle of thought and action.29  As L&J have it, 
“[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another.”30  More specifically, it is the “partial structuring” of a “less clearly delineated” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 138.  See pp.141-143 for a critique of L&J's "culture" and 
Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, ch.5 for "meaning."   
29 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 153. 
30 Ibid., 5. 
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conceptual domain by a “more clearly delineated” one. 31  To take one of their 
workhorse examples, L&J claim that the concept ARGUMENT is structured by the 
concept WAR, generating everyday expressions such as: 
 
Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
I’ve never won an argument with him.32 
 
L&J emphasize that the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR does not determine 
merely the way we talk about arguments, but the very way we conceive of (“we see the 
person we are arguing with as an opponent”), experience (“we can actually win or lose 
an argument”), and perform in them (“we attack his position and defend our own”).33 
Notice, however, that a statement like “I outflanked the ground invasion of his 
counterclaims,” though perhaps intelligible, would not be a normal expression of the 
underlying metaphor.  L&J accordingly distinguish between the “used” and “unused” 
parts of the source domain as pertains its structuring of a target domain.34  Though the 
latter is not involved in the structuring, it can be exploited to create novel expressions 
(for better or worse) like the one above.35      
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Ibid., 59. 
32 Ibid., 5. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 52. 
35  Puzzlingly, L&J use the terms “literal” and “figurative” to characterize expressions 
emanating from the “used” and “unused” parts of the mapping, respectively.  Similarly, in the 
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ARGUMENT IS WAR and similar conceptual metaphors—e.g. TIME IS MONEY 
(“budget your time”36), LOVE IS MADNESS (“I’m crazy about her”37)—are but one of three 
types of metaphorical concepts.  Whereas these “structural” metaphors structure one 
concept in terms of another, “orientational” metaphors ‘organize a whole system of 
concepts with respect to one another,’ typically assigning a spatial orientation to a 
concept.38  These assignments are not arbitrary but based on bodily and cultural 
experience.   Thus, because “[d]rooping posture typically goes along with sadness and 
depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state,” we have HAPPY IS UP (“I’m 
feeling up”) and SAD IS DOWN (“My spirits sank”).39  L&J argue for an “external 
systematicity” to these pervasive and often unnoticed metaphors: “GOOD IS UP gives an 
UP orientation to general well-being, and this orientation is coherent with special cases 
like HAPPY IS UP, HEALTH IS UP, ALIVE IS UP, CONTROL IS UP.”40 
The third type of metaphor, the “ontological,” comes in a few varieties: “entity 
and substance” metaphors confer physicality on abstract phenomena like events, 
emotions, activities, and ideas (e.g. “Inflation is lowering our standard of living” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
context of ARGUMENT IS WAR, they refer to expressions such as “attack a position” and other 
“conventional ways of talking about arguments” as literal (Ibid., 5).  They mean to stress that 
such expressions are just the regular, automatic, prosaic ways of talking about arguments (i.e. 
what we might reflexively call “literal”).  Of course the whole point of their book is to show 
how thoroughly metaphorical, i.e. figurative, our normal language is.  The choice of 
terminology here, the confusion of the central dichotomy which is their goal to reformulate, is 
infelicitous to say the least.  
36 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 8. 
37 Ibid., 49. 
38 Ibid., 14. 
39 Ibid., 14–15. 
40 Ibid., 18. 
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(INFLATION IS AN ENTITY), “You’ve got too much hostility in you” (HOSTILITY IS A 
SUBSTANCE));41 “container” metaphors construe similar phenomena and (relatively 
unbounded) physical areas as bounded space s or objects (e.g. “Are you in the race?” 
(RACES ARE CONTAINERS), “We’re out of trouble now” (TROUBLE IS A CONTAINER), “I 
have him in sight” (VISUAL FIELDS ARE CONTAINERS)); 42  and “personification” 
metaphors (e.g. “Life has cheated me” (LIFE IS A PERSON), “This fact argues against the 
standard theories” (FACTS ARE PEOPLE)).43   
Ontological metaphors arise naturally from our “experiences with physical 
objects (especially our own bodies).”44  For example, from the experience of oneself as 
a “container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation…we project our own 
in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces.”45  
All three types of metaphor are grounded in “systematic correlates within our 
experience.”46  Orientational metaphors arise from correlations between the more 
“sharply delineated” conceptual structure of spatial orientations (which emerge 
directly from perceptual-motor functioning, e.g. UP) and the “less clearly delineated” 
realm of emotional experience (e.g. HAPPY). 47   Similarly, the concepts/domains 
OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, and CONTAINER, which emerge directly from experience with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Ibid., 26. 
42 Ibid., 30–32. 
43 Ibid., 33. 
44 Ibid., 25. 
45 Ibid., 29. 
46 Ibid., 58. 
47 Ibid., 57–58. 
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instances of the same (prominently our bodies’ objecthood, substantiality, and 
boundedness) correlate with certain less clearly delineated experiences.  For example, 
“[t]he TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT metaphor is based on the correlation between an 
object moving toward us and the time it takes to get to us.”48  Analogously, in 
“structural” metaphors, the less concrete concept, e.g. LABOR, is structured by the 
more concrete concept, e.g. RESOURCE, with which it correlates experientially (i.e. “In 
general, the more labor you perform, the more you produce.”).49 
Although “we typically conceptualize the nonphysical [i.e. less clearly delineated 
and usually more abstract] in terms of the physical [i.e. more clearly delineated and 
usually more concrete],” this does not imply that the latter is more experientially basic, 
only more conceptually basic. 50   Emphasizing the essential role of experiential 
grounding, L&J explain that the “IS” (or “ARE”) in their verbal representations of 
conceptual metaphors is a shorthand for the experiential correlations that generate 
them.51 
 
* 
 
For the purposes of my critique, I differentiate two chief maneuvers in L&J’s 
program, the first positing linguistic metaphor as evidence of conceptual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Ibid., 58. 
49 Ibid., 65. 
50 Ibid., 59. The identification of “clearly delineated” with “physical” and “usually more 
concrete” is L&J’s. See Ibid., 108-9. 
51 Ibid., 20. 
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metaphor and the second explicating the derivation and dynamics of 
metaphorical mappings.  I will assess these in turn.  
 
From Language to Thought 
 
L&J’s undertaking rests on two related philosophical commitments concerning the 
relationship of language to thought: first, that thought, specifically concepts, is 
logically prior to language, and second, that it is possible to infer the structure of the 
former from the patterns of the latter.  As these are classic, well-debated issues, it is 
beyond the purview of this chapter to rehearse arguments on either side, or those in 
the middle, or to champion one view or another.  It is worth noting, however, that 
neither position is explicitly stated or defended by L&J.  This omission conceals the 
contentiousness of their claims and methods.  To wit, there are several reasons to be 
skeptical of the tacit theoretical underpinning of their project.  
Leezenberg highlights an epistemological complication attending the assertion of 
conceptual priority: 
[P]reconceptual structure, which Lakoff and Johnson claim to be directly meaningful, is 
in fact meaningful only given a culturally determined background…. Moreover, this 
background cannot even be fully articulated and structured without linguistic means…. 
In other words, conceptual structure is not wholly prior to linguistic expression or 
linguistically conveyed meaning even at the allegedly basic level.52 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 142.  Though L&J nod to the constitutive role of culture in 
experience and concept formation (Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 57), they fail to 
systematically address it or, as Leezenberg points out, consider its ramifications for conceptual 
priority. This difficulty speaks to L&J’s overall handling of cultural factors, which I will not 
deal with explicitly in this critique.  See Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, chs. 1 and 4 for a 
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As for the second philosophical commitment, inferring conceptual structure from 
linguistic utterances is a precarious and perhaps inevitably speculative endeavor.  
Recall Sapir and Whorf’s (in)famous hypothesis concerning Inuit words and 
supposedly corresponding concepts for “snow.” on the basis of his claim that language 
influences mental distinctions and categories, Whorf held that Eskimos, who (appear 
to) have more words for “snow” than English speakers, must have correspondingly 
more ways of thinking about the phenomenon.  Yet the only evidence given for the 
supposed cognitive difference is linguistic, namely the very same facts about Eskimo 
words for “snow.”  Cognitive semantics critics Gregory Murphy and Matthew 
McGlone have argued that this circularity, which undid the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis, is 
at play in L&J.  Namely, L&J’s groupings of linguistic expressions suggest certain 
conceptual underpinnings, the only predictions of which are those very linguistic 
expressions.  Language cannot serve, as Murphy puts it, as “both the predictor…and 
the predicted data.”53 
Absent independent (i.e. non-linguistic) corroboration of the former, the latter can 
at best be suggestive.  How can one verifiably determine from language alone how “far 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
thorough theoretical treatment. From a more empirical perspective, Naomi Quinn (“The 
Cultural Basis of Metaphor,” in Beyond Metaphor: The Theory of Tropes in Anthropology, ed. James 
W. Fernández (Stanford University Press, 1991), 56–93) examined the role of culture in 
American English speakers’ metaphors for marriage, similarly challenging L&J’s treatment of 
culture.  “…I think, quite contrary to what Johnson and Lakoff seem to be saying, that 
metaphorical systems or productive metaphors typically do not structure understandings de 
novo.  Rather, particular metaphors are selected by speakers, and are favored by these 
speakers, just because they provide satisfying mappings onto already existing cultural 
understandings. (Ibid., 65)  She argues further that speakers’ “understanding of this story [i.e. 
their beliefs] about marriage exists, for them, independently of the metaphors they use to talk 
about marriage.” (Ibid., 68) 
53 Gregory L. Murphy, “On Metaphoric Representation,” Cognition 60, no. 2 (1996): 183.  See 
also McGlone, “What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?,” 114–15. 
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down” metaphor goes? Or if its hypostatization at the essentially hidden conceptual 
level is warranted?  To the question “how do you know we conceptualize argument as 
war?” it is not enough to reply “because we speak of it that way.”  Further difficulties 
with the linguistic evidence, considered presently, will bolster this skepticism. 
In the scheme of metaphor studies, the range of linguistic phenomena considered 
metaphorical by L&J is exceptionally broad.  Many usages asserted by L&J to be 
metaphorical, for example “Inflation has gone up” (an instance of both the ontological 
metaphor INFLATION IS A SUBSTANCE and the orientational metaphor MORE IS UP54), 
are understood instead by many scholars to be instances of polysemy.  That is to say 
that the meaning of “gone up,”—or, more generally, “to rise”—is general enough to 
cover increases in various dimensions.  Charles Ruhl, for example, argues against 
views like L&J’s that, without justification, differentiate multiple meanings where a 
single definition, “unspecified for concrete or abstract.”55  The same has been argued 
for words like “have” and “in” in expressions like “I have troubles” and “I’m in trouble” 
(putative instances of ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS and STATES ARE LOCATIONS 
respectively)56—namely that they can refer, non-metaphorically, to attributes and 
psychological states as well as objects and locations.57  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 171. 
55 Charles Ruhl, On Monosemy: A Study in Linguistic Semantics (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), vii-
xiv, 29 
56 George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” in Metaphor and Thought, ed. 
Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 225. 
57 McGlone, “What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?,” 123. 
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L&J’s motivation for narrowing the literal meaning of “rise” and most other words 
to their strictly physical uses is plain: it accords with their central claim that our 
conceptual system is thoroughly metaphorical and that abstract reasoning takes place 
via cross-domain mapping from “more clearly delineated” (i.e. physical) arenas of 
experience to “less clearly delineated” ones (i.e. nonphysical).  The psychologist 
Gregory Murphy challenges this physicalist bias: 
 
L&J assume (rather than explicitly argue) that the real meaning of rise is physical rising, 
and any other kind of increase is a metaphorical meaning. This assumption turns out to 
be much the same as their theory of concepts applied to language; namely, it says that 
only simple physical experiences can be directly encoded in linguistic meaning, and 
nonphysical or abstract relations must be expressed via metaphor. Thus, their claim that 
Inflation is rising is metaphoric is basically an assumption of their theory, rather than 
evidence for it.58  
 
Many scholars of semantics and pragmatics, moreover, challenge the notion of 
literality altogether, resting as it does on an idealization of linguistic meaning as fixed, 
stable, and decontextualized. 59  Both language’s inherent semantic fluidity and 
imprecision and its ineluctable context-dependence argue against what Leezenberg 
characterizes as a folk-mythological misconception that nonetheless remains a common !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Murphy, “On Metaphoric Representation,” 189.  More generally, Leezenberg argues: 
“[C]ognitive semantics presupposes that the domains of ‘concrete’ physical experience and 
‘abstract’ reasoning and conceptualizing are distinct, even disjunct, classes.  This requires the 
language user to realize that these cognitive domains are distinct from each other before she 
can even begin to conceptualize abstract domains of experience metaphorically…In other 
words, cognitive semantics presupposes precisely what it should explain: the emergence of 
clearly delimited, distinct cognitive domains between which metaphorical transfers are to take 
place.” Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 144. 
59 Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 295–304. 
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methodological assumption.60  Leezenberg claims further that, despite various attempts 
(e.g. Searle, Davidson), “no strict distinction between literal and metaphorical can be 
made at either the empirical level of linguistic behavior, or at the theoretical level of 
semantics or concepts.”61  That L&J do not argue for the fundamental distinction on 
which their theory trades is problematic.  That they operate with just such a static, 
decontextualized view of language and concepts as has been widely discredited is not 
only troublesome, but aligns them with the “objectivist” thinking that they so 
vociferously attack.62  
Several commentators have noted that L&J’s ontological metaphors are 
conventionally understood more simply as reifications of abstract concepts rather than 
figurative extensions.63  More importantly, even by L&J’s definition, these should not 
qualify as true metaphors as it is difficult to see how certain rather vague ontological 
source domains (e.g. ENTITY, SUBSTANCE, etc.) are “more clearly delineated” than the 
target domains they are meant to structure (e.g. INFLATION, RUNNING, etc.).  This of 
course begs the question of what is meant by “clearly-delineated.”  As with many core 
terms and concepts that L&J casually employ without rigorously defining, “clearly 
delineated” is presented as a self-evident, commonsensical notion.  The nearest they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 See Ibid., 300–01, where he briefly sketches the history of this folk theory of literal meaning 
from Genesis to Plato to the present day.  
61 Ibid., 301.  Leezenberg bases his conclusions on several studies of categorization and 
metaphor in non-literate, non-urbanized societies, and of the effect of literacy on 
conceptualization.   
62 That they endorse such a stable ontology of meaning is seen not only in their hard distinction 
between and ready enumeration of literal and figurative meanings, but also in their 
characterizing essential features of particular concepts (e.g. WAR, JOURNEY, etc.). 
63 Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 140. 
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come to a definition is in their discussion of those kinds of experience that are 
“understood directly:”  
 
While our emotional experience is as basic as our spatial and perceptual experience, our 
emotional experiences are much less sharply delineated in terms of what we do with our 
bodies.  Although a sharply delineated conceptual structure for space emerges from our 
perceptual-motor functioning, no sharply defined conceptual structure for the emotions 
emerges from our emotional functioning alone.64 [emphasis added] 
 
Even granting for now the equation of perceptual-motor structure with conceptual 
delineation,65 many putative ontological metaphors still do not deserve the name.  In 
what sense are our experiences with entities or substances “sharply delineated in terms 
of what we do with our bodies”?  Surely those categories are far too general to afford 
any meaningful specification of our perceptual-motor dealings with them.  And surely 
running (or RUNNING), for example, already implicates a highly structured bodily 
relation.  Furthermore, what possible experiential correlation could be posited between 
SUBSTANCE and RUNNING (and other metaphors of the kind) that could provide the 
requisite grounding for the conceptual metaphor? 
Ontological metaphors, on L&J’s account, allow us to refer to, quantify, and 
identify features of certain experiences.66  But it is not clear in many cases why those 
purposes could not have been served without conferring substantiality or objecthood !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 57–58. 
65 This claim is not fleshed out until L&J’s 1987 publications and so will be taken up in chapter 
2. 
66 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 25–27. 
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on the experience.  Would it not suffice, for example, to understand inflation simply as 
the phenomenon that it (literally) is in order to comprehend (to use L&J’s example) 
the phrase “more inflation”?  Must it, in other words, be an ENTITY for there to be more 
or less of it?67 
 L&J’s enlargement of the jurisdiction of metaphor results in many other strained 
and counterintuitive analyses, several discussed below.  This is not merely an issue of 
particular interpretive differences.  Rather, one wonders generally about the value of 
an approach that treats phrases as straightforward as “That was a beautiful catch,” and 
“Did you see the race?” as metaphorical. 68   “There is an ironic quality to its 
shortcomings,” McGlone incisively summarizes: 
  
[T]he view trumpets the importance of metaphor in human cognition, yet its major flaw 
is a hyper-literal construal of the relationship between metaphoric language and 
thought…. 
 Paradoxically, Lakoff couples this hyper-literal model of metaphor understanding to a 
hyper-metaphoric construal of literal language.69  
 
 The deficiencies of L&J’s linguistic evidence, which consists of short lists of 
conventional expressions, extend beyond the interpretive ones above.  Focusing on the 
inevitable incompleteness of L&J’s collections of expressions, the psychologist Andrew 
Ortony accuses L&J of methodological legerdemain: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Ibid., 26.  Similarly for “There is so much hatred…”, “…a lot of political power” etc.   
68 Ibid., “catch” and “race” being ontologized in these examples as OBJECTS. 
69 McGlone, “What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?,” 122–23. 
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Perhaps the failure to address this issue has to do with the fact that the method puts the 
cart before the horse…. The method is advertised as a discovery procedure, but is in 
reality a hypothesis confirmation procedure…. 
  What is lacking are constraints on examples and constraints on the metaphors from 
which they allegedly derive…. As it is, we simply do not know how many missing cases 
there might be, and whether missing cases would merely reflect incompleteness, or 
whether they would actually constitute counter-evidence. 70 
 
 This important issue raises another: what would constitute counter-evidence to the 
existence of specific conceptual metaphors?  Two possibilities come to mind: usages 
that appear to contradict a putative conceptual metaphor (e.g. if happiness were 
correlated with a “down” term) and instances of typical source domain language that 
do not appear to instantiate the conceptual meaning (e.g. where “in” seems not to 
involve CONTAINER or a correlated domain).71     
 As an example of the former, if GOOD IS UP and CONTROL IS UP, then we seem to 
be “messing” in the wrong direction (however fittingly).  If HEALTH IS UP, shouldn’t 
one be “shaken down” after a trauma? Why do couples and cell phone calls “break !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Andrew Ortony, “Are Emotion Metaphors Conceptual or Lexical?,” Cognition & Emotion 2, 
no. 2 (1988): 99–100. See also Ruhl, On Monosemy, xiv. 
71 One might object to the latter proposal, claiming that conceptual metaphor theory does not 
require every “in” to instantiate CONTAINER, every “up” VERTICALITY, etc.   I would argue 
that while L&J do not explicitly state this entailment, neither do they state any other principle 
that would contradict it.  Furthermore, given the keystone claim that our conceptual system is 
“fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 4) and 
pervaded by just such basic orientational and ontological metaphors, the burden not only to 
state that there are exceptions but to justify them rests squarely on L&J.  In other words, if it 
were the case that only certain instances of “in” (or “up,” etc.) and not others invoked 
CONTAINER (or VERTICALITY, etc.), then a compelling rationale for that distinction would be 
needed.  
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up”? For that matter, what would it mean at all for something to break “up”?  In other 
words, as opposed to “breaking down,” for which L&J could posit the tendency of 
broken things to fall to the earth, what experiential correlation could possibly ground 
“breaking up”?  As an example of the latter, in what sense do “holed up,” “shut up,” 
“make up” (either to invent or to reconcile), “close up,” “what’s up,” “meet up,” “wash  
up”, “show up,” “let up,” “beat up,” or “three up” (as in “tied at three”), to name just a 
few, derive their meaning from, or instantiate whatsoever, the concept/schema 
VERTICALITY?72  
 L&J generally deal with the former type by postulating a different conceptual 
metaphor for the seemingly inconsistent expression.  As they do not appear to 
acknowledge the latter type as such, they treat expressions like these as they would 
any other non-literal “up” expression, namely as implying a conceptual metaphor.  This 
often results in implausible or incoherent interpretations, as the following two cases 
exemplify. 
The latter strategy can be seen in their explanation of the phrase “what’s up:” 
 
FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP (and AHEAD) All up coming events are listed in 
the paper. What's coming up this week? I'm afraid of what's up ahead of us. What's up? 
Physical basis: Normally our eyes look in the direction in which we typically move 
(ahead, forward). As an object approaches a person (or the person approaches the 
object), the object appears larger. Since the ground is perceived as being fixed, the top 
of the object appears to be moving upward in the person's field of vision.73 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 One could equally cite examples for other orientational terms: “show off,” “mouth off,” “dry 
off,” “top off,” etc.  
73 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 16. 
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Even granting the conceptual metaphor and its experiential basis, “what’s up” cannot 
be explained by it as that expression refers predominantly to the present (“what is 
happening”), sometimes to the imperfect past (“what has been going on”), but not to 
the future.   
 A more systemic problem can be seen in their discussions of UNKNOWN IS UP; 
KNOWN IS DOWN:  
 
This conceptual metaphor can be seen in examples like: 
 
That's still up in the air.  
I'd like to raise some questions about that.  
That settles the question. It's still up for grabs. Let's bring it up for discussion. 
 
And the reason that the verb come is used in come up with an answer is that the answer is 
conceptualized as starting out DOWN and ending where we are, namely, UP.74   
 
In this example, the last sentence is meant to forestall a potential objection to 
UNKNOWN IS UP on the basis of the apparently conflicting expression “come up with an 
answer.”  Their preemptive counterargument is that the phrase is nonetheless 
consistent with the reigning conceptual metaphor (i.e. KNOWN IS DOWN) and that the 
“up” in the expression, being paired with “come,” refers to the journey of the answer 
from DOWN (i.e. KNOWN) to the subject/speaker.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Ibid., 137. 
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At least three problems beset this explanation.  First, the expression contradicts its 
supposed conceptual basis.  Namely, if their story were correct, the expression should 
be “the answer came up to me,” not “I came up with the answer.”  Second, one “comes 
up” with questions as well as answers, among other things.  But questions, signifying 
UNKNOWN, cannot rise from below (i.e. KNOWN) to us. Their rationale implies, then, 
that the “up” for questions is different (i.e. has a different experiential/conceptual 
basis) than the “up” for answers.  Though this falls short of contradiction, it is a rather 
counterintuitive and convoluted interpretation.  Third, according to the experiential 
origin story—i.e. “it's easier to grasp something and look at it carefully [thereby 
understanding it] if it's on the ground in a fixed location than if it's floating through 
the air”75—we, the graspers/understanders, are DOWN on the ground.  Yet in the above 
story for “come up with an answer” we are UP, as opposed to the ground.  Somehow, 
then, the governing conceptual metaphor is (made) able to cover an expression whose 
conceptual scheme actually inverts its own. 
Contemporaneously with MWLB, Susan Lindner offered a more systematic study 
and explanation of just these types of orientational metaphors.  Her 1981 dissertation 
examined some 1800 VPC’s (Verb-Particle Constructions, e.g. “wake up,” “pick out”), 
including 1200 with “up,” within the framework of Langacker’s “space grammar,” 
which, as the name suggests, is roughly compatible with conceptual metaphor theory.  
(Johnson, in fact, borrows Lindner’s “out” schemata for his 1987 The Body in the Mind.)  
Her aim is to demonstrate the meaningfulness, whether concrete or abstract, of these 
particles and, moreover, to postulate a comprehensive, hierarchically unified network 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Ibid., 20. 
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of schematic meanings.  In particular she subsumes all “up” VPC’s under two UP 
schemas (“Vertical UP” and “Goal-oriented UP”), and their roughly two dozen varieties 
or sub-schemas (e.g. “Completive UP,” “UP as path from possession into access,” 
“Fastening and closure”) with nods to experiential bases and figurative elaborations 
thereof.   
Though many of her analyses and categorizations are compelling, I would contend 
her project suffers from two deficiencies also applicable to L&J’s.  First, particular 
semantic interpretations seem forced to fit her hypothesis.  To substantiate her 
subcategory of “replicate trajectors” (a type of “Reflexive UP,” itself a type of “Goal-
oriented UP”), for instance, she claims that what differentiates “connect up” from 
“connect” is directness, so that while “connecting” two wires could involve an 
intermediate wire, “connecting” them “up” necessarily connotes an unmediated 
attachment.76  Of course I cannot demonstrate that this is not so, only pit my and 
several friends’ intuitions against hers and those of at least some of the dozen 
colleagues she consulted (consensus was not a prerequisite for inclusion).  
(Furthermore, that this disagreement, and many others like it, might be attributable to 
the 30 years and regional dialect that separate us is, I would argue, a significant 
problem for approaches that make conceptual claims about “English” as if it were 
stable across time and place.)  In others, she mistakes the semantic contribution of the 
particle for the contextual meaning of the expression.  For example, she uses the 
phrase “they wrote the party up in the paper” as an example of UP ‘denoting a change 
in someone’s opinion of something for the better’ (hence movement upward along a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Susan Lindner, “A Lexico-Semantic Analysis of English Verb Particle Constructions with 
Out and Up” (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 1981), 188. 
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metaphorical vertical axis).77  I would argue that “write up” (or what differentiates it 
from simply “write”) has nothing to do with praise or promotion (which “party” might 
mislead one to think), as anyone who has been “written up” for a speeding ticket can 
confirm.78   
Second, in order to incorporate such varied usages and meanings into a unified 
scheme, the latter is stretched so far and made so general as to hardly seem meaningful 
at all.  Lindner asserts that “UP paths have as either point of departure or as goal a 
region which we may call the region of interactive focus – the realm of shared 
experience, existence, action, function, conscious interaction and awareness.”79  With 
criteria this vague and inclusive (note especially that UP paths can be approaching or 
departing the region of interactive focus), it is hardly surprising that so many “up” 
VPC’s could be accounted for, especially given Lindner’s charitable interpretations.  
Lindner finds (or is compelled to find) UP in some obscure places often via tortuous 
conceptual logic.  She claims, for instance, that “giving up” involves ‘sacrificing’ or 
‘relinquishing’ to an implied “dominating force,” “pressure,” or “reason” (that is 
conceived as “above”).80  To explain “ate it up” as an example of “Completive UP,” the 
completion must be conceptually inverted so that “the processed region is the ghost of 
what was there before it was eaten.”81  Again, one cannot show that interpretations like 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Ibid., 159. 
78 See also “linked” v. “linked up” (Ibid., 186) and “took” v. “took up” (Ibid., 161). 
79 Lindner, “A Lexico-Semantic Analysis of English Verb Particle Constructions with Out and 
Up,” 171. 
80 Ibid., 170. 
81 Ibid., 195. 
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these are wrong, only submit that their strained quality points to a faulty hypothesis 
and a problematic hypothesis confirmation methodology.    
 L&J’s hyper-literal approach to language forces them to construct similarly 
tortured logics, exemplified above with “what’s up” and UNKNOWN IS UP; KNOWN IS 
DOWN.  Note, however, that none of my objections constitute a hard disproof of the 
theory itself.  The first example suggests only that the programmatic explanation of the 
expression “what’s up” is unsuccessful, not that one is inherently impossible.  And 
though their attempt to explain “come up with an answer” is tenuous, it is not 
technically refutable.  There is always another origin story to supply, another twist to 
the conceptual logic, another conceptual metaphor to posit to save L&J from 
contradiction.   
But this turns out to be not a strength of the theory, but a major weakness.  The 
kind of quasi-logic combined with just-so origin stories exemplified above is L&J’s 
modus operandi.  The generality and inherent relativity of schemas like UP-DOWN, IN-
OUT, etc. only lends further malleability to their interpretations.  These features, along 
with the lack of constraints on positing conceptual metaphors and the lack of evidential 
criteria for substantiating them, make their system so pliable, their rationales so 
amenable to convenient massaging as to render the theory non-falsifiable and, 
conversely, non-verifiable.  
Leaving these larger methodological issues aside, the linguistic evidence itself 
suffers from several limitations, not least of which that it falls short of substantiating 
L&J’s claims.  Strictly speaking, the most their lists can show is a possible association 
or thematic parallelism between certain expressions and certain concepts—possible 
because their particular groupings of expressions, though presented as self-evident, are 
! 36!
often open to entirely different, but no less plausible, interpretations. 82  The linguist 
Verena Haser, in her extended critique of cognitive semantics, offers just such a 
rearrangement of L&J’s evidence for ARGUMENT IS WAR.  In place of subsuming their 
various examples (here reduced to key words) under one conceptual metaphor, she 
offers three alternative source domains (and hence conceptual metaphors) for the same 
expressions:83 
 
Figure 1.1 Haser’s alternative groupings of ARGUMENT IS WAR 
 
There is no principle in their system that can prefer or prioritize their 
categorization over hers.  At stake, then, is “whether there is generally a fact of the 
matter as to which metaphorical concept(s) posited is (are) preferable.”84  Haser argues 
convincingly in the negative.  As L&J allow for the possibility of multiple source !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 147.  
83 Ibid., 174. 
84 Ibid., 176.  
! 37!
domains for the same target (e.g. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS MADNESS, etc.), one 
might counter that this presents no difficulty.  Recall, however, that L&J’s metaphors 
are meant to refer to a mental reality—i.e. that the posited source domain is actually 
accessed mentally in the creation and comprehension of relevant expressions. 85  
Furthermore, if all possible source domains for all figurative words used in the context 
of the target domain are accounted for (i.e. all source domains in which “win”, 
“defend”, etc. can be used literally), the number of conceptual metaphors at play 
proliferates and L&J’s account strains cognitive plausibility.86   
Equally importantly, Haser’s groupings call into question the very method and 
rationale for L&J’s positing ARGUMENT IS WAR at all.  Leaving aside the largely tacit 
criteria for determining the literality or figurality of usages, it is clear that every 
expression adduced to support ARGUMENT IS WAR can be traced to at least one 
different source domain. 87   Nor would these alternative domains be relatively 
impoverished or tenuous, as many more corroborating expressions can be instanced 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 E.g. Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” 245. 
86 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 176.  
87 See also Max Black, “Review of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson ‘Metaphors We Live 
By,’” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 40, no. 2 (1981): 209. 
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for each.88  Moreover, many of L&J’s examples, for instance “demolish” and “win,” do 
not appear to be even primarily connected to the domain of war.89 
How, then, do L&J arrive at WAR as the definitive source domain? The implicit 
claim is that the force of the linguistic evidence leads naturally to that determination, 
that the common denominator suggests itself.90   Yet, as has been argued, their 
classification of their collection is in fact far from self-evident or objective.  In other 
words, ARGUMENT IS WAR appears to be less the natural conclusion of the evidence 
than a largely unsupported assumption of the theory.  As Haser puts it, “[c]onceptual 
metaphors reflect the preconceived grid superimposed by linguists on actual linguistic 
expressions…disparate source domains will be posited depending on the selection of 
items taken into consideration.  Which source concept will be chosen is largely a 
matter of ad hoc decisions.”91 
Several commentators have also questioned the designation, or rather, seeming 
arbitrariness of the category level for ARGUMENT IS WAR and conceptual metaphors 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 This is the “etc.” in Haser’s diagram.  See Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist 
Philosophy, 179–89.pp. 179-89 for extensive exemplification.  For the ARGUMENT IS GAME-
PLAYING, for instance, we have win, lose, gambit, trump card, lay one’s cards on the table, strategize, 
rules etc.  This is not to imply, however, that L&J require a minimum of expressions to justify 
the positing of a conceptual metaphor.  Indeed, their discussion on p.54 of MWLB arguably 
implies that a single expression may suffice. 
89 Ibid., 178.  Of course this begs the question of the method and rationale for determining 
literality/figurality.  Haser bases her assertions on etymology and intuition/common sense, 
which is at least as rigorous as L&J’s apparent criteria.    
90 Note, as asserted above, that the intuitive/psychological claim that we in fact conceptualize 
argument as war (and reason accordingly) cannot count as evidence, as the only proof of that 
hidden reality is, in turn, the linguistic expressions. 
91 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 192.  See also Leezenberg, Contexts 
of Metaphor, 140–41, who makes the same accusation about image schema determinations. 
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generally. 92   The determination of generality/specificity of domains is left 
unsystematized in MWLB.  Jackendoff and Aaron, in their review of Lakoff and 
Turner’s More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor, remark on the lack of 
justification for positing LIFE IS A FIRE for a particular phrase rather than the more 
general LIFE IS SOMETHING THAT GIVES OFF HEAT or the more specific LIFE IS A 
FLAME.93  This is not merely a semantic or technical concern, for these alternative 
source domains carry substantially divergent conceptual (and hence verbal) 
entailments.  Nor can one appeal to the coherence of the set of linguistic expressions to 
justify the category level of a source domain, as the very selection of that set has been 
shown to be somewhat arbitrary.  Thus the problem of category level is entangled in 
the problems of source domain attribution and linguistic expression selection presented 
above. 
Part of the reasoning for choosing WAR may in fact be given by L&J themselves, 
though unwittingly.  In a discussion of the difference between metaphorical 
structuring and subcategorization, L&J assert that the breadth of one’s literal concept 
of FIGHT (i.e. whether it includes psychological as well as physical dominance and 
pain), determines whether the formulation ARGUMENT IS FIGHT is a metaphor (if 
FIGHT is defined narrowly) or a subcategorization (if FIGHT is defined broadly), in 
which latter case ARGUMENT IS FIGHT would be literal, i.e. not a conceptual !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Jackendoff and Aaron, “Review Article: More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic 
Metaphor, by George Lakoff an Mark Turner,” 324–25; Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and 
Experientialist Philosophy, 177–79.   
93 Jackendoff and Aaron, “Review Article: More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic 
Metaphor, by George Lakoff an Mark Turner,” 324.  Similarly, Black wonders why L&J’s 
evidence for ARGUMENT IS WAR could not equally lead to formulations like AN ARGUMENT IS 
A DUEL or A VERBAL DISPUTE IS A BATTLE. Black, “Review of George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson ‘Metaphors We Live By,’” 209. 
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metaphor.94  In other words, ARGUMENT IS WAR, the centerpiece case of MWLB, may 
have been chosen over the more general (and for several reasons more sensible95) 
ARGUMENT IS FIGHT for the simple but crucial reason that the latter might not qualify, 
by L&J’s own criteria, as a conceptual metaphor. 
Despite these technical and conceptual deficiencies, somehow the intuitive appeal 
of conceptual metaphor theory (and the often underlying image schemas) persists.  
One does, after all, seem to feel embattled when in an intense argument.  Common 
sense wonders how one could speak of constructing a theory, falling in love, or wasting 
time and readily understand myriad other like expressions if there were no 
underpinning conceptual mapping?   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 84. 
95 To begin with, FIGHT is more inclusive than WAR without losing meaningful particulars 
(since the particulars of WAR which differentiate it from FIGHT basically coincide with the 
“unused” part of WAR anyway).  Furthermore, it is difficult to make the case that WAR is more 
concretely structured and experientially basic than ARGUMENT, a prerequisite for its ability to 
metaphorically structure it.  For one, we argue well before we are aware of war, but probably 
fight before we argue.  In fact, L&J struggle to make this argument by appealing to a 
speculative socio-evolutionary story wherein “we humans have evolved the social institution of 
verbal argument” as a way of “getting what [we] want without subjecting [ourselves] to the 
dangers of actual physical conflict.”(MWLB, 62.) Despite this sublimation of our animal 
instinct, even our most rational, ostensibly pacific arguments are “still comprehended and 
carried out in terms of WAR.”(Ibid., 63) Thus the usual ontogenic story is replaced with a 
phylogenic one.  This move seemingly allows them to obviate the experiential priority of 
ARGUMENT over WAR.  Thus, “[e]ven if you have never fought a fistfight in your life, much 
less a war, but have been arguing from the time you began to talk, you still conceive of 
arguments, and execute them, according to the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor because the 
metaphor is built into the conceptual system of the culture in which you live.” (Ibid., 64) But 
this is a tenuous and ultimately self-defeating argument for several reasons.  First, notice that 
this argument should favor FIGHT, not WAR, for ARGUMENT’S source domain.  Second, the 
phylogenic appeal, substantiated by arguable etiology, severely weakens the evidential criteria 
for conceptual metaphors generally so that even if experience contradicts a mapping, a cultural 
story may still be concocted to save it (see also my chapter 2 on the problematic conflation of 
ontogeny and phylogeny in image schema theory).  Third, the cultural-evolutionary story only 
defers, rather than solves, the problem – that is, it begs the question of how WAR came to 
structure ARGUMENT in the first place. 
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A clever experiment by the psychologists Keysar and Bly, however, suggests that 
we may in fact be particularly susceptible to explanations of the kind offered by L&J 
and that their apparent intuitive resonance may be the result of post-hoc 
rationalization.96  If, as L&J claim, idiom transparency (i.e. a native speaker’s intuitive 
comprehension of an idiom, e.g. spill the beans) is a function of underlying and 
independently existing conceptual structure,97 it follows, Keysar and Bly reason, that 
an idiom’s opacity should reflect the lack of motivating conceptual structure.  In other 
words, for idiom comprehension to count as evidence of conceptual structure it must in 
principle, by Popper’s criterion, be able to provide negative evidence—that is, in 
addition to demonstrating how an idiom means what it does, one must show what it 
cannot mean.   
Keysar and Bly assert that the theory of conceptual metaphor cannot in principle 
provide that kind of evidence since idiom transparency (or opacity) is a function of 
what the speaker already knows, or was taught to think, it means.  Thus an idiom’s 
opacity is not a result of a lack of motivating conceptual structure, and indeed idioms 
could have meant their opposites (e.g. “spill the beans” could have meant “to keep a 
secret”) if only they didn’t already have their meanings.  To substantiate this claim, 
Keysar and Bly introduced 15 obsolete idioms, for instance “the goose hangs high,” to 
two subject groups: one was taught the correct meaning (in this case, “things are 
looking good”) and the other its opposite (“things are looking bad”).  Subjects were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Boaz Keysar and Bridget Bly, “Intuitions of the Transparency of Idioms: Can One Keep a 
Secret by Spilling the Beans?,” Journal of Memory and Language 34, no. 1 (1995): 89–109; Boaz 
Keysar and Bridget Bly, “Swimming against the Current: Do Idioms Reflect Conceptual 
Structure?,” Journal of Pragmatics 31, no. 12 (1999): 1559–78. 
97 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 449. 
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then asked to predict a stranger’s interpretation of the idiom if heard in a neutral 
context.  For 80% of the idioms, a significant majority of subjects predicted the 
stranger’s interpretation would align with their own, in other words, that they had 
come to regard the meaning they learned as more sensible than its opposite.98 
It appears, then, that, for idioms at least, L&J’s story is backwards: conceptual 
structures do not motivate meaning, rather meaning motivates rationalizing strategies 
that can then, by mistaking the post hoc for propter hoc, be misinterpreted as its cause.99  
The authors incisively generalize this methodological error: 
 
This is a problem for theories that postulate motivating conceptual structures, because 
the discovery of underlying conceptual structures seems to depend on knowing the 
meaning of the idiom. This raises the possibility that meanings may suggest conceptual 
structures that do not exist independently, but rather are the result of knowing the 
meaning. They only seem to have independent existence because we do not recognize the 
effect of knowing the meaning of the idiom.100 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Keysar and Bly, “Intuitions of the Transparency of Idioms,” 96–98. Sam Glucksberg, Mary 
Brown, and Matthew McGlone, “Conceptual Metaphors Are Not Automatically Accessed 
During Idiom Comprehension,” Memory & Cognition 21, no. 5 (1993): 712.  Note additionally 
that subjects were apparently just as intuitively satisfied by the incorrect meaning, despite its 
dissonance with the putatively regnant orientational metaphor GOOD IS UP.   
99 This type of fallacy is at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the “intellectualist” 
(cognitivist) approach to the concept of “attention,” prompting Hubert Dreyfus to call it the 
“attention fallacy.”  Similarly, Eugene Gendlin’s critique of Johnson’s image schemata centers 
on the same accusation.  Both points will be taken up in the phenomenological critique. 
100 Keysar and Bly, “Swimming against the Current,” 1571.  
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Thus, “[i]nstead of serving as a linguistic window onto conceptual structure, idiomatic 
expressions may mirror the content put into them.  And just like mirrors, they might be 
mistaken for windows.”101 
Several other experiments have cast doubt on the role of conceptual structure in 
speaker comprehension of metaphor.  Recall that L&J claim not only that metaphors 
are subtended by conceptual mappings, but also that source domains are actually 
accessed, if unconsciously, in linguistic comprehension.102  Glucksberg, Brown, and 
McGlone demonstrated that while speakers could make use of conceptual metaphor 
structures in situations that allowed for deliberate consideration,103 they did not appear 
to access such structures in automatic comprehension.104  In the experiment by Nayak 
and Gibbs to which theirs responds,105 subjects were asked to judge the suitability of 
idioms in given contexts.  For instance, after reading a paragraph describing “Susan” 
as “tense,” “fuming,” and “getting hotter”, with “the pressure…really building up” as 
she waited for a tardy “Chuck,” subjects rated the appropriateness of two possible 
concluding idioms: when Chuck finally arrives, Susan either “blew her top” or “bit his 
head off.” 106  That subjects tended to prefer the former, which is consistent with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Ibid., 1560.  
102 “The system of conventional conceptual metaphor is mostly unconscious, automatic, and is 
used with no noticeable effort, just like our linguistic system and the rest of our conceptual 
system." Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” 245. 
103 Incidentally, this would support Keysar and Bly’s post-hoc rationale explanation. 
104  Glucksberg, Brown, and McGlone, “Conceptual Metaphors Are Not Automatically 
Accessed During Idiom Comprehension.” 
105 Nandini P. Nayak and Raymond W. Gibbs, “Conceptual Knowledge in the Interpretation 
of Idioms,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 119, no. 3 (1990): 315–30. 
106  Glucksberg, Brown, and McGlone, “Conceptual Metaphors Are Not Automatically 
Accessed During Idiom Comprehension,” 712. 
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conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID UNDER PRESSURE107 that permeates the 
paragraph, led Nayak and Gibbs to conclude not only that conceptual metaphors play 
an important role in idiom comprehension, but that because of its inconsistency with 
the regnant metaphor, the latter idiomatic alternative was more difficult for subjects to 
comprehend.   
Glucksberg, Brown, and McGlone duly criticize this overly generous 
interpretation, reasoning that the appropriateness ratings “may not be the product of 
ease of comprehension at all, but rather the outcome of postcomprehension decision 
and judgment processes,” reflecting a natural preference for thematic and semantic 
consistency.  Moreover, even if decisions were made pre-consciously, the results could 
be, more simply, a result of lexical priming.108  Of course these alternative explanations 
per se discredit neither conceptual metaphor generally nor its hypothesized role in 
automatic (unconscious) comprehension.  To test the latter directly, Glucksberg, 
Brown, and McGlone measured subjects’ reading speeds of “analogically consistent” 
versus “inconsistent” idioms that followed a prompting paragraph (much as in the 
Nayak and Gibbs experiment).109  In two versions of this experiment they found no 
difference in reading times and thus no correlation between analogical consistency and 
ease of comprehension.   
Similarly, Gluckberg, Keysar, and McGlone, in response to Gibbs, argued that 
“people need not access conventional metaphoric mappings when interpreting either !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 380 ff. 
108  Glucksberg, Brown, and McGlone, “Conceptual Metaphors Are Not Automatically 
Accessed During Idiom Comprehension,” 712. 
109 Ibid., 714.  Subjects were required to score perfectly on content questions for their speed 
data to count. 
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novel or conventional metaphors.”110  Their experiment centered on three metaphoric 
expressions given by Gibbs: “Our love is a bumpy roller coaster ride,” “Our love is a 
voyage to the bottom of the sea,” and “Our love is a dusty road traveled,” all 
instantiations of the putative LOVE IS A JOURNEY.  Gibbs hypothesized that if the 
meanings of these phrases are indeed governed by conceptual metaphorical mappings, 
then their interpretations should include conventional journey-related properties and 
“convey slightly different entailments about love.” 111  Glucksberg, Keysar, and 
McGlone had subjects paraphrase the three sentences and found that interpretations 
varied substantially and rarely mentioned journey-related content.112  These results 
were consistent, however, with the “class-inclusion model” of metaphorical meaning 
propounded by the authors.  In their view, “metaphors of the form ‘a is b’ are directly 
understood as class-inclusion assertions,” wherein a (the “topic”) is assigned to the 
category prototypified by b (the “vehicle”).113  Thus topic meaning and metaphorical 
interpretation should, and indeed did, reflect “the specific properties of the metaphor 
vehicle attributive category [i.e. b].” 114   Similar experiments by Glucksberg and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Sam Glucksberg, Boaz Keysar, and Matthew McGlone, “Metaphor Understanding and 
Accessing Conceptual Schema: Reply to Gibbs (1992),” Psychological Review 99, no. 3 (1992): 
579. 
111 Raymond W. Gibbs, “Categorization and Metaphor Understanding.,” Psychological Review 99, 
no. 3 (1992): 573. 
112 Glucksberg, Keysar, and McGlone, “Metaphor Understanding and Accessing Conceptual 
Schema: Reply to Gibbs (1992),” 571, 589. 
113 Ibid., 578. 
114 Ibid., 579.  In other words, subject paraphrases had much more to do with the particular 
vehicle of the given metaphor (roller coasters, sea bottoms, and dusty roads, respectively) then 
the hypothesized governing mapping LOVE IS JOURNEY.  The “class-inclusion model” has 
much in common with Haser’s Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” approach, alluded to 
below.  It is beyond the scope of this project to fully elaborate these alternative approaches to 
metaphor.  I broach them only to broaden the context for appraising L&J’s approach and to 
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McGlone in 1999 and McGlone in 1996 showed no agreement concerning underlying 
metaphor among subjects’ interpretations of metaphorical expressions.115 
The problem of comprehensional irrelevance, however, is deeper than experimental 
invalidity, for it is not even clear that L&J’s handpicked examples can theoretically rely 
on their posited conceptual metaphors for meaning.  In an extension of her criticism of 
the arbitrariness of ARGUMENT IS WAR (reprised above), Haser focuses on twelve 
expressions adduced by L&J for LOVE IS A JOURNEY: 
   
Look how far we’ve come. 
It’s been a long, bumpy road. 
We can’t turn back now. 
We’re at a crossroads. 
We may have to go our separate ways. 
The relationship isn’t going anywhere. 
We are spinning our wheels. 
Our relationship is off the track. 
The marriage is on the rocks. 
The marriage is out of gas. 
We’re trying to keep the relationship afloat. 
We may have to bail out of this relationship.116 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
show some obvious advantages they have over it.  For more on the “class-inclusion model”, see 
Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar, “Understanding Metaphorical Comparisons: Beyond 
Similarity,” Psychological Review 97, no. 1 (1990): 3–18.  For more on Haser’s approach, see 
Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, especially pp.224-36. 
115 Sam Glucksberg and Matthew McGlone, “When Love Is Not a Journey: What Metaphors 
Mean,” Journal of Pragmatics 31, no. 12 (1999): 1541–1558; Matthew S. McGlone, “Conceptual 
Metaphors and Figurative Language Interpretation: Food for Thought?,” Journal of Memory 
and Language 35 (1996): 544–65.   
116 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 64; Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of 
Metaphor,” 206, as listed in Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 227.  
! 47!
 
How necessary, as L&J claim, or even relevant, is LOVE IS A JOURNEY to the 
meanings of these phrases?  Put differently, how many of these phrases actually 
insinuate JOURNEY or are necessarily about LOVE?  Haser notes that “keep afloat,” for 
example, requires no notion of journey or travel to attain its meaning, only the contrast 
between above and under water, with their connotations of safety and danger.117  In 
fact, with the possible exception of “long, bumpy road,” none of the above phrases per 
se necessitate either journey- or love-related notions.118   
Even that expression, however, occurs in a wide variety of contexts apart from 
LOVE—a quick Internet search yields the “target domains” of sports, business, public 
policy, and publication, among others.  This implies, for L&J, a separate structuring 
metaphor for each instance of the form _______ IS A JOURNEY, without which the 
phrase would be unintelligible.  As Haser argues, “if LOVE IS A JOURNEY is needed to 
account for bumpy road in the context of love, an infinite number of other metaphors is 
needed to explain the use of the phrase in countless other contexts in which it can be 
employed.”119  But this is needlessly cumbersome and cognitively implausible. “A far 
simpler solution is to say that there is a metaphorical correspondence between long, 
bumpy roads and difficult undertakings, which can be applied to an infinite number of 
target contexts.”120  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 228. 
118Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 140 similarly questions the relevance of putative conceptual 
metaphors for the given expressions, for example “He broke down,” which is supposed to be 
governed by THE MIND IS A MACHINE (Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 28). 
119 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 229. 
120 Ibid., 229–30.  The same argument can be made for the rest of L&J’s examples. 
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Conversely, that “long, bumpy road” (and the other metaphorical phrases above) 
has the same meaning across all domains—a fact contradicted by L&J’s assertion of 
different conceptual metaphors for each target—implies that LOVE IS A JOURNEY plays 
no part in either constructing or constraining its meaning.  In turn, none of their 
examples can provide evidence for its existence.121  Remarkably, L&J’s evidence for 
LOVE IS A JOURNEY does as good a job of undermining the fundamental tenets of 
conceptual metaphor theory as supporting them.  
Thus far, in focusing on L&J’s attempt to derive conceptual metaphors from 
linguistic ones, I have noted its questionable philosophical underpinnings and several 
difficulties attending the radical expansion of metaphor’s purview, including a 
physicalist bias, their presumption of a fraught literal/figurative dichotomy, and the 
failure of their “ontological metaphors” to live up their name.  I have argued that the 
theory’s systematic permissiveness along with L&J’s expediently malleable conceptual 
logic and just-so origin stories allow for the perpetual evasion of falsification.  I have 
highlighted various problems with the linguistic evidence, including its inherent 
incompleteness, the arbitrariness of source domain designations, and L&J’s ad hoc 
classification of the conceptual metaphors that govern them.  A number of experiments 
have suggested that the theory’s intuitive appeal is a result of post-hoc justification and 
that conceptual metaphors play no role in automatic comprehension or interpretation.  
Finally, Haser has demonstrated that L&J’s own evidence undermines their theory 
and points instead to a considerably simpler and more cognitively plausible theory of 
metaphorical meaning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Ibid., 230–32. 
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From Source to Target 
 
Difficulties, deficiencies, and inconsistencies persist in L&J’s account of metaphorical 
mapping dynamics, the most glaring being their failure to sufficiently define and 
defend the cognitive process of “structuring” (i.e. of target by source domain) that is 
central to their theory.  This lacuna prompted Murphy, a critic of cognitive semantics, 
to postulate two possible views, “strong” and “weak,” derived by inference from L&J’s 
writings. 122   For Murphy, the question of structure, and cross-domain mapping 
generally, hinges on the representational status of the target domain, that is, whether 
the target concept, say ARGUMENT, possesses an independent mental representation.  
In the “strong view,” where it does not, the source domain obtains all of its structure 
from the target domain.  In other words, the mental representation for ARGUMENT 
would consist solely of mappings or references to WAR (e.g. arguers ! combatants, 
criticism ! attack, etc.).  “In a real sense,” Murphy explains, “one does not really 
understand an argument - one only understands war, and the understanding of 
arguments is parasitic on this concept.”123  In the “weak view,” the target domain is 
independently structured, but the “existence of systematic verbal metaphors in our 
culture,” it could be argued, has exerted an influence on its content and structure.124 
Though the “strong view” may seem extreme or implausible at first blush (for 
reasons considered presently), several passages in L&J ostensibly support it, not least 
their very definition of conceptual metaphor as “understanding and experiencing one !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Murphy, “On Metaphoric Representation,” 176–79. 
123 Ibid., 178. 
124 Ibid., 177. 
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kind of thing in terms of another.”125  Neither does their later explanation appear to 
stray from this view:  
 
[M]any aspects of our experience cannot be clearly delineated in terms of the naturally 
emergent dimensions of our experience. This is typically the case for human emotions, 
abstract concepts, mental activity, time, work, human institutions, social practices, etc., 
and even for physical objects that have no inherent boundaries or orientations. Though 
most of these can be experienced directly, none of them can be fully comprehended on 
their own terms. Instead, we must understand them in terms of other entities and 
experiences, typically other kinds of entities and experiences.126  
 
Though the qualifiers “clearly delineated” and “fully” could, depending on their 
intended meaning, imply a slightly different view, neither term is in fact clearly or fully 
delineated by L&J.127  Certainly, though, if “we must understand” target concepts in 
other terms, they must not have independent mental representation.  This inference is 
corroborated by their assertion that all of our various understandings of time are 
“relative to other concepts such as motion, space, and event.”128  Similarly, in perhaps 
the clearest statement of the strong view, L&J state, “LOVE is not a concept that has a 
clearly delineated structure; what-ever structure it has it gets only via metaphors.”129 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 5. 
126 Ibid., 177.   
127 See, for example, Ibid., 114.   
128 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 137. 
129 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 110.  Though earlier (p.85) they write, “[t]he 
concept LOVE, for example, is structured mostly in metaphorical terms.” [my emphasis]  This 
inconsistency and confusion about the nature of structure underlies a major difficulty in their 
theory, discussed presently. 
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 The shortcomings of Murphy’s postulated strong view are considerable.  Without 
at least minimal representation in the target domain, it is hard, if not impossible, to 
imagine how source domain elements (e.g. combatant) could become correlated with 
target domain elements (e.g. arguer) that have no cognitive actuality.130  Even if this 
were achievable, the absence of an independent target domain structure would render 
the mind incapable of preventing incorrect inferences, for instance that arguments not 
only involve a kind of battle but also involve infantry, MIA’s, reparations, etc.131 
McGlone goes a step further, arguing that “[a] conceptual system arranged in this 
fashion would seem incapable of generating propositions about abstract concepts with 
figurative intent.  For example, a conceptual system whose knowledge of theories was 
a subset of building knowledge should assume that theories are not merely metaphoric 
‘buildings,’ but literal buildings!”132 
 Murphy’s criticism of the weak view, though astute, is beside the point.  As Haser 
rightly points out, the weak view, according to which language influences conceptual 
structure, is fundamentally at odds with L&J, who claim precisely the opposite.  
Murphy’s framing of the pivotal issue of domain structuring nonetheless remains 
illuminating.  Indeed, it is perhaps just such concerns that led L&J to refine that 
aspect of their theory post-MWLB with Lakoff’s “invariance principle:” 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 McGlone, “What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?,” 113–14. 
131 Murphy, “On Metaphoric Representation,” 180–81.  
132 McGlone, “What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual Metaphor?” 122. See also 
Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 256. 
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Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema 
structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the 
target domain.133 
 
Informally, Lakoff offered Murphy a (doubly apposite) bodily metaphor to explain his 
position: the minimal inherent structure of the target domain is the skeleton that the 
source domain fleshes out.134  It is the skeleton, then, which is meant to constrain 
mappings and inferences, preventing false ones as above.  For Murphy, however, this 
leads to an aporia:  
 
The "flesh" added to the skeleton is an example of the strong view of metaphoric 
representation…. [T]here is no direct representation of this metaphoric material, which 
results in the same problems as were raised for the strong view of metaphoric 
representation.  In particular, what is to stop people from making inferences that are 
empirically incorrect about the target domain? That is, without more content in the 
argument concept, the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor would allow people to infer that 
guns are used, etc. In order to prevent this, the skeleton must be detailed enough to 
specify which inferences are permissible and which are not: No one infers that guns are 
used in arguments, because one already knows that they are not. However, this turns 
out to be simply a form of direct representation after all, since the inherent structure of 
the domain must be detailed enough to determine what can and cannot be said about the 
concept. That is, if the skeleton (or other literal information in memory) truly prevents 
the incorrect inferences, then the concept seems to be directly represented; if it cannot 
prevent them, then it is empirically incorrect. Thus, the skeleton needs to be both !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” 215.  In relation to Murphy’s critique, it 
is interesting to note that the earlier version, called the  “invariance hypothesis,” lacked the 
final clause (i.e. “in a way…”).  See George Lakoff, “The Invariance Hypothesis: Is Abstract 
Reason Based on Image-Schemas,” Cognitive Linguistics 1, no. 1 (1990): 57.  
134 Murphy, “On Metaphoric Representation,” 187. 
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extensive (to prevent incorrect inferences) and minimal (to allow metaphoric 
mappings).135        
 
 Damaging as this analysis is, even deeper problems issue from the invariance 
principle.  Consider the continuation of Lakoff’s above exposition, presented in the 
context of his discussion of CLASSICAL CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS and LINEAR 
SCALES ARE PATHS:136 
 
What the Invariance Principle does is guarantee that, for container schemas, interiors 
will be mapped onto interiors, exteriors onto exteriors, and boundaries onto boundaries; 
for path-schemas, sources will be mapped onto sources, goals onto goals, trajectories 
onto trajectories; and so on.”137 
 
This reasoning is blatantly circular, for it is only as a result of the mapping itself that 
the target domain obtains image-schematic structure (i.e. that we can speak, 
metaphorically, of putting something in a category, etc.).  That CLASSICAL 
CATEGORIES do not inherently have exteriors, interiors, or boundaries is precisely the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 Ibid. 
136 I.e. “Classical categories are understood metaphorically in terms of bounded regions, or 
‘containers.’ Thus, something can be in or out of a category, it can be put into a category or 
removed from a category, etc. The logic of classical categories is the logic of containers.…If X 
is in container A and container A is in container B, then X is in container B. This is true not by 
virtue of any logical deduction, but by virtue of the topological properties of containers…” and, 
similarly, the linguistic-inferential content of PATHS is mapped onto LINEAR SCALES, allowing 
us to say and reason (using Lakoff’s example) that if “Bill’s intelligence goes beyond Phil’s” 
and “John is far more intelligent than Bill,” then “John’s intelligence is way ahead of Phil’s.” 
Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” 214. 
137 Ibid., 215. 
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motivation for its borrowing the language and logic of the more concrete 
CONTAINERS. 138   Remarkably, Lakoff warns against this understanding—despite 
having just asserted that “classical categories are understood metaphorically in terms of 
bounded regions, or ‘containers’”139—in favor of the incoherent one: 
 
To understand the Invariance Principle properly, it is important not to think of 
mappings as algorithmic processes that start with source domain structure and wind up 
with target domain structure. Such a mistaken understanding of mappings would lead to 
a mistaken understanding of the Invariance Principle, namely, that one first picks all the 
image-schematic structure of the source domain, then one copies it onto the target 
domain unless the target domain interferes. One should instead think of the Invariance 
Principle in terms of constraints on fixed correspondences: If one looks at the existing 
correspondences, one will see that the Invariance Principle holds: source domain 
interiors correspond to target domain interiors; source domain exteriors correspond to 
target domain exteriors; etc.140 
 
Again, no image-schematic correspondences exist until the mapping creates them.  But 
an entity cannot create the conditions of its own existence.  Conceptual metaphors 
cannot both ground and be grounded by the same experience.  The problem is not just 
that the invariance principle is nonsensical, but that it intensifies Murphy’s paradox.  
To wit, if structural (i.e. image-schematic) correspondences already exits (i.e. if the 
target domain has inherent image-schematic structure and its concomitant linguistic-
inferential patterns), there would be no motivation for or benefit from a cross-domain !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 For a similar argument, see Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 150. 
139 Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” 212. [emphasis added] 
140 Ibid., 215. 
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mapping.  If, on the other hand, structure is indeed exported from source to target 
domain, then difficulties attending the strong view apply.  Haser aptly summarizes this 
core confusion: “The ambivalence concerning the question whether metaphors impose 
structures or whether they reflect pre-existing structures is a pervasive feature of 
Lakoff/Johnson’s approach, which can in part be traced to their refusal to explicate 
the concept structure in the first place.”141   
 A similar vacillation subtends another circularity in L&J’s account of the role of 
experience in conceptual metaphor. 142   Conceptual metaphors are “grounded in 
systematic correlations within our experience,” e.g. those between ARGUMENT and 
WAR.143  At the same time, “[u]nderstanding a conversation as being an argument 
involves being able to superimpose the multidimensional structure of part of the 
concept WAR upon the corresponding structure CONVERSATION.”  Thus, our having 
the concept ARGUMENT at all is dependent on the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, which 
is itself based on experiential correlations between the two domains.  But ARGUMENT !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 167. 
142 See Ibid., 148–9, 157. 
143 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 190, 61.  For their analysis of these structural 
correlations, see Ibid., 79-81.  This list of the literal features of arguments that correspond to 
features of WAR (e.g. “You have an opinion that matters to you. (having a position)”; “The 
difference of opinion becomes a conflict of opinions. (conflict)”) inadvertently demonstrates 
that ARGUMENT can be conceptually fleshed out on its own terms, is no less “clearly delineated” 
than WAR, and thus not dependent on it for metaphorical structuring.  L&J would likely 
respond to this claim by arguing that “[w]hat gives coherence to this list of things that make a 
conversation into an argument is that they correspond to elements of the concept WAR,”(Ibid., 
80) and that “not only our conception of an argument but the way we carry it out is grounded 
in our knowledge and experience of physical combat.”(Ibid., 63) As argued above, however, 
absent non-linguistic evidence this claim is just a claim.  Strictly speaking, all their comparative 
list shows is a possible thematic correlation between ARGUMENT and WAR.   An equally, or, 
for Haser, more, plausible conclusion is that “[a]rgument and war share a common structure 
independently of metaphorical transfer.” (Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 
149.) 
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does not exist until the metaphor creates it.  Haser, again, incisively recapitulates: 
“Lakoff/Johnson cannot have it both ways: Either the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is 
a presupposition of being able to ‘understand a conversation as being an 
argument’…or the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is based on our experience of 
arguments as warlike.”144 
 This contradiction is seen even more clearly in the orientational metaphor MORE IS 
UP, which supposedly enables us to grasp and conceptualize some aspect of the “less 
clearly delineated” MORE.145  The experiential basis of the metaphor (i.e. what “IS” 
represents) is “the cooccurrence of two types of experiences: adding more of a 
substance and seeing the level of the substance rise.”146  Yet without an antecedent 
notion of MORE, this cooccurrence could never have been noticed.  In this way, namely 
petitio principii, the conceptual metaphor presupposes what it is meant to explain.   
 L&J might reasonably retort: MORE, being less clearly delineated, can be 
experienced directly, but not conceptualized on its own terms.  It is the experience of MORE, 
correlated with the experienced and conceptualized UP, that leads to MORE IS UP, 
which adds conceptual flesh to the skeletal MORE.  If we accept this account, the 
question then becomes: why is MORE conceptually bereft and how do L&J know that 
it is?  For the former question, there is the claim that some domains of experience are 
just “less clearly delineated” (e.g. emotions)—though why this should be the case for 
MORE is unclear.  For the latter, presumably L&J would argue that the very existence 
of the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP testifies to our need to have created it, in other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 149. 
145 See Ibid., 155–57.  
146 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 155.  E.g. when adding more liquid to a glass. 
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words, to the conceptual impoverishment of MORE.  Relatedly, they might argue that 
the metaphorical asymmetry (i.e. that UP tends be the source and MORE the target of 
conceptual metaphors; or, using another example, that we speak of a theory’s 
construction but not of a building’s hypothesis) points to MORE’s antecedent conceptual 
dearth.  Metaphorical asymmetry, however, need not lead to the conclusions of 
conceptual metaphor theory; alternative approaches, including Haser’s and 
Glucksberg’s, offer compelling accounts of that phenomenon.147  More importantly, 
L&J would still need to explain how and why a target domain could have inherent 
image-schematic structure (as the invariance principle has it) but still need to borrow 
the linguistic-inferential patterns that arise from the very same image schemas in the 
source domain.  It should already have access to all the conceptual entailments of its 
own image schemas.  L&J’s insufficient and inconsistent explication of the concepts of 
“structure,” “experience,” and “conceptualization” only aggravates these ambiguities 
and aporias.   
  Absent a plausible and detailed account of cross-domain structuring, the problems 
of meaning and the interpretation of specific metaphors remain unsolved.  That 
metaphorical expressions are open to different interpretations is often obscured by the 
sedimentation of meanings within a linguistic community.148  L&J’s nearly exclusive 
use of conventional expressions, which many analytic philosophers do not even 
consider to be true metaphors on account of their “frozen” meanings,149 not only !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
147 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explicate these positions, but see Haser, 
Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, ch. 8 and Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar, 
“Understanding Metaphorical Comparisons: Beyond Similarity,” and Murphy, 197-8. 
148 This was shown to be the case for idioms by Keysar and Bly’s experiment, glossed above 
149 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 154. 
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conceals this fact but allows them to evade the issue of interpretation.  In other words, 
these expressions’ crystallized meanings obfuscate the complex cognitive maneuvers 
theoretically required, on L&J’s account, to get from utterance to meaning.  Namely, a 
phrase must first be recognized as metaphorical and its elements not only as members 
of superordinate categories, but the appropriate ones (e.g. “that we’re just spinning our 
wheels”150 is, first, not to be taken literally, and second, causes the listener/reader to 
access LOVE and JOURNEY to the exclusion of other possible domains).151  L&J 
provide no account of these processes (nor mention the need for one), a major 
shortcoming for a cognitive semantic theory that claims to have shed new light on classic 
problems of meaning, understanding, and truth.152  Though it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to show that such maneuvers are cognitively unfeasible, it seems clear that, 
compared to, say, Glucksberg’s class-inclusion model, they are cognitively 
cumbersome and inefficient.    
 Even granting this automatic, category-abstracting ability, the problem of 
interpretation persists, for the correlation of two domains does not per se entail a 
particular construal of their relationship, of how A IS B.  Haser concludes similarly: “The 
formula ‘understanding X in terms of Y’ is empty: What we need is an interpretation of 
the metaphor—a specification of how this understanding of X in terms of Y is itself to 
be understood.”153  That understanding will depend on which features of the source 
domain are selected to participate in the mapping (i.e. which of the many viable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 45. 
151 See Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 139–40.  
152 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, chs. 19-30; Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 139. 
153 Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 153. 
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aspects and associations, indeed versions, of JOURNEY, WAR, and BUILDING, for 
example, are used) and how metaphorical analogs in the target domain are generated 
and defined (i.e. what on the rocks, attack, foundation, etc. will mean in the domains of, 
say, LOVE, ARGUMENT, and THEORY respectively).  L&J appear to recognize some of 
these issues but do not truly address them.  As for the latter, they maintain that “[t]he 
definition of subconcepts, like BUDGETING TIME and ATTACKING A CLAIM, should fall 
out as consequences of defining the more general concepts (TIME, ARGUMENT etc.) in 
metaphorical terms.”154  But this only defers the problem to the former concern, which 
implicates not only the various problems of structure broached above, but also the 
issue of “used” and “unused parts” of the source domain (mentioned in the overview of 
MWLB).  Typical of their expository method, L&J provide a description of a 
purported phenomenon without an explanation of its origin or mechanism.  That only 
some aspects of the source domain are employed in a metaphorical transfer is obvious. 
What is required is an explanation of how this comes to be.  Absent that, L&J end up 
assuming what they should be proving (e.g. their “IS” appears to presume what it 
should explain) and smuggling conclusions into their premises.155   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 117. 
155 This issue speaks to the larger epistemological problem, first identified by Wittgenstein,  
with conceptualist approaches that, like L&J’s, treat concepts as mental images or states-of-
mind, and “preconceptual structure” (or “direct understanding”) as meaningful largely on the 
basis of the content of corresponding mental images.  In short, Wittgenstein showed that 
mental images are not a self-interpreting idiom and thus cannot explain language use.  It is the 
ability to employ, not merely posses, a mental representation that constitutes understanding. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English 
Translation, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, UK; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), §139ff. 
For incisive argumentation along these lines, see Leezenberg, Contexts of Metaphor, 263–267 
and Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy, 124–142.   
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 As mentioned earlier, it is the sedimentation of conventional expressions’ meanings 
that allow these fundamental deficiencies to remain somewhat hidden.  Because we 
already know the meanings (and find it hard to imagine other possible meanings156), we 
overlook, or fill in ourselves, the various gaps required for an explanatory theory, 
thereby lending L&J’s story the illusion of illumination.  
 Focusing on the structuring, experiential grounding, and interpretation of cross-
domain mappings, I have argued that L&J’s exposition of these central concepts is 
vague, inconsistent, often based on circular reasoning or petitio principii, and thus often 
resulting in aporia or incoherence.  Regarding structure, the confusion over whether 
conceptual metaphors create or reflect structure permeates their account and the 
conflation of these views results in circularity.  Similarly, regarding experience, the 
ambiguity over whether experience grounds or is grounded by cross-domain mappings 
renders their argument indefensible.  Both these problems were seen to undermine 
their approach to meaning and interpretation, which, by focusing on conventional 
expressions, fails to deal meaningfully with essential cognitive semantic questions and 
masks basic gaps in their theory. 
  In chapter 2 I summarize and critique the image schema theory and offer a 
phenomenological assessment.   
  !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 See Keysar and Bly, “Swimming against the Current.”  
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   CHAPTER 2  
Mistaking Concept for Process: Image Schema Theory 
 
I am only against reading concepts back as if they were “the basis of” the process that 
gives rise to them. That falsifies and hides the process. 
 
- Eugene Gendlin1 
 
 
 If conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) outlines the pervasively metaphorical, 
experientially grounded structuring of our conceptual system, image schema theory 
(IST) elaborates and codifies the predominant agents of that structure and their bodily 
basis.  Though certain proto-image schemas figure prominently in Metaphors We Live By 
as source domains (e.g. CONTAINER), it is not until Johnson’s and Lakoff’s 1987 
publications that they are systematically articulated as such, promoted from prevalent 
source domains to fundamental cognitive apparatus.2   Given that extended treatment, 
especially by Johnson in The Body in the Mind (TBM), a detailed evaluation is warranted. 
  
                                                
1 Eugene Gendlin, “Reply to Johnson,” in Language Beyond Postmodernism: Saying and Thinking in 
Gendlin’s Philosophy, ed. David Levin (Northwestern University Press, 1997), 169. 
2 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980); Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and 
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and 
Dangerous Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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 Part two of my critique of cognitive musicology proceeds in three stages: After 
summarizing image schema theory proper,3 I offer a two-pronged critique, the first 
general, comprising both original and previously leveled criticisms, and the second 
phenomenological.   
   
* 
 
As in Metaphors We Live By (MWLB), Lakoff and Johnson’s opponent and target in 
their 1987 work is “Objectivism,” the epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical 
paradigm that has allegedly dominated Western philosophy and culture for centuries.  
Against the latter’s disembodied idealism, Lakoff and Johnson (L&J) pit their 
embodied “Experientialism,” the former focusing on categorization and 
conceptualization and the latter on image schemas and their metaphorical 
elaborations.4   
 For Johnson, those two basic phenomena demonstrate the essential but heretofore 
neglected role of imagination, a capacity without which “nothing in the world could be 
meaningful.”5  This resurrection and privileging of imagination—here referring not to 
nineteenth-century notions of unfettered creativity but to a neo-Kantian cognitive 
faculty that mediates between percept and concept—in turn compels reformulations of 
                                                
3 I will focus my critique on Johnson’s account, considered ground zero for image schema 
theory, with occasional mention of Lakoff’s contributions.  Whereas the latter’s 1987 work is 
largely about categorization (image schemas are discussed only in Book II, case study 2), the 
former’s is almost exclusively concerned with image schemas and their metaphorical 
elaborations. 
4 For an overview of Objectivist and Experientialist tenets, see chapter 1. 
5 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, ix. 
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such basic notions as reason, meaning, and truth.  As the latter follow 
programmatically from Johnson’s exposition of two central “imaginative structures of 
understanding” (i.e. image schemas and their metaphorical elaborations), I begin 
there.6 
 Johnson’s foundational claim is that “human bodily movement, manipulation of 
objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns without which our 
experience would be chaotic and incomprehensible.” 7   These thereby embodied 
patterns, namely image schemas, not only order our experience preconceptually, but 
also, via metaphorical projection, structure our perception and conceptualization of 
more abstract realms of experience, as well as reasoning itself.8   
 Like “imagination,” the term “schema” comes from Kant, though Johnson specifies 
his version in several ways.  Crucially for his anti-Objectivist account, they are not 
propositional in the conventional sense (as defined by Johnson9), i.e. abstract, finitary, 
predicative, truth-conditional, symbolic representations.  Though “some important 
structural features of any given schema” can be thus captured, their essentially 
operational and embodied nature resists a comprehensively propositional description.10  
Johnson argues further that “propositional content is possible only by virtue of a 
complex web of nonpropositional schematic structures that emerge from our bodily 
                                                
6 Ibid., xiv. 
7 Ibid., xix. 
8 As Lakoff put it, “they structure our perceptions and…their structure is made use of in 
reason.” Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 440. 
9 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 3. 
10 Ibid. 
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experience.”11  It is this nonpropositional, embodied, preconceptual dimension of 
meaning that lies at the heart of his philosophy.   
 If image schemas are not propositional structures, neither are they “rich, concrete 
images or mental pictures.”12  Following Kant’s notion of schema, Johnson asserts that 
they are rather “structures that organize our mental representations at a level more 
general and abstract than that at which we form particular mental images.”13  They 
thus “operate at a level of mental organization that falls between abstract propositional 
structures, on the one side, and particular concrete images, on the other,” and as such, 
make possible the other two cognitive faculties.14   
  Image schemas are gestalt structures, that is, “organized whole[s] within our 
experience and understanding that [manifest] a repeatable pattern or structure.”15  
Though analyzable into parts, they are meaningful in perception and cognition as 
unities.  As analog functions, they operate as “continuous structure[s] of an organizing 
activity” yet, despite that structure, remain “dynamic patterns rather than fixed and 
static images.”16 Though they are pragmatically represented in two-dimensional visual 
form, Johnson emphasizes that they are in fact three-dimensional, temporal, and 
kinesthetic.17 
                                                
11 Ibid., 5. 
12 Ibid., 23. 
13 Ibid., 23–24. 
14 Ibid., 29. 
15 Ibid., 44. 
16 Ibid., 29. 
17 Ibid., 23., though he admits that “our visual schemata seem to predominate.” (Ibid., 25) 
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 Johnson’s discussion of the CONTAINER schema exemplifies many of these 
features: 
Our encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most pervasive features 
of our bodily experience.  We are intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional 
containers into which we put certain things (food, water, air) and out of which other 
things emerge (food and water wastes, air, blood, etc.).  From the beginning, we 
experience constant physical containment in our surroundings (those things that 
envelop us).  We move in and out of rooms, clothes, vehicles, and numerous kinds of 
bounded spaces.  We manipulate objects, placing them in containers (cups, boxes, cans, 
bags, etc.).  In each of these cases there are repeatable spatial and temporal 
organizations.  In other words, there are typical schemata for physical containment.18 
 
Whereas propositional meaning involves logical inferences, image-schematic structure 
carries “entailments,” several of which Johnson enumerates for CONTAINER: 
 
(i) The experience of containment typically involves protection from, or resistance to, 
external forces.  When eyeglasses are in a case, they are protected against forceful 
impacts.  (ii) Containment also limits and restricts forces within the container.  When I 
am in a room or in a jacket, I am restrained in my forceful movements….(v) Finally, we 
experience transitivity of containment.  If B is in A, then whatever is in B is also in A.  If 
I am in bed, and my bed is in my room, then I am in my room.19 
 
Though entailments are unavoidably expressed in propositional terms, Johnson 
cautions, “we must not mistake our mode of description for the things described,” 
                                                
18 Ibid., 21. 
19 Ibid., 22.  Emphasis is original unless otherwise noted. 
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which are argued to be preconceptual and thus nonpropositional features of 
embodiment.20 
 The CONTAINER schema is represented as follows: 
 
 
CONTAINMENT21 
Figure 2.1 Johnson’s CONTAINMENT schema 
 
Following Lindner, Johnson posits three related schemas to cover “in-out 
orientation:”22 
 
                                                
20 Ibid., 4. 
21 Ibid., 23. 
22 Ibid., 32.  See Susan Lindner, “A Lexico-Semantic Analysis of English Verb Particle 
Constructions with Out and Up” (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 1981).  
Lindner analyzed some 600 “out” verb-particle constructions (VPC, e.g. take out) and 1200 “up” 
VPC’s (e.g. pick up).  For the former, she proposed a systematically unified meaning for all 
usages covered by the three schemas above plus their various sub-schemas.  See chapter 1 for 
a discussion of her work.  
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Figure 2.2 Johnson’s OUT schemata (following Linder) 
 
As figure to ground, the “trajector” (TR) in these schemas moves in relation to the 
“landmark” (LM).  Johnson concerns himself with the first, considered the 
prototypical OUT schema, in which a trajector exits a container.23  This dynamic 
pattern, pervasive in our spatial grasp of the world, shows up in activities (and 
sentences) like “John went out of the room” and “He squeezed out some toothpaste.”24  
Figurative elaboration and extension of the schema allows for the comprehension and 
conceptualization of numerous non-spatial, typically more abstract phenomena.  In 
                                                
23 Linder labels the first “Prototypical OUT.”  The second, “Reflexive OUT” describes an 
expansion of a single object (e.g. “roll out the carpet,” “grow out your hair”), and the third, 
“OUT-3,” profiles “movement away from a point designated as origin, center, or source” (e.g. 
“they started out for Alaska”). Lindner, “A Lexico-Semantic Analysis of English Verb Particle 
Constructions with Out and Up,” 137. 
24 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 33.  Johnson suggests that the projection of in-out orientation 
onto inanimate objects (as in the second sentence) “is already a first move beyond the 
prototypical case of my bodily movement” (Ibid., 34) (as in the first sentence), though he 
asserts that “nothing crucial rests on this claim.” (Ibid., 33) 
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“Tell me your story again, but leave out the minor details,” an event (story) is 
conceived as the landmark and an abstract entity (details) as the trajector.  In other 
cases, an agreement or obligation is conceptualized as a container (“Don’t you dare 
back out of our agreement”), thus the sense of being physically bound by container is 
extended to cover senses of being bound by legal, moral, or other obligations.25  Indeed, 
for Johnson, “this fact is a consequence of the schema for containment.”26  Another 
kind of projection treats the contents of the container as hidden or unnoticed and the 
out movement as a “bringing into prominence or making public” (e.g. “Honda just put 
out its 1986 models,” “When you wear blue, it really brings out your eyes”).  These 
examples highlight the inherently perspectival nature of orientational image schemas: 
whereas in these instances, the “viewpoint” is outside the container, the viewer 
perceiving what emerges therefrom, in examples like “He bowed out of our agreement,” 
the implied perspective is from within the container of the agreement.27  Importantly 
for Johnson, this is a specifically nonpropositional facet of image-schematic 
employment: “[G]rasping the relevant perspective is not usually a matter of 
entertaining a proposition, such as ‘I’m viewing the container from the outside’; rather 
it is simply a point of view that we take up, because it is part of the structural relations of the 
relevant schema.”28 
                                                
25 Ibid., 35. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 36. 
28 Ibid.  Incidentally, this aspect is perhaps an example of how the two-dimensional visual 
diagram of a schema is inevitably “misleading,”(23) as the CONTAINER diagram’s perspective, 
if it implies any, is either avian or divine. 
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 As also argued in MWLB, conceptual metaphors do not reflect preexisting 
similarities between domains of experience, but actually create structure in the target 
domain.  (It is this “creative” function of image schemas that Johnson considers 
“imaginative,” hence a theory of imagination.)  As “projection” implies, the structure of 
the source domain is “metaphorically imposed” on the target domain, determining not 
only how we conceive of and talk about the latter, but our very experience of it.29  For 
instance, the projection of the body-derived BALANCE schema onto our psychic and 
emotional makeup—resulting in conceptual metaphors like “balanced personality,” 
“under control emotions,” and “problems weighing on our minds,” etc.—dictates the 
“structure of our experience of emotions.” Thus, “[w]hen I am emotionally worked-up, I 
feel myself to be out of balance.”30  When emotions overflow or erupt, one attempts to 
restore equilibrium by releasing or suppressing them.  Conversely, when feeling drained or 
exhausted, one might try to recharge or pump oneself up in order to regain balance.31 
 These sorts of “inferences,” argues Johnson, arise directly from the internal 
structure of the grounding image schema, which, though bare and malleable, is 
sufficient to yield entailments (as seen above with CONTAINER).  In the previous case, 
the EQUILIBRIUM schema (a variation on the prototypical BALANCE schema, the TWIN-
PAN BALANCE, see figure 2.3 below) entails that equilibrium rests on the “symmetrical 
(or proportional) arrangement” of internal and external forces.32  This in turn generates 
the emotional/psychological inferences above, as well as parallel inferences in the 
                                                
29 Ibid., 98, 89.  Johnson thus calls them “experientially formative.” (35)    
30 Ibid., 89. 
31 Ibid., 88. 
32 Ibid., 85. Note the embedded CONTAINER. 
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domain of systems, from mousetraps to entire philosophies (i.e. “there must exist a 
certain dynamic equilibrium, a proper balance of forces, if the system is to function 
properly”).33  Similarly, the TWIN-PAN BALANCE schema experientially and inferentially 
(as well as conceptually/verbally) organizes our notion of legal/moral balance (we 
assess the weight of opposing arguments, aim to realign the scales of justice) and even 
the abstract idea of mathematical equality (where numerical values have weight and we 
balance equations).34  Furthermore, BALANCE undergirds the logical properties of 
transitivity (“A balances B if and only if B balances A”), transitivity (“If A balances B, 
and B balances C, then A balances C”), and reflexivity (“A balance A”), and thus 
governs basic modes of abstract reasoning.35 
 
 
                                                
33 Ibid., 87. 
34 Ibid., 90. 
35 Ibid., 97.  In the domain of abstract reasoning, Johnson postulates the image-schematic 
underpinning of formal reasoning in terms of (motion along) a PATH schema – “we understand 
ourselves as starting at some point (a proposition or set of premises), from which we proceed 
in a series of steps to a conclusion (a goal, or stopping point) – and logical negation in terms of 
a CONTAINER schema – e.g. the “law of the excluded middle” (i.e. a proposition is either true 
(P), or its negation is (~P)) follows from our conceiving of categories as containers, for which 
any entity is either inside or outside. (Ibid., 38-39)  Similarly, he suggests that a FORCE 
schema lies at the root of the laws of logical necessity/possibility (i.e. “if P is logically necessary, 
then P is true”), meaning “[i]f the force of logic operates to move you to a certain “place,” then 
you wind up in that place.”(Ibid., 64)  He uses the same schema (or rather the family of 
FORCE schemas) to ground our understanding of modal verbs (following Sweetser) and 
speech act structure (Austin, Searle). See Ibid., 48-61.  
 
71 
                                         
                                              EQUILIBRIUM                          TWIN-PAN BALANCE36 
Figure 2.3 Johnson’s EQUILIBRIUM and TWIN-PAN BALANCE schemata 
 
  As image-schematic projections create possibilities of meaning, they equally limit 
them—or, rather, these two functions are two sides of the same coin:  
 
To say that image schemata “constrain” our meaning and understanding and that 
metaphorical systems “constrain” our reasoning is to say that they establish a range of 
possible patterns of understanding and reasoning.  They are like channels in which 
something can move with a certain limited, relative freedom.  Some movements 
(inferences) are not possible at all.  They are ruled out by the image schemata and 
metaphors.37 
 
Inasmuch as constraints, or prohibited inferences, are the inverse, a kind of 
photographic negative, of positive inferences, we have already encountered them on a 
basic level.  Johnson demonstrates their more complex workings in an analysis of the 
pioneering work of Hans Selye, the founder of modern stress theory.  In his research 
and clinical experience, Selye noticed a cluster of nonspecific, pervasive symptoms 
                                                
36 Ibid., 86–87. 
37 Ibid., 137. 
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(including intestinal distress, joint pains, enlarged spleen or liver, etc.) that seemingly 
acted as a “syndrome of response to injury as such.”38 Selye was initially confounded by 
these observations since they did not square with the established model of disease, 
which Johnson argues was governed by the BODY AS MACHINE metaphor.  Because of 
the latter’s entailments (“The body consists of distinct, though interconnected parts,” 
“Breakdown occurs at specific points or junctures in the mechanism,” “Treatment 
directs itself to specific faulty units or connections,” etc.39), Selye was unable to grasp 
the meaning of his findings, essentially constrained by the reigning metaphor.  
Specifically, there was no place for nonspecific symptoms in that diagnostic paradigm.  
It was not until he embraced a novel understanding of the BODY AS HOMESTATIC 
ORGANISM, in which the body’s goal is the maintenance of balance among its 
organically connected systems, that Selye came to his (and the still current) 
conceptualization of “stress” as a “general adaptive response to any stressor.”40  For 
Johnson, these metaphors are not interpretive overlays, but are rather constitutive of 
experience and conceptualization.   
  In conceptual metaphors, the pairing of source domains with the target domains 
they structure is “natural” in that they are based on “experiential correlation.”41  To 
take Johnson’s classic example, our understanding of MORE in terms of UP or, more 
generally, QUANTITY in terms of VERTICALITY (e.g. “The crime rate keeps rising,” 
                                                
38 Hans Selye, The Stress of Life (McGraw-Hill, 1956), 25–26., quoted in Johnson, The Body in 
the Mind, 129.  
39 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 130. 
40 Ibid., 132. 
41 Ibid., 116–117. 
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“That stock has fallen again,” “Turn down the heat,” etc.) arises from basic experiences 
like adding more of a substance to a pile and seeing its level rise.42  The metaphor 
MORE IS UP “is based on, or is an instance of…the SCALE schema,” (see figure 2.4) 
which organizes both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of our experience:  
 
[w]e can view our world as a massive expanse of quantitative amount and qualitative 
degree or intensity.  Our world is experienced partly in terms of more, less, and the same.  
We can have more, less, or the same number of objects, amount of substance, degree of 
force, or intensity of sensation.  This “more” or “less” aspect of human experience is the 
basis of the SCALE schema. 
  
 
SCALE43 
Figure 2.4 Johnson’s SCALE schema 
 
This nearly ubiquitous schema is “figuratively extended to cover abstract entities of 
every sort (numbers, properties, relations, geometric structures).” 
 Similarly, grounding the pervasive PURPOSES ARE PHYSICAL GOALS, by which we 
understand and experience abstract goals as spatial ones (e.g. “I’ve got quite a way to go 
before I get my Ph.D,” “Jane was sidetracked in her search for self-understanding,” 
                                                
42 Ibid., 121, xv. 
43 Ibid., 123. 
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“Follow me—this is the path to genuine happiness” 44 ), is a primal experiential 
correlation of the two domains: 
 
From the time we can first crawl, we regularly have as an intention getting to a 
particular place, whether for its own sake, or as a subgoal that makes some other activity 
possible.  There may well be no intention satisfied more often than physical motion to a 
particular desired location.  In such cases, we have a purpose—being in that location—
that is satisfied by moving our bodies from a starting point A, through an intermediate 
sequence of spatial locations, to the end point B.45 
 
Like MORE IS UP, PURPOSES ARE PHYSICAL GOALS is based on an underlying schema, 
here the PATH schema (in conjunction with the metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS, 
which enables the mapping of abstract states onto physical locations) (figure 2.5).  To 
say that an experiential correlation grounds a metaphor is to say that “the metaphorical 
mapping is isomorphic with the experiential pairing,” 46  yielding the following 
mappings: 
 
Starting location onto initial state. 
Goal (final location) onto final state. 
Motion along path onto intermediate actions.47   
 
                                                
44 Ibid., 115. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 116. 
47 Ibid., 114. 
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  PATH48 
Figure 2.5 Johnson’s PATH schema 
 
As intimated above, Johnson’s exposition of these essentially “imaginative” phenomena 
(following a revised, embodied Kantian notion of a cognitive faculty that mediates 
between percept and concept, or mental representation and logical structure49) leads to 
a new, anti-Objectivist approach to understanding, meaning, and rationality, not to 
mention experience and truth.  Understanding is thus not a largely propositional 
reflection on experience but rather “the way we ‘have a world,’ the way we experience out world 
as a comprehensible reality….In short, our understanding is our mode of ‘being in the 
world.’”50  As such it “is a result of the massive complex of our culture, language, 
history, and bodily mechanisms that blend to make our world what it is.  Image 
schemata and their metaphorical projections are primary patterns of this ‘blending.’”51 
 In place of an Objectivist theory of meaning which treats it “as a relation between 
sentences and objective (mind-independent) reality,” Johnson proposes a non-
Objectivist “semantics of understanding” in which “meaning is always a matter of 
human understanding.”  Simply put, “[a] theory of meaning is a theory of 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 The specifics of Johnson’s reading and modification of Kant is not crucial for my critique, 
bur for details see Ibid., 147–72. 
50 Ibid., 102.  
51 Ibid., 104. 
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understanding,” which involves, of course, image schemas, their metaphorical 
projections, as well as propositions.52   
 Bridging, or eliminating, the gap between the purely material and the purely 
rational (Kantian Idealism), or, similarly, between body and mind (Objectivism), leads 
Johnson to a view of experience and understanding based on an ongoing, mutually 
transformative, pragmatically coupled “organism-environment interaction.”  That 
symbiotic evolution has yielded not only image schemas (i.e. the recurring patterns of 
that interaction), but also the “basic level” of experience and categorization that is the 
subject of Lakoff’s contemporaneous publication: 
 
Such a level of organization permits us to function well most of the time.  It is the level 
defined by gestalt perception of overall shape, by our capacities for motor movement in 
interaction with the object, and by our ability to form rich images of the object.  It is 
thus the level of organization that permits us to characterize relatively accurately those 
discontinuities in nature that matter most for our everyday functioning.53 
 
CHAIR, for instance, is a basic level object.  It is that category level, rather than the 
superordinate FURNITURE or the subordinate ROCKING CHAIR that is experientially 
basic.54 
 Johnson summarizes the thrust of his (and Lakoff’s) view thusly: 
 
                                                
52 Ibid., 174. 
53 Ibid., 208.  For more on the “basic level” and the related “prototype theory” (Rosch), see 
Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. 
54 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 208. 
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[w]e have conceptual systems that are grounded in two ways—in basic-level and image-
schematic understanding—and are extended imaginatively by category formation and 
by metaphorical and metonymic projections…Understanding is an event—it is not merely a 
body of beliefs (though it includes our beliefs).  It is the means by which we have a 
shared, relatively intelligible world.  The basic epistemological finding of this ‘experientialist’ 
(cognitive semantics) approach is that knowledge must be understood in terms of 
structures of embodied human understanding, as an interaction of a human organism 
with its environment.55 
 
* 
 
While much compels in Johnson’s philosophy—the grounding of experience and 
understanding in embodiment, the privileging of nonpropositional knowledge, the 
rapprochement of mind and body in an organism-environment coupling—there is 
much that is wanting, confused, and problematic.  My critique will focus on three main 
features of his system: the alleged indispensability and emergence of image schemas, 
the grounding and dynamics of metaphorical projection, and the evidence for image 
schemas and their metaphorical elaborations.  In brief, I will argue that Johnson 
assumes rather than proves that image schemas are necessary for our successful 
functioning in the world, that their putative ontogenesis is improbable if not illogical, 
that “experiential correlation” as the basis of metaphorical projections is ultimately 
incoherent, and that neither the psychological evidence he marshals for image schemas 
nor the analyses he provides substantiate their existence.  
                                                
55 Ibid., 209. 
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 As a result of these and other methodological, empirical, and philosophical issues, I 
contend that image schemas are not the organically emergent, nonpropositional 
structures Johnson claims, but rather constitute a conceptual retrofitting of embodied 
experience that ultimately obscures rather than illuminates the complexity of that 
phenomenon.  Consequently, Johnson’s attempt to “put the body back into the mind,” 
I will argue, ends up instead smuggling the mind back into embodiment.56  To build 
towards this more global, essentially phenomenological claim, I begin with criticisms of 
various details of Johnson’s account. 
 The very definition of image schemas consists of a paradox.  On the one hand, they 
are the structures “by means of which our experiences manifests discernible order.”57 
They, in fact, “[define] form itself.”58  On the other hand, as Johnson repeatedly 
asserts, they “emerge from our bodily experience,”59 they have “embodied origins.”60  
They are thus prerequisite for meaningful experience yet also generated, indeed 
abstracted, therefrom.61  It is unclear, and left unexplained, how image schemas could 
both ground and be grounded by the same experiences.  As Timothy Clausner, a 
proponent of IST, puts it, they cannot be “both presupposed and acquired, and both 
                                                
56 Ibid., xxxvi. 
57 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xix. 
58 Ibid., 206. 
59 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 29.  see also xix, 21.  
60 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xv. 
61 e.g. “the verticality schema is the abstract structure of these verticality experiences, images, 
and perceptions.” Ibid., xiv.  Emphasis added. 
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basic and derived.”62  This tension, perhaps outright circularity, is apparent even 
within single iterations of Johnson’s thesis, such as when he speaks of “patterns of 
meaningful experience that give rise to image-schematic structures.”63  By his own 
definition, it is only by virtue of image-schematic structures that meaningful experience, 
let alone patterns of them, is possible.  Clearly those experiences, on pain of circularity, 
cannot in turn generate image-schematic structure. 
 Pace Clausner, who believes the investigation of this paradox can lead to a 
refinement of IST, I will argue in the phenomenological critique below that further 
scrutiny reveals only deeper confusions, even contradictions, attending the purported 
ontogenesis and function of image schemas.  
 However they emerge, image schemas are asserted to be cognitively/experientially 
necessary.  Indeed, the argument for their existence partially hinges on this 
indispensability, as Johnson repeatedly asserts: 
 
If we are to experience our world as a connected and unified place that we can make 
sense of, then there must be repeatable pattern and structure in our experiences.  Image 
schemata are those recurring structures of, or in, our perceptual interactions, bodily experiences, 
and cognitive operations.64 
 
                                                
62 Timothy C. Clausner, “Image Schema Paradoxes: Implications for Cognitive Semantics,” in 
From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics, ed. Beate Hampe and Joseph E. 
Grady (Berlin!; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 107.  
63 Ibid., 32. Clausner presents this and another paradox attending image schema theory in the 
spirit of promoting deeper understanding.  He does not (though it is not his aim to) provide a 
solution, and as of yet none appears to have been suggested in the literature.  
64 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 79. 
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Without them [i.e. image schemata] our experience would be an undifferentiated 
mush.65 
 
Without links [i.e. LINK], we could neither be nor be human.66 
 
The import of this ontological and epistemological claim should not be underestimated.  
In short, image schemas are what stand between us and sensorial tohu-bohu, what 
wrangle the sensory chaos into ordered, structured, and therefore meaningful 
phenomena—in short, what we call “experience.” 
 Johnson provides neither evidence nor argument to support this oft-repeated, 
foundational premise.  His initial promise to “[show] that human bodily movement, 
manipulation of objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring patterns without 
which our experience would be chaotic and incomprehensible”67 is not only left unfulfilled, but 
simply not addressed. 
 To be fair, perhaps his intention was not to prove this supposition a priori or 
directly, but, by demonstrating the utility and ubiquity of image schemas in experience, 
indirectly substantiate their cognitive indispensability.  On the role of CONTAINER in 
our everyday activities, for example, Johnson writes: 
Consider, for example only a few of the many in-out orientations that might occur in the 
first few minutes of an ordinary day.  You wake up out of a deep sleep and peer out from 
beneath the covers into your room.  You gradually emerge out of your stupor, pull 
yourself out from under the covers, climb into your robe, stretch out your limbs, and walk 
                                                
65 Ibid., 206. 
66 Ibid., 117. 
67 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xix. [my emphasis] 
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in a daze out of the bedroom and into the bathroom.  You look in the mirror and see your 
face staring out at you….Once you are more awake, you might even get lost in the 
newspaper, might enter into a conversation, which leads to your speaking out on some 
topic.68 
 
Our performance of these unnoticed in-out “orientational feats,” whether physical 
(“into the bathroom”) or abstract (“into a conversation”), not to mention innumerable 
others (up-down, near-far, etc.), “involves an exceedingly complex interaction with 
[our] environment in which [we] experience significant patterns and employ 
structured processes [i.e. the CONTAINER schema] that give rise to a coherent world of 
which [we] are able to make sense.”69  
 Though Johnson does not admit of a difference between the physical and abstract 
here, it is useful to consider the above claim as it pertains to each domain.  For physical 
in-out orientations (i.e. where an actual container is involved), the assertion implies 
that we would literally be unable to leave or enter a room as such without the 
CONTAINER schema to guide our way, or that we would find ourselves unable, say, to 
put cherries into our mouths and take out the pits.70  (This is not meant as a caricature 
of his position, simply its logical converse.)  This is a strange, seemingly 
overcomplicated and over-mediated picture of basic cognition and behavior.  A crucial 
question, then, is whether there is good reason to accept this cornerstone assumption.71  
                                                
68 Ibid., 30–31. 
69 Ibid., 31. 
70 Indeed, a strict reading would seem to imply that even breathing (taking air in and breathing 
it out) is dependent on CONTAINER.  Ibid., 21.  
71 Here it is important to distinguish evidence for the psychological reality of image schemas 
(which Johnson offers in ch.5, and which I will take up below) and evidence (or arguments) 
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Or, put differently, must image schemas be posited to account for basic human 
functioning in the world?  That is, is there a plausible account of basic human-
environment negotiation that does not resort to such mediating structures?  In the 
phenomenological critique below, I submit that just such an account is put forward by 
Merleau-Ponty (with important elaborations by Todes, Gibson, and Dreyfus) and that 
not only is it cognitively simpler, and thus preferable, but also far more loyal to the 
phenomena in question.   
 Accepting Johnson’s account of non-physical “orientational feats” (i.e. where 
CONTAINER is imposed on an abstract entity) depends in turn on accepting CMT as 
fact.  Implicit in his CONTAINER story is the claim that when we “walk in a daze” or 
“get lost in the newspaper,” that orientational terminology evidences the underlying 
experiential/conceptual structuring of the relevant image schema.  In part one, I 
offered many reasons to doubt L&J’s account of conceptual metaphor, and further 
arguments will be presented below.   
 Thus, Johnson’s narration of “orientational feats,” or the other similar informal, 
linguistic analyses of image-schematic underpinnings of normal activities, cannot 
indirectly substantiate the claim of their psychological necessity.  They are 
restatements, not proof, of IST and/or CMT.   
                                                                                                                                            
for their psychological necessity, for which none is offered.  Consequently, discrediting the 
latter claim, as I aim to do, does not necessarily disprove the former (though I also aim to do 
that separately).  In other words, showing that image schemas are not necessary for an account 
of human functioning does not ipso facto disprove their existence, only undercuts the strongest 
motivation (i.e. indispensability) for proposing them.  Thus even without existential necessity, 
Johnson could still maintain that they arise at a later stage (perhaps as an abstraction from 
certain patterns of human functioning, closer to Mandler’s image schema theory) and have 
cognitive utility as grounds for metaphorical projection and abstract reasoning. 
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 What is the actual evidence adduced to support their existence?  Johnson lists six 
kinds, the first involving “image-schematic transformations”:  
 
[E]xperiments show that we can perform operations on image schemata that are analogs 
of spatial operations.  For example, we can rotate images through mental space to 
perform matching operations.  We can superimpose one image schema upon another.  
We can transform schemata (such as “pulling away” from an aggregate of distinct 
objects until it becomes a single homogenous mass).  In other words, there is a level of 
image schematic operations more abstract than, and not reducible to, the formation of 
rich images or mental pictures.72   
 
Even granting the validity of these findings, it is unclear how they are meant to 
corroborate image schemas.  Apart from this very discussion, Johnson does not 
mention “image-schematic transformations” or “operations,” and fails even here to 
define them or elucidate their relationship to the general theory or particular schemas.  
Furthermore, it would seem antithetical to the very notion of image schemas as 
abstract, pre-conceptual patterns to be able to be consciously called to mind, as any 
other mental image, to be “performed on.”  
 Many of Johnson’s examples come from Lakoff, who defines “image-schema 
transformations” only slightly less vaguely, as “certain very natural relationships 
among image-schemas.”73  Yet not one of the four examples he gives explicitly involves 
some interaction between image schemas, and two do not appear to involve any named 
                                                
72 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 104. 
73 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 440. 
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image schema at all.  Consider the “path focus ↔ end-point focus” and “multiplex ↔ 
mass” transformations: 
 
It is a common experience to follow the path of a moving object until it comes to rest, 
and then to focus on where it is.  This corresponds to the path focus and end-point focus 
transformation. 
 
As one moves further away, a group of individuals at a certain point begins to be seen as 
a mass.  Similarly, a sequence of points is seen as a continuous line when viewed from a 
distance. 74 
 
The first presumably involves the PATH schema, though it is unclear how mentally 
focusing on its different aspects involves a “transformation.”  The second is simply not 
explained in reference to any image schema mentioned by either author.   
 Putting these definitional and expositional inadequacies aside, the larger argument 
of L&J is essentially the following: these various mind’s eye exercises demonstrate that 
there exists a level of abstract mental imagining that mimics physical phenomena and 
thus is image-schematic. Two larger problems prevent this argument from approaching 
the level of evidence.  First, as above, it would require far more explanation than L&J 
offer to conclude that the abilities tested in the various experiments mentioned—
experiments which were not explicitly testing, or even aware of the notion of, image 
schemas75—correspond meaningfully to image schemas proper.  Second, the equation 
                                                
74 Ibid., 442. 
75 Johnson neglects to mention this important fact (which is pointed out in Raymond W. Gibbs 
and Herbert. L. Colston, “The Cognitive Psychological Reality of Image Schemas and Their 
Transformations,” Cognitive Linguistics 6, no. 4 (1995): 347–78.) and even misleadingly speaks 
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of various mental acrobatics—some (like the two “transformations” above) not even 
formal experiments but armchair exercises suggested by L&J76—with fundamental 
cognitive faculties is not only an unwarranted interpretive leap, but a kind of 
ontological argument (i.e. imaginability equals reality) that carries the same absurd 
consequences as those used to prove god’s existence.  
 A thorough evaluation of the experimental literature marshaled for IST and CMT 
in the last twenty-five years—the so-called “mountains of evidence”77—far exceeds the 
scope of this project.  There are, nonetheless, several general reasons to suspect that 
these “mountains” may in fact be molehills.  First, a great deal of the evidence is 
linguistic or language-based (i.e. analyses of language à la L&J, experiments involving 
verbal responses, etc.), which is suspect on two counts, both discussed in chapter 1: 
evidential circularity (i.e. where language serves as “both the predictor…and the 
predicted data” 78 ) 79  and hindsight-bias (where intuition/rationalization of known 
                                                                                                                                            
of these experiments as if they had explicitly tested for image schemas, and some authors (e.g. 
Anderson) as if they had drawn conclusions about image schemas, when in fact they are his 
interpretation of their findings. See Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 25–26.  Of course this does 
not necessarily invalidate his interpretation, but it is at the very least curious that he 
misrepresents these experiments. 
76  Johnson describes the same transformations in a try-this-yourself-at-home manner: 
“Imagine a large sphere and a small cube.  Increase the size of the cube until the sphere can fit 
inside it.  Now reduce the size of the cube and put it within the sphere.” Johnson, The Body in 
the Mind, 26. 
77  Mark Johnson and George Lakoff, “Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied 
Realism,” Cognitive Linguistics 13, no. 3 (2002): 251.  In the same they also refer to “evidence 
that fills the pages of our discipline to overflowing.”(Ibid., 261)  This article, a response to 
Rakova’s critique (cited below), it must be noted, is an ad hominem attack (see ARGUMENT IS 
WAR) that focuses far more on belittling Rakova than responding substantively to her 
reasonable criticisms.   
78 Gregory L. Murphy, “On Metaphoric Representation,” Cognition 60, no. 2 (1996): 183. 
79 Ibid., 183–84; Matthew S. McGlone, “What Is the Explanatory Value of a Conceptual 
Metaphor?,” Language & Communication 27, no. 2 (April 2007): 114–15; Matthew S. McGlone, 
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meanings is (mis)taken for a cognitive processing account).  Second, as argued above, 
some alleged “evidence” brought by L&J, like “image-schematic transformations,” is so 
vague and empirically shoddy as to not be worthy of the name.  Third, much of the 
empirical work on metaphor comprehension supposedly supporting CMT has been 
rightly criticized and empirically rebutted by cognitive scientists (several examples of 
which were discussed in chapter 180) for both its unparsimonious conclusions and the 
mistaking of post-hoc rationalization for actual meaning construction, or as McGlone 
succinctly put it, metaphor “appreciation” for “comprehension.”81   
 As an example of the latter methodological error, among several others, in the 
context of image schema research, consider Gibbs et. al.’s seminal and oft-cited 1994 
experiment, which “attempted to experimentally show that the different senses of the 
polysemous word stand are motivated by different image schemas that arise from our 
bodily experience of standing.”82  Significantly, the study is given pride of place in his 
                                                                                                                                            
“Hyperbole, Homunculi, and Hindsight Bias: An Alternative Evaluation of Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory,” Discourse Processes 48, no. 8 (2011): 567–68. 
80 Sam Glucksberg, Boaz Keysar, and Matthew McGlone, “Metaphor Understanding and 
Accessing Conceptual Schema: Reply to Gibbs (1992),” Psychological Review 99, no. 3 (1992): 
578–81; Boaz Keysar and Bridget Bly, “Swimming Against the Current: Do Idioms Reflect 
Conceptual Structure?,” Journal of Pragmatics 31, no. 12 (1999): 1559–1578; Boaz Keysar and 
Bridget Bly, “Intuitions of the Transparency of Idioms: Can One Keep a Secret by Spilling the 
Beans?,” Journal of Memory and Language 34, no. 1 (1995): 89–109; Sam Glucksberg, Mary 
Brown, and Matthew McGlone, “Conceptual Metaphors Are Not Automatically Accessed 
During Idiom Comprehension,” Memory & Cognition 21, no. 5 (1993): 711–719; Sam 
Glucksberg and Matthew McGlone, “When Love Is Not a Journey: What Metaphors Mean,” 
Journal of Pragmatics 31, no. 12 (1999): 1541–1558; Matthew McGlone, “Conceptual 
Metaphors and Figurative Language Interpretation: Food for Thought?,” Journal of Memory 
and Language 35 (1996): 544–565. 
81  Matthew S. McGlone, “Hyperbole, Homunculi, and Hindsight Bias: An Alternative 
Evaluation of Conceptual Metaphor Theory,” Discourse Processes 48, no. 8 (2011): 565. 
82 Gibbs Jr. and Colston, “The Cognitive Psychological Reality of Image Schemas and Their 
Transformations,” 352. 
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and Colston’s 1995 summary of empirical research that substantiated the “cognitive 
psychological reality of image schemas and their transformations,” and for good 
reason: it was, at the time, “the only empirical work in psychology that has explicitly 
set out to investigate the possible role of image schemas in perception, thought, or 
language use.”83    
 The first of the four experiments that comprised the study (each involving separate 
subjects) proceeded as follows: 
  
As a first step toward understanding how image schemas partly motivate the meanings 
of the polysemous word stand, a preliminary experiment sought to determine which 
image schemas best reflect people’s recurring bodily experiences of standing.  A group 
of participants were guided through a brief set of bodily exercises to get them to 
consciously think about their own physical experience of standing.  For instance, 
participants were asked to stand up, to move around, bend over, to crunch, and to 
stretch out on their tiptoes.  Having people actually engage in these bodily experiences 
facilitates participants’ intuitive understandings of how their experience of standing 
related to many different possible image schemas.  After this brief standing exercise, 
participants then read brief descriptions of 12 different image schemas that might 
possibly have some relationship to the experience of physical standing (e.g., 
VERTICALITY, BALANCE, RESISTANCE, ENABLEMENT, CENTER-PERIPHERY, LINKAGE).  
Finally, the participants rated the degree of relatedness of each image schema to their 
own embodied experience of standing.  The results of this first study showed that five 
image schemas are primary to people’s bodily experiences of standing (i.e., BALANCE, 
VERTICALITY, CENTER-PERIPHERY, RESISTANCE, and LINKAGE). 84 
 
                                                
83 Ibid., 354. 
84 Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. et al., “Taking a Stand on the Meanings of Stand: Bodily Experience 
as Motivation for Polysemy,” Journal of Semantics 11, no. 4 (1994): 231–51. 
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In the second experiment, participants grouped 35 usages of “stand” (e.g. “stand at 
attention,” “let the issue stand,” “stand the test of time”) into five groups by similarity 
of meaning.  In the third experiment, participants were led through the standing 
exercises, read the descriptions of the five highest rated image schemas from 
experiment 1, and then prompted to “rate the degree of relatedness” between those 
image schemas and 32 usages of “stand.”  Gibbs et. al. then correlated the findings 
from this experiment with those of the second, concluding as follows:  
  
Statistical analyses showed that knowing the image schema profiles for different senses 
of stand allowed us to predict 79% of all the groupings of stand in Experiment 2. These 
data provide very strong support for the hypothesis that people's understandings of the 
meanings of stand are partly motivated by image schemas that arise from their bodily 
experiences of standing.85  
 
 For a number of reasons, this flawed study proves nothing of the sort.  The 
products of conscious reflection on the experience of standing86 are crucially different 
from the preconceptual abstract patterns that might be subtending that activity.  Tacit 
gestalts and (prompted) cogitations on experience are different in kind.  Similarly, 
being read descriptions of an image schema—e.g. “Consider the notion of 
                                                
85 Gibbs Jr. and Colston, “The Cognitive Psychological Reality of Image Schemas and Their 
Transformations,” 353.  The fourth experiment was a control study meant to eliminate the 
possibility that groupings of “stand” were determined by semantic context.   
86 “Participants in this study were guided through a brief set of bodily exercises to get them 
consciously to think about their own physical experience of standing.” [my emphasis] Gibbs Jr. et 
al., “Taking a Stand on the Meanings of Stand,” 235.  Incidentally, the “experience of standing” 
arguably should not include moving around, bending over, crunching, etc, which would invoke 
all sorts of different image schemas unrelated to simply standing.  Why these exercises were 
chosen is not discussed.   
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VERTICALITY. Verticality refers to the sense of an extension along an up-down 
orientation. As you stand there, do you feel a sense of verticality?”87—has as much to 
do with the actual image schema as a description of gastrointestinal enzymatic activity 
has do with actual digestion.  A description of an image schema is not an image schema, 
and putting a “notion” in someone’s head does not magically access the preconceptual 
cognitive structure that it is meant to reference.  The equation of preconceptual 
cognitive structure with conscious reflection on what are, for all intents and purposes, 
concepts that bare the same name (even described to the subjects as “notions,”) is as 
methodologically naïve as it is theoretically misconceived.   
 Yet this error is perfectly consistent with what I have argued throughout is one of 
the basic flaws of CMT and IST, namely the mistaking of post-hoc linguistic analyses 
for a process account of meaning.  If Gibbs et. al.’s study is successful, it is precisely at 
confirming that some of L&J et al.’s conceptual categorizations reasonably correlate 
with some aspects of meaning when people are made to think about them in those 
categories (and made to think about standing and “verticality” while standing just 
before answering questions about usages of “stand”).  But even if my argument were 
entirely wrong, and they did in fact access the image-schematic level of subjects’ 
cognition, the authors’ move from correlation to causation is still utterly unwarranted.  
That they can mostly predict semantic groupings of “stand” by “image schema profile” 
does not demonstrate that the latter “motivates” the former.  That this is an assumption 
of the experiment, posing as a finding, is evident from Gibbs’s own description of the 
                                                
87 Ibid., 237. 
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aim of the study, namely to understand “how,” not if, “image schemas partly motivate 
the meanings of the polysemous word stand.”  
 Gibbs et al.’s foundational study is a veritable synopsis of the various 
methodological and theoretical flaws that pervade CMT and IST: it takes conclusions 
as assumptions, it conflates (or at least fails to consider carefully the distinction 
between) the pre-conceptual and conceptual, it mistakes conceptual correlation with 
cognitive motivation, and post-hoc appreciation for meaning generation.  If this was 
the evidential centerpiece for IST as of 1995, the body of evidence may not be as 
robust as claimed.   
 Even as recently as 2011, in his summary of the empirical research corroborating 
CMT, Gibbs conceded that, thirty years on, a number of fundamental questions 
remain unanswered: 
 
First, does one initially access the complete conceptual metaphor (e.g., “Love 
relationships are journeys”) from memory and then apply it to infer the metaphoric 
meaning of an expression (e.g., “Our marriage is a roller-coaster ride from hell”)? 
Second, if the conceptual metaphor is accessed prior to interpretation of expression, 
does it come with a package of detailed meaning entailments or correspondences that are 
also inferred as part of one’s understanding of what the expression means?; or, must 
people compute source-to-target domain mappings online to determine which 
entailments of the conceptual metaphor are applied to the meaning of utterance? Finally, 
do conceptual metaphors arise as products of understanding and are, therefore, not 
necessary to create an initial understanding of a metaphorical expression?...  
…There are, as of yet, no empirical studies that provide exact answers to these 
questions.88  
                                                
88 Raymond W. Gibbs, “Evaluating Conceptual Metaphor Theory,” Discourse Processes 48, no. 8 
(2011): 550. [emphasis added] 
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 Johnson’s second kind of evidence, the “systematicity of literal expression,” is, in 
other words, the linguistic evidence for conceptual metaphor compiled in MWLB.  For 
many reasons laid out in chapter 1, this is proof neither of image schemas nor their 
metaphorical elaborations.   
 The third kind of evidence is our ability to use and comprehend novel metaphorical 
expression.  For example, a sentence like “His theories are Bauhaus in their 
pseudofunctional simplicity” is readily understandable, L&J argue, because it is a 
reasonable employment of the “unused” part of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS (the “used” 
parts being those that are “typically projected onto the target domain,” in this case a 
building’s foundation and outer shell89).  First, if expressions based on the “used” part 
of conceptual metaphors fail to demonstrate their existence, then neither do those 
based on the “unused” parts.  Second, their distinction between “used” and “unused” is 
unsubstantiated in the first place, based only on what they consider an “ordinary” 
usage.90  As the “unused” part can structure the target domain, i.e. it acts as a 
conceptual metaphor, there is no functional difference between the two.   
 Johnson’s fourth source of evidence, polysemy, is again a restatement of CMT.  He 
argues that the multiple, related meanings for a term (e.g. “out,” “up,” etc.) can be 
explained only by underlying image schemas and their metaphorical extensions.  I 
argued in part one that L&J’s polysemic nets are cast too widely, that many usages fall 
outside a global explanation, and other theories of metaphor deal compellingly with the 
                                                
89 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 106. 
90 Ibid. 
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phenomenon without resorting to image-schematic structures.  Furthermore, a 
schematic subsumption (as in Lindner) of varied usages, even if plausible, proves only 
that it is possible as an interpretational/conceptual exercise, not that it is a mental 
reality.   
 The fifth type of evidence comes from a study of diachronic semantic change by 
Sweetser, who noted the “general tendency to borrow concepts and vocabulary from 
the more accessible physical and social world to refer to the less accessible worlds of 
reasoning, emotion, and conversational structure.”91   For instance, several Indo-
European roots that originally referred to vision later came to include meanings related 
to understanding (e.g. “I see what you mean”).  Liaising between these two domains is 
PHYSICAL TOUCHING/MANIPULATION, which many vision words etymologically 
intimate (e.g. “behold,” “perceive” (Lat. “seize”), “discern” (Lat. “separate”)).  For 
Johnson, these findings “suggest the existence of shared metaphorical systems (e.g. 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING) in our understanding that are tied up with our bodily 
experience…. If there is any intelligibility to this change, then we have good reasons to 
think that metaphorical projections in our experience are central to the whole 
process.”92 
 Johnson’s embracing of Sweetser’s phylogenic account as confirmation of his 
ontogenic one points to a questionable conflation of the two in both MWLB and TBM. 
Cultural linguistic evolution is not the same as individual cognitive/linguistic 
                                                
91 Eve Sweetser, “Semantic Structure and Semantic Change: A Cognitive Linguistic Study of 
Modality, Perception, Speech Acts, and Logical Relations” (University of California, Berkeley, 
1984), 26. Quoted in Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 107. 
92 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 109. 
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development and there seems little reason, prima facie, to suppose that the latter 
recapitulates the former.  The former, in fact, would seem to obviate the need for the 
latter.  If, for example, UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING has become built into a language 
over time, so that many ‘understanding’ words are ‘seeing’ words, the young language 
acquirer need not recreate a possible metaphorical derivation of one from the other in 
order to comprehend them.  She need only learn the meanings of the words, that is, 
how to use them appropriately.  Her language instruction does not follow etymological 
or conceptual patterns.  It is only upon later reflection—of the sort that L&J’s system 
is in reality based on, as I have argued—that such relationships could be uncovered.  
Conceptual polysemy appears to be irrelevant in the face of practical polysemy, a post-
hoc interpretive overlay.  Etymology is not ontogeny.  At the very least, L&J would 
need to explain how the historical/cultural interacts with the personal/cognitive, which 
they have yet to do adequately.93 
 Johnson’s final type of evidence involves “metaphorical constraints on inference.”  
If it can be demonstrated that people’s underlying metaphorical conceptions determine 
specific inferences they make when reasoning in that domain, then those conceptions 
are clearly not just verbal but conceptual phenomena.   Johnson interprets a set of 
experiments by Gentner and Gentner on analogical reasoning as corroborating 
precisely this point.  Subjects operating with one of the two most common 
                                                
93 The same issue was noted in chapter 1 regarding L&J’s discussion of ARGUMENT IS WAR.  
Conceding the experiential priority of ARGUMENT, they reason: “[e]ven if you have never 
fought a fistfight in your life, much less a war, but have been arguing from the time you began 
to talk, you still conceive of arguments, and execute them, according to the ARGUMENT IS 
WAR metaphor because the metaphor is built into the conceptual system of the culture in 
which you live.” (Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 64.)  See chapter 1 for a critique 
of this rationale.            
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metaphorical models of electricity (“fluid-flow” or “moving-crowd”) were asked to 
solve problems concerning battery and diffuser alignments.  Subjects using the “fluid-
flow” model did better on battery questions and “moving-crowd” modelers did better 
on diffuser questions, results that were predictably consistent with inferences from 
their respective models.94   Johnson concludes as follows: 
 
Someone who proposes a strict theory/practice separation might argue that these 
experiments show only an obvious fact—that humans use different models to apply their 
knowledge.  But these are just cases of “application” of independently existing 
knowledge.  I am suggesting the stronger thesis that such models constitute an 
individual’s understanding of a phenomenon and thereby influence their acts of 
inference.  The metaphors, or analogies, are not merely convenient economies for 
expressing our knowledge; rather they are our knowledge and understanding of the 
particular phenomenon in question.”95   
 
Johnson thus admits of no alternative between two extreme views of metaphor, 
according to which they are either a superficially linguistic means of expressing 
preexisting knowledge or thoroughly constitutive of, indeed nothing other than, 
knowledge itself.96  In championing the latter, he puts forward the clearest expression 
                                                
94 Subjects were asked to report on how they solved the problems, from which researches 
extrapolated which model they were using. In another version of the experiment, subjects were 
first taught one of three models (two variations of “fluid-flow” and the “moving-crowd” model) 
and then asked to solve the problems.  Results were consistent with the first experiment for 
resister problems, but there was no difference among models for battery problems. 
95 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 112. 
96 The Gentners’ own conclusions are far more modest than Johnson’s.  They submit only that 
our analogies influence our inferences, that “analogies can have genuine effects on a person's 
conception of a domain.” Dedre Gentner and Donald R. Gentner, “Flowing Water or Teaming 
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yet of Murphy’s “strong view” of metaphoric representation, according to which 
representationally bankrupt target domains are completely structured by source 
domains.97  The ample problems with such a view were pointed out in chapter 1, but 
one is particularly relevant here.  If the metaphors we use simply are our knowledge, 
there would appear not only to be no way of noticing incorrect inferences in the target 
domain, but also no mechanism for revising or jettisoning a metaphor if it is unsuitable.   
Indeed the very idea of suitability or accuracy would be impossible without some 
indigenous understanding of the target domain.  By erasing any separation between 
domains, Johnson renders us incapable of having perspective on those models or even 
recognizing them as such.  By subsuming target within source so that reality is always 
already mediated, his account would seem to imprison us in a metaphoric determinism. 
Indeed, Johnson’s very reflection on the role of metaphor in cognition (i.e. MWLB, 
TBM, etc.) would be impossible on his account.  
 These issues are seen even more clearly in Johnson’s interpretation of Selye’s work 
on stress, summarized above.  In brief, he explains Selye’s momentous formulation of 
stress as involving a move from the regnant conception of the BODY AS MACHINE to the 
novel conception of the BODY AS HOMEOSTATIC ORGANISM.  Johnson’s reconstruction 
of the process of that move, spurred by Selye’s inability to make sense of his medical 
and experimental observations within the dominant MACHINE metaphor, is as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Crowds: Mental Models of Electricity,” in Mental Models, ed. Dedre Gentner and Albert 
Stevens (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1983), 99.  
97 Murphy, “On Metaphoric Representation,” 176–79.  
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The first step was his recognition that he was dealing with a syndrome of response, 
rather than a mere aggregate of symptoms.  In searching for an explanation of the 
frustrating results of his sex hormone research, Selye began explorations we see as 
depending upon the power of the HOMEOSTASIS metaphor.  Under the BODY AS 
HOMESTATIC ORGANISM one would tend to see every bodily response as serving some 
function.  Thus, Selye began to understand this syndrome of response as having a 
general function…Now a new explanation was possible for these facts under the 
HOMEOSTASIS metaphor—the syndrome could now be seen as the body’s general 
adaptive response to toxicity.98 
  
In sum, Selye, a man in search of a metaphor for his ill-fitting observations, found one 
that “made it possible to understand…the cluster of symptoms previously 
discovered.”99  It is plausible, however, that it was precisely the other way around: 
Selye’s coming to terms with his findings helped create the new metaphor, fashioning its 
contours and features as parallels of the literal ideas he was forming.  Such a reading 
would be problematic for Johnson because it undermines the primacy and constitutive 
role of metaphor.  
 Of course neither reading is demonstrable, as it involves getting inside Selye’s head.  
There are, however, two reasons to prefer mine.  First, it makes better sense of the 
emergence of the new metaphor (and new metaphors in general).  In my reading, it 
was generated, or at least instigated, by new knowledge.  For Johnson, it appears the 
emergence has to be either lucky or magical.  If Selye truly had no grasp of the 
meaning of his observations, how could he go about finding a new metaphor to explain 
them?  His search would have to be blind in some sense—he might stumble on a 
                                                
98 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 131.  
99 Ibid. 
 
97 
metaphor that fits his observations in some way (and then determine if other 
inferences are fruitful), but there would be no way of knowing what to look for.100  
This does not render Johnson’s account impossible, only, I would argue, 
phenomenologically dubious.101    
 Second, and perhaps more importantly, Selye’s story, as Johnson conceives it, is 
not a story of exchanging one metaphor for another, for the second one, by Johnson’s 
definition, is simply not a metaphor.  The body is quite literally a homeostatic organism.  
Presumably, Johnson treats HOMEOSTASIS as a kind of BALANCE, specifically 
EQUILIBRIUM, metaphor.   Yet, in his earlier exposition of those image schemas, 
Johnson asserts that “we understand the notion of systemic balance in the most 
immediate, preconceptual fashion through our bodily experience.”102  In other words, 
EQUILIBRIUM emerges from our bodily experience of “systemic balance,” namely 
physiological homeostasis.  Remarkably, Johnson even exemplifies that experience 
with some of the same symptoms and processes that eventually led Selye to his 
breakthrough (unwittingly, of course):  
                                                
100 I would contend that Johnson’s awareness on some level of this dilemma led him to make 
what at first seems like a curious claim in his reconstruction of Selye’s thought process, quoted 
above.  He writes, “[t]he first step was his recognition that he was dealing with a syndrome of 
response, rather than a mere aggregate of symptoms.” Only after this does Selye adopt the new 
HOMEOSTASIS metaphor.  But why is that adoption contingent on the first step?  I would 
argue that Johnson realized that without it, Selye couldn’t know how to find the right 
metaphor.  In other words, that initial recognition puts him on the path towards a metaphor 
that can deal with the idea of “response.”  But Johnson’s attempt to have his cake and eat it 
too self-destructs because that first step should, on his account, already depend on the 
metaphorical shift.  That is, the notion of “a syndrome of response” does not exist in (is not a 
permitted inference of) the MACHINE metaphor (which lacks the agency to have such a thing); 
it is already a homeostatic notion.      
101 Johnson’s phenomenological aspirations are evident in the introduction where he describes 
his method as a “descriptive or empirical phenomenology” whose test of success is 
“comprehensiveness, coherence, and explanatory power.” Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xxxvii. 
102 Ibid., 75. 
 
98 
 
There is too much acid in the stomach, the hands are too cold, the head is too hot, the 
bladder is distended, the sinuses are swollen, the mouth is dry.  In these and numerous 
other ways we learn the meaning of lack of balance or equilibrium.  Things are felt as 
“out of balance.”  There is “too much” or “not enough” so that the normal, healthy 
organization of forces, processes, and elements is upset.103  
 
Clearly, BODY AS HOMEOSTATIC ORGANISM cannot be considered a metaphor if the 
“target” is the paradigmatic case that grounds the “source.” 
 What for Johnson is an example of metaphor’s constitutive influence on perception 
and cognition (i.e. the Selye story), I would argue instead demonstrates our manifest 
ability to push back against the influence of metaphorical models and towards a more 
suitable (even non-metaphorical) framework for explaining our reality.  That ability 
presupposes our ability to achieve perspective on our models, to see them as models, to 
question their accuracy with respect to the reality they frame, and to shape them as 
much as they shape us.  It is this perspective, this essential distance, that is precisely 
denied by Johnson’s treatment of metaphor as absolutely constitutive.   Ironically, 
Johnson’s very project of exploring the role of metaphor would be impossible if his 
account were right.  Here, as elsewhere, Johnson mistakes an essentially conceptual 
interpretation (and a flawed one at that) for a cognitive explanation.    
 The same flaw—mistaking analysis for explanation—subtends Johnson’s 
experiential/image-schematic derivation of various laws of logic.  The CONTAINER 
schema, he argues, generates the “law of the excluded middle” in the following manner:  
                                                
103 Ibid. 
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It follows from the nature of the CONTAINER schema (which marks off a bounded 
mental space) that something is either in or out of the container in typical cases.  And, if 
we understand categories metaphorically as containers (where a thing falls within a 
container, or it does not), then we have the claim that everything is either P (in the 
category-container) or not-P (outside the container).  In logic, this is known as the “Law 
of the Excluded Middle,” that is, there is no third possibility between possessing a 
property (i.e. falling within a category) or not possessing that property (falling outside 
the category).  In those cases, therefore, where we understand certain phenomena via 
CONTAINER metaphors (and most of us operate with such simplified models much of 
the time), the principle “Either P or not-P” has an intuitive basis in our daily experience 
with containment.104  
 
It is unclear how such a contingent account (contingencies in bold105) is meant to 
explain the experiential basis of a culturally shared logical law.  Perhaps part of the 
problem is that Johnson never establishes or defends satisfaction criteria for 
experiential bases.  His methodology seems instead to involve the same problematic 
hypothesis confirmation procedure of MWLB (highlighted by Ortony106): if a concept 
can be found in image-schematic structure, then that must be the concept’s basis.107  
                                                
104 Ibid., 39.  Using the same reasoning, he derives the law of negation. 
105 I would include two more, unstated contingencies: propositions (what ‘P’ stands for) must 
be understood as properties, and then properties must be understood as categories.   
106 Andrew Ortony, “Are Emotion Metaphors Conceptual or Lexical?,” Cognition & Emotion 2, 
no. 2 (1988): 99. 
107 Or, more generally, as Vervaeke and Kennedy, characterizing Johnson’s modus operandi, 
put it: “[O]nce a metaphor is shown to be a version of a schema Johnson deems the work of 
understanding the nature of the metaphor to be complete. The trick, for Johnson, is to find the 
schema, and once that ‘image’ is found then Johnson takes it that ‘human understanding is 
image-schematic through and through, from the most primitive and mundane unreflective acts 
of perception and motor activity all the way up to abstract reasoning and argument.’” John M. 
Kennedy and John Vervaeke, “Metaphor and Knowledge Attained via the Body,” Philosophical 
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But that depends on accepting the larger claims of IST, namely that image schemas are 
the foundation of reasoning.  More importantly, that depends on who fashions the 
image schemas and what structure is imputed to them.  Johnson recognizes that 
despite the implications of the two-dimensional CONTAINER schema, entities can be 
neither in nor out, hence the qualifier “in typical cases.”  In fact, however, in all the 
experiences Johnson cites as the basis for the schema—breathing, eating, entering 
rooms, etc.—there is the possibility of being both/neither in and/nor out.  Moreover, if 
we are to take the kinesthetic aspect of image schemas seriously, the transition from 
inside to outside a container, or vice versa, is an essential part of its dynamic structure.  
It is no surprise, then, that the container language we use often (“typically”?) makes 
use of this facet (“on its way out,” “sticking out,” “almost in,” “on the boundary,” 
“overflowing,” “on the edge,” even “entering”108).  It is, then, only by neglecting 
structural features of CONTAINER that Johnson derives the foundation of various 
logical concepts.109 
                                                                                                                                            
Psychology 6, no. 4 (1993): 409.  Even if we take these similarities between image-schematic 
structure and logic to be genuine, correlation is not causation. 
108 Or, understanding colors as categories, that turquoise is both/neither green and/nor blue. 
109 Even if Johnson’s account were internally coherent, there is yet another caveat that should 
attend his explanatory venture here, unmentioned by Johnson, but admitted by Lakoff: “[T]he 
fact that reasoning can be done with them [i.e. image schemata] does not prove that reasoning 
is done with them.” Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, 459.  Scholnick and Cookson 
add another important proviso: “Even though metaphors can be used to construct abstract 
concepts and tools of thought, that neither proves that abstract concepts are constructed 
metaphorically or that the metaphors chosen by experiential realists are the child's first entry 
into particular abstract domains. In addition, the translation of meaningful images into formal 
rules requires a more detailed theory of the detection of similarities and mapping relations than 
cognitive semantics currently provides.” Ellin K. Scholnick and Kelly Cookson, “A 
Developmental Analysis of Cognitive Semantics: What Is the Role of Metaphor in the 
Construction of Knowledge and Reasoning?,” in The Nature and Ontogenesis of Meaning, ed. 
Willis F. Overton and David Stuart Palermo (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1994), 
120. 
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 There are two issues here: who decides what is typical and what is the role of 
typicality in determining the form of image schemas?  And more generally, how 
exactly are these embodied patterns (i.e. image schemas) abstracted from experience 
and at what level of generality/specificity? Johnson addresses none of these.  His 
image schemas are asserted to be cognitively real, constantly structuring our 
experience and, via their structural “entailments,” our (metaphorical) understanding.  
Their structure is therefore an empirical issue with great cognitive consequences.  His 
failure to recognize the traces of his interpretation or explain the mechanism of pattern 
emergence—an aspect one would think absolutely central to IST—is therefore deeply 
problematic.    
 This unnoticed interpretive leeway in determining structure introduces the 
possibility of ad hoc reasoning.  To wit, Johnson’s image schema (can) have whatever 
“definite internal structure” he needs them to have to “generate” the entailments he 
wants. 
 From a developmental psychological standpoint, too, Johnson’s derivation of 
category-inclusion from CONTAINER (presupposed in the “law of the excluded middle” 
derivation) is, as the psychologists Scholnick and Cookson argue, potentially unsound: 
 
We use developmental research on children's knowledge of taxonomies to argue that 
knowledge of containers and part-whole relations may be insufficient to derive the 
formal logic of class inclusion. Because children do not exploit the full implications of 
the container schema we question whether it structures category formation or simply 
bolsters already present category knowledge.110  
                                                
110 Scholnick and Cookson, “A Developmental Analysis of Cognitive Semantics: What Is the 
Role of Metaphor in the Construction of Knowledge and Reasoning?,” 120–21. More 
specifically, “We argue that if the container schema structures our knowledge of categories, a 
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 Yet a different problem undoes Johnson’s derivation of our understanding formal 
reasoning itself from PATH, FORCE, and CONTAINER schemas:111 
 
When we reason, we understand ourselves as starting at some point (or proposition or 
set of premises), from we proceed in a series of steps to a conclusion (a goal, or stopping 
point).  Metaphorically, we understand the process of reasoning as a form of motion 
along a path—propositions are the locations (or bounded areas) that we start out from, 
proceed through, and wind up at.112   
The force of logic moves from one propositional location to another—forcing us to 
conclusions.  From this, the basic axiom of the logic of logical necessity follows: 
 
!P→P (“If P is logically necessary, then P is true.”) If the force of logic operates to 
move you to a certain “place,” then you wind up in that place. 
 
Given our understanding of negation in terms of the CONTAINER schema (not-P is 
located outside the bounded space defined by P), the intuitive relation between necessity 
and possibility follows immediately: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
body of implications should be present very early. The child should know that a category 
delimits objects belonging to a class from those that do not. But research on formation of 
classes shows a piecemeal emergence of this insight…. Yet another reason for doubting an 
image schema underlies understanding is that toddlers only group together items that are 
practically identical, as opposed to members of basic categories. The slow mastery of sorting 
skills does not suggest that the child's performance is automatically guided by a coherent 
theory of category extension based on some underlying schema. Perhaps the structure is there, 
but the child has difficulty mapping it.” (Ibid.) 
111 Though this problem is also applicable to the derivation of the law of the excluded middle 
from CONTAINER. 
112 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 38. 
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~!~P→◊P (“If it is not logically necessary that P is false, then it is logically possible for 
P to be true.”)113 
 
 
Even granting the details of Johnson’s account (i.e. neglecting my argument against 
his derivation of negation from CONTAINER), what he has given is not an explanation 
of the basis of formal reasoning, i.e. how logic works, but a superficial description of its 
overall form.  As Rakova remarks, “to say that someone arrived at a proposition A 
does not in the least clarify how he or she arrived there, i.e., the fact that we talk of 
propositions as if they were locations is no explanation for those cognitive mechanisms 
which make such inferences possible.” “One cannot,” argue Kennedy and Vervaeke, 
“reduce reasoning to temporal order.”114  Equally, to say that logical necessity is the 
“force of logic” moving you to a certain place says nothing about the source of that 
force—in other words how or why a particular logical maneuver is cogent.  To say that 
a proposition’s truth equates to being in a container says nothing about how or why it 
got in there—in other words, how it is determined that a proposition is true.  This is de 
dicto analysis masquerading as de re explanation.   
 In chapter 1, following Murphy and Haser, I underlined the basic difficulties 
attending L&J’s account of cross-domain mapping.  Murphy argued that CMT 
requires inherent target domain structure to be both minimal, in order to accept 
metaphorical projection, and maximal, to prevent incorrect inferences.  Haser argued 
that the “experiential basis” of conceptual metaphors appear to presuppose the very 
                                                
113 Ibid., 63–64. 
114 Kennedy and Vervaeke, “Metaphor and Knowledge Attained via the Body,” 409. 
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understanding of the target domain that the metaphorical projection is meant to confer.  
The introduction of image schemas in TBM adds a new layer to the story of cross-
domain mapping.  Rather than mitigating or solving these difficulties, however, it 
aggravates and codifies them, rendering the entire phenomenon of conceptual 
metaphor confused beyond intelligibility.  
 In TBM, “experiential correlation” still grounds conceptual metaphors.  Johnson 
maintains, for example, that MORE IS UP arises from regular co-occurrences in 
experience, for example seeing the level of a pile rise when objects are added to it, or 
the level of liquid in a container rise when more is poured in.  In addition, however, 
now the metaphor “is based on, or is an instance of,…the SCALE schema,”115 by which 
Johnson means that both source and target domains are instances of SCALE, the 
schema that subtends experiences of increase and decrease.  Let us call these type-1 
projections.  But this is precisely not the mechanism of metaphorical projection 
Johnson describes time and again: 
                                                
115 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 122.  The introduction, however, presents a different 
formulation: “we understand QUANTITY in terms of the VERTICALITY schema.”(Ibid., xv).  
Assuming these are meant to be two versions of the same idea, VERTICALITY must be a 
specification, variation, or sub-schema of SCALE (the more general schema).  Johnson asserts, 
however, that VERTICALITY emerges “from our tendency to employ an up-down orientation in 
picking out meaningful structures of our experience.”(xiv)  It is furthermore unclear if 
QUANTITY is meant to be a schema or a concept (one of the other entities that receives caps, 
along with domains and metaphors – clearly this system does not aid clarity).  (And 
presumably there is no difference between it and “amount” or AMOUNT, the term(s) Johnson 
uses in the later account (i.e. Ibid., 121-22)).  Perhaps these differences are more semantic 
than cognitive.  Then again, for a “cognitive semantics”, they might be consequential.  
Specifically, the meta-structure of schemas is never systematically addressed.  The discussion 
of BALANCE and FORCE schemas suggests that there is or at least can be a categorial 
organization: BALANCE incorporates four schemas (Johnson’s figures 17-20, Ibid., 86-87), 
with the TWIN-PAN BALANCE schema the “prototypical” version.  Yet it is never explained if 
this organization plays a role (and if so what role) in image-schematic operations (i.e. in our 
experience) or is just a conceptual organization by Johnson.  Nor is it explained if 
prototypicality is a function of conceptual, experiential, or other factors.    
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Through metaphor, we make use of patterns that obtain in our physical experience to 
organize our more abstract understanding. ...our bodily movements and interactions in 
various physical domains of experience are structured (as we saw with image schemata), 
and that structure can be projected by metaphor onto abstract domains.116 
 
We saw…that balance in visual perception already involves a metaphorical projection 
of schematic structure from the realm of the physical and gravitational forces and 
weights to a domain of visual forces and weights in “visual space.”117  
 
In so many words, the thing that is projected in “metaphorical projections” is image-
schematic structure.  Thus Johnson refers simply to “schematic metaphorical 
projections” or “metaphorically extended image schemata.”118  
 Hence the contradiction: since MORE is already structured by SCALE, the 
metaphorical projection of UP’s schematic structure (i.e. SCALE) is superfluous.119   
Furthermore, MORE, being already directly structured by an image schema—meaning 
it is a non-abstract, physical domain of experience—definitionally does not require 
                                                
116 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xv. [my emphasis] 
117 Ibid., 99. 
118 Ibid., 98, 101. 
119 Even according to another possible reading (which is not made explicit in Johnson)—that 
VERTICALITY (as a variation or specification of SCALE) is UP’s schema and MORE IS UP 
confers VERTICALITY on MORE’s SCALARITY, enabling the linguistic borrowings from UP—
the story fails to make sense.   Johnson would still have to explain why MORE, having 
schematic structure, needs any help from UP.  Furthermore, as I argue in the following note, 
MORE should not need UP’s language anyway as it already possesses literal equivalents for all 
UP terminology.   
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further structuring for our comprehension of it.  By Johnson’s own logic, metaphorical 
projections between schematic domains are unnecessary.120   
 Moreover, Johnson’s system actually forces him into this contradiction, for it 
would appear that “experiential correlation” depends on image-schematic commonality.  
It is precisely two domains’ common image-schematic structure that allows for a point-
to-point isomorphism in the first place.  In other words, it is only because MORE and 
UP are both already SCALES that a “rise” can be correlated with an “increase” and a 
“fall” with a “decrease.”  But this yields the circle in Johnson’s logic: image-schematic 
commonality between source and target is presupposed in the grounding of the 
metaphor whose purported purpose is to project that very structure from the former to 
the latter.121  
 The type of metaphorical projection that Johnson actually discusses in his 
theoretical exposition, namely that from an image-schematic domain to a schema-less 
                                                
120 The projection is redundant for yet another reason. In general, what is accomplished along 
with the imposition of schematic structure is the importation of the terminology associated 
with that structure; Hence the metaphorical language that then characterizes the target domain.  
For MORE IS UP, not only is there no need for the structure (as it already has scale structure), 
but there should also be no need for up language.  For all the literal language of up, more 
appears already to have equivalents: for “high/up” it has “more,” for “rise” it has 
“accumulate/increase,” etc.  This is just another way of saying it is independently, directly 
structured.  It is no surprise, then, that Johnson (or L&J in MWLB) never explains why more 
is considered an abstract domain.  By their definition, it is not.   
121 The same is true for the (only) other metaphorical projection of this type discussed, namely 
PURPOSES ARE PHYSICAL GOALS (later renamed PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS).  It is only 
because the domains of intention and physical action are both already PATH schemas that they 
can be meaningfully correlated.  He admits as much in a 1991 article, in which he rehearses the 
experiential grounding story of TBM (discussed above):  “There arises, then, a connection in 
our experience between structure in the domain of intentions and structure in the domain of 
physical actions.” Mark Johnson, “Knowing through the Body,” Philosophical Psychology 4, no. 
1 (1991): 11.  That “structure” is, of course, image schematic, specifically SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.  
The projection of that very schema in the metaphor is thus both redundant and circular.  And 
Johnson’s assertion that “the metaphorical mapping is isomorphic with the experiential 
pairing,”(Ibid., 116) is not an insight or discovery, but mere tautology.   
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abstract domain (which I will call type-2 projections) fares no better.   It is, in a sense, 
the inverse of the problem with type-1 projections.  For without image-schematic 
commonality, effectively the enabler of “experiential correlation”, there is nothing to 
pair source and target domain experientially, hence no grounding for the metaphor.  
How are ARGUMENTS and CONTAINERS, EMOTIONAL HEALTH and EQUILIBRIUM, or 
MORAL JUDGMENT/MATHEMATICAL EQUALITY and BALANCE, correlated in 
experience?   Johnson is silent on this question.  The problem is actually deeper, for 
not only do these sets of domains happen not to be experientially correlated, but 
Johnson’s system makes a correlation impossible.  Because image-schematic structure 
is “experientially formative,” “the level that defines form itself,”122 that is, constitutive of 
experience, prior to the target domain’s metaphoricization (i.e. image-schematic 
importation), there is simply no experience with which the source domain could be 
correlated. 123   How could anything be meaningfully correlated with an 
“undifferentiated mush”? 
 The introduction of image schemas thus only exacerbates the inadequacies of 
MWLB’s account of structure and experiential grounding, indeed codifying the 
confused logic subtending it.  Either way Johnson construes the grounding and 
dynamics of metaphorical projection—as based on a common image schema or 
between an image-schematic and abstract domain—contradiction results. Image-
schematic domains cannot structure other image-schematic domains because the latter 
are already structured, and they cannot structure abstract domains because there is no 
                                                
122 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 208. 
123 In MWLB, the correlated experience turns out to be the very experience structured by the 
metaphorical projection, giving rise to a circularity identified by Haser (see chapter 1).      
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experience to correlate them.  Projections of the former kind are redundant and of the 
latter kind impossible.124   
 The core issue can be restated, to return to Murphy’s framing, in terms of inherent 
target domain structure.  Johnson needs the target domain to have image-schematic 
structure already for it to be an intelligible domain at all and for it to be experientially 
correlated in the first place.  But he also needs it be without image-schematic structure 
for the projection of image-schematic structure to occur and be useful.  His attempt to 
have it both ways—for an image schema be both the basis of the projection and the 
thing projected—results first in his presenting two contradictory accounts of 
metaphorical projection, and, in particular, the circular reasoning that undoes type-1 
projections.125  
 It also leads to blatantly contradictory accounts in two subsequent publications.  
Recall that in TBM, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS is presented as a type-1 projection, 
i.e. both domains are inherently structured by PATH.126  In a 1991 article, the same 
                                                
124 That Johnson puts forward not one but two versions of conceptual metaphor can perhaps 
be seen to issue from his implicit awareness of the two-horned dilemma.  In other words, the 
dilemma explains the otherwise curious fact that Johnson’s theoretical discussion of 
metaphorical projection deals exclusively with type-2 projections yet the only specific 
examples he gives that attempt to elucidate the mechanism of structuring involves type-1 
projections.  Specifically, the latter would be incoherent to explicate theoretically and the 
former incoherent to exemplify.   
125 The most concise statement of this circularity is presented by Johnson himself, in his 
response to Kennedy and Vervaeke’s criticism, discussed presently, of the circularity: “By 
virtue of common features and image-schematic structure shared between two conceptual 
domains, we construct metaphors in which we project structure from a domain of one kind 
(the source domain) onto a domain of a different kind (the target).” Mark Johnson, 
“Conceptual Metaphor and Embodied Structures of Meaning: A Reply to Kennedy and 
Vervaeke,” Philosophical Psychology 6, no. 4 (1993): 413.  The problem, again, is that the 
“structure” by virtue of which the mapping is possible is identical with the “structure” that is 
allegedly projected in the metaphor.   
126 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 115. 
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metaphor, with the same experiential grounding story, instead involves “[o]ur 
projection of the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL in our understanding of intentional activity [i.e. 
PURPOSES].” 127  Kennedy and Vervaeke rightly criticize the circularity of this view: 
 
…what made the connections possible in the first place is, apparently, that intended 
actions and tracking an object from A to B have the same schema. It is not clear, then, 
how intended action could derive its schema in the first place from a projection that rests 
on connections that can only be made if the schema is already present! This is a chicken-
and-egg problem that Johnson skirts around and does not recognise. Indeed, once 
Johnson asserts that the schema allows the connections, and the connections allow 
projection, he then claims the projection is a metaphor that constitutes "our very 
understanding of intentional action itself."128  
 
 In short, schematic structure cannot be both the grounding connection that enables 
the projection and also the thing projected.  In his response to their critique (which, I 
would argue, he misunderstands 129 ) Johnson produces the most confused and 
contradictory exposition of conceptual metaphor yet.  He changes his position again, 
affirming that (now in reference to LOVE IS A JOURNEY), “[t]here most definitely is a 
                                                
127 Johnson, “Knowing through the Body,” 11. (PATH was renamed SOURCE-PATH-GOAL 
around this time.)  
128 Kennedy and Vervaeke, “Metaphor and Knowledge Attained via the Body,” 408.    
129 “They insist that I am stuck with the following chicken-and-egg problem.  If metaphors are 
mappings between two different conceptual domains, then each of those domains must already 
be conceptually determinate and well-structured.  And if metaphors are based on common 
features between two domains, then those features must pre-exist, and we cannot claim that 
the target domain derives structure from the source domain.”  Johnson, “Conceptual 
Metaphor and Embodied Structures of Meaning,” 414.  This is not Kennedy and Vervaeke’s 
argument, the crux of which is quoted above, but rather a straw man of Johnson’s making 
(which, ironically, in his attempt to dismiss it, only ends up showing how trenchant the true 
critique is).   
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shared image-schematic structure between these two domains, namely, the ‘source-
path-goal’ image schema.”130 Perhaps realizing that this would render the mapping 
unnecessary (as I argued above), Johnson introduces a new fold in the story: “But, on 
the basis of this shared structure, we go further to take the logic of the source domain 
and project it onto the target domain to give rise to new structure in the target 
domain.”131  For this explanation to carry any weight, a domain’s “logic” would have to 
be something different from its schematic structure, otherwise, again, the target 
domain, which already has the schematic structure, would already have the “logic” as 
well.  Yet this is precisely not the case, as he makes clear throughout the article: 
 
Image schemas that arise in our sensorimotor interactions have their own “spatial” or 
“corporeal” logic.... The logic of a particular image schema (which is based on its 
internal structure)…. 
 
The “source-path-goal” schema defines its own definite corporeal logic.132   
 
In other words, what Johnson here calls “logic” is nothing other than what he called 
“structural entailments” in TBM (e.g. the transitivity of CONTAINMENT, reflexivity of 
                                                
130 Ibid., 418. Why LOVE should inherently have SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure is far from 
obvious, not explained in his discussion, and contradicted by L&J’s assertion in MWLB that 
“LOVE is not a concept that has a clearly delineated structure; what-ever structure it has it gets 
only via metaphors.” Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live by, 110. This in spite of the fact 
that three pages earlier he also reaffirms the other position: “metaphors involve a mapping of 
structures and features (including image-schematic structure) from a source domain onto a 
target domain.”  Johnson does not explain what he means by “features” or (the implied) non-
image-schematic structures. 
131 Johnson, “Conceptual Metaphor and Embodied Structures of Meaning,” 418. 
132 Ibid., 415–16. [emphasis added] 
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BALANCE, etc.).  Because the “logic” of a schema is a property of its structure, it is 
incoherent to argue that a mapping between two SOURCE-PATH-GOAL domains 
consists of projection the “logic” of the source onto the target.  By definition, the target 
domain already has it.   
 Lakoff fares no better with his contemporaneous attempt to elucidate the 
mechanism of cross-domain mapping.  Indeed, his “invariance principle” is subtended 
by circular reasoning:  
 
In the examples we have just considered, the image-schemas characterizing the source 
domains (containers, paths) are mapped onto the target domains (categories, linear 
scales). This observation leads to the following hypothesis, called The Invariance Principle:  
Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema 
structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the 
target domain.  What the Invariance Principle does is guarantee that, for container 
schemas, interiors will be mapped onto interiors, exteriors onto exteriors, and 
boundaries onto boundaries; for path-schemas, sources will be mapped onto sources, 
goals onto goals, trajectories onto trajectories; and so on.”133 
 
It is only as a result of the mapping (see first sentence) that the target domain gains 
image-schematic structure, i.e. interiors, boundaries, sources, etc.  That is, in fact, 
                                                
133 George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” in Metaphor and Thought, ed. 
Andrew Ortony, 2nd ed (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 215.  Cf. Lakoff’s earlier version, called the “invariance hypothesis”: “Metaphorical 
mappings preserve the cognitive topology (this is, the image-schema structure) of the source 
domain.” George Lakoff, “The Invariance Hypothesis: Is Abstract Reason Based on Image-
Schemas,” Cognitive Linguistics 1, no. 1 (1990): 54.  Absent the culminating clause of the 
“principle,” the “hypothesis” appears to claim nothing more or other than what Johnson 
spends the entire TBM arguing for, namely that conceptual metaphors are projections of 
image-schematic structure.  It is rather odd, then, that Lakoff, as if ignorant of his partner’s 
recent book, claims it as his own finding.    
 
112 
precisely the raison d’être of the conceptual metaphor.  To then claim that “interiors will 
be mapped onto interiors,” etc. is nonsensical, for there was no (target) interior before 
the mapping, and if there were, the mapping would be unnecessary.  Thus, the 
“inherent structure of the target domain” (the first mention of such a notion in the 
thirteen years since MWLB) turns out to be precisely that which is mapped onto it by 
the metaphor.134  
 The continuation of the above explication only deepens the contradiction: 
 
To understand the Invariance Principle properly, it is important not to think of 
mappings as algorithmic processes that start with source domain structure and wind up 
with target domain structure....  One should instead think of the Invariance Principle in 
terms of constraints on fixed correspondences: If one looks at the existing 
correspondences, one will see that the Invariance Principle holds: source domain 
interiors correspond to target domain interiors; source domain exteriors correspond to 
target domain exteriors; etc.  As a consequence it will turn out that the image-schematic 
structure of the target domain cannot be violated: One cannot find cases where a source 
domain interior is mapped onto a target domain exterior, or where a source domain 
exterior is mapped onto a target domain path. This simply does not happen.135 
 
There are no “fixed” or “existing correspondences” until the mapping establishes them.  
Target domain interiors, trajectories, etc. cannot already exist and also be projected by 
the metaphor.  What Lakoff presents as insight is tautology, for the target domain has 
no pre-mapping image-schematic structure that could be violated.  
                                                
134 For a similar argument, see Verena Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy: 
Challenging Cognitive Semantics (Berlin!; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 150. 
135 Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” 215. 
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 My critique thus far has highlighted several shortcomings, difficulties, and aporiae 
in Lakoff and Johnson’s philosophy.  I have argued that the very notion of image 
schemas is beset by paradox, if not contradiction, and that their purported cognitive 
indispensability is unsubstantiated.  The evidence for their existence consists either of 
restatements of CMT, which I have challenged separately, questionable, if not 
unsound, interpretations of psychological and philological findings, or 
methodologically flawed psycholinguistic experiments.  Johnson’s treatment of 
metaphor as completely constitutive of understanding—erasing any epistemological 
separation between target and source—would deny our manifest ability to recognize 
them as metaphors, let alone examine (e.g. MWLB, TBM), question, and change them.  
The account(s) of metaphorical mapping by “experiential correlation” is rendered 
incoherent by Johnson’s conditioning of intelligible experience on image-schematic 
structure.  Abstract (i.e. schema-less) target domains cannot yield experience with 
which to be correlated and concrete (schematic) domains, even if correlated, do not 
require the structure conferred by the mapping.  
 More globally, I have suggested that Johnson’s alleged explanations (e.g. Selye) 
and derivations (e.g. of logical laws) appear instead to be conceptual, interpretative 
overlays (and questionable ones at that), that the image-schematic model of cognition 
is essentially a reading back of “adult” conceptualizations into cognitive processes that 
do not necessarily resemble or make use of such structures and mechanisms. The 
ensuing phenomenological critique corroborates this accusation of  “psychological 
fallacy.  
 
* 
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 The majority of these theoretical complications can be seen to issue from the 
foundational claim that image schemas are prerequisite for, indeed create, intelligible 
experience, that schema-less experience (an oxymoron by Johnson’s account) would 
be an “undifferentiated mush.”  It is this claim that generates the paradox of image 
schema emergence by necessitating their presence in the very experiences that 
supposedly give rise to them.  It lies, as mentioned, at the heart of the circularity of 
“experiential correlation” by denying the target domain the basic sense it would need 
to be meaningfully correlated.  And because metaphorical projection is essentially 
image-schematic projection, the latter’s constitutiveness is passed on to the former, 
resulting in the metaphoric blindness and determinism discussed above 
 But why make the metaphysical assumption, as Kant does, that the world is 
inherently formless, thereby necessitating an account of how we mentally structure it?  
For one, nothing in our conscious experience evidences such a thoroughgoing 
configuration of an otherwise meaningless reality.  Rather, the world appears to us as 
always already meaningful.  “We must not…wonder whether we really perceive a 
world,” Merleau-Ponty exhorts in Phenomenology of Perception, “ we must instead say: the 
world is what we perceive.”  Of course this is not, nor meant to be, a knockdown 
argument against Idealism, Kantian or otherwise.  Theories that rely on essentially 
hidden mental processes, as we saw with CMT, are perhaps impossible to truly refute.  
Merleau-Ponty’s tack is instead to expose the inadequacies and internal inconsistencies 
of such a view, specifically showing how they necessarily miss or cannot explain 
certain basic aspects of experience.  A fuller discussion of his arguments against the 
“traditional prejudices” of “empiricism” (e..g Berkeley, Hume) and “intellectualism” 
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(e.g. Descartes, Kant)—the former positing sensation, the latter judgment as the 
building blocks of perception—appears in chapter 4.  My aim here is to consider a few 
of his key objections to intellectualism—along with elaborations by Hubert Dreyfus 
and Charles Taylor—and to demonstrate their applicability to L&J’s project, 
particularly IST.  Though image schemas represent an advance over the mental 
representations and categories of classical intellectualism, I maintain that, despite their 
purportedly embodied origins, they operate in essentially the same way, namely as 
abstractions that structure a senseless external reality.  
 Resting fundamentally on a dichotomy of mental (inner) and physical (outer), 
intellectualism’s basic task is to elucidate their interaction.  Its premise, as summarized 
by Taylor, is that “[k]nowledge of things outside the mind/agent/organism only comes 
about through certain surface conditions, mental images, or conceptual schemes within 
the mind/agent/organism. The input is combined, computed over, or structured by the 
mind to construct a view of what lies outside.”136  In this dualistic picture, our 
knowledge of the world is fundamentally mediated, giving rise to two basic questions: 
whence these images or schemes? and how are they appropriately applied in specific 
situations?   
 The trouble with the first question is that these images or schemes cannot, on pain 
of circularity, emerge from the very reality they are instrumental in structuring.  Thus 
Kant’s categories are asserted to be a priori, though this does not solve the problem as 
much as hide it.  Descartes’s ideas, in particular their instantiations as little pictures of 
                                                
136  Charles Taylor, “Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen (Cambridge, UK; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 27. 
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the outside world, only begs the question of the interpretation of those representations, 
leading to the well-known homunculus problem.137  
 As for the second question, Dreyfus, following Merleau-Ponty, and speaking of 
more recent intellectualist incarnations—e.g. mainstream cognitivism—summarizes 
one of the attending difficulties:  
[T]he intellectualist cannot explain how the organism could possibly use features of the 
current situation to determine which rule or concept should be applied.  There are just 
too many features, so the selection of relevant features requires that one has already 
subsumed the situation under the relevant concept.138 
 
Though Dreyfus here refers specifically to the domain of skill acquisition, the same 
problem attends perception generally.   And this problem again boils down to a 
circularity:  if schemes are required to make sense of reality in the first place, there is 
no underlying sense that could summon the appropriate scheme.  
 Even if the right scheme or concept is somehow applied, a further problem ensues, 
that of incorrigibility about our own perception.  For by binding judgment (i.e. 
schemes, categories, etc.) to perception, making the latter a condition, or even nothing 
                                                
137 For a discussion of more recent versions of the intellectualist mediational term (i.e. images, 
categories, beliefs, etc.) see Ibid., 28–33.  For a thorough critique of cognitivist mental 
representations, see Benny Shanon, The Representational and The Presentational:  An Essay on 
Cognition and the Study of Mind (Hertfordshire, England: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 259–308. 
See Hasty bibliography for more. 
138 Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen (Cambridge, UK!; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129.  For his Merleau-Pontyan critique of 
cognitivist models of artificial intelligence, see Hubert L Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t 
Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).  See also Hubert 
Dreyfus, “Intelligence Without Representation–Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental 
Representation: The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation,” Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 4 (2002): 367–83. 
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other than, the former, there can be no way to know if a judgment is wrong.  As 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, ““if we see what we judge, how can we distinguish between 
true and false perception?”139 
 A seed of these difficulties, as suggested above, is the supposition of an orderless 
external reality and thus the necessity for mediation between it and us.  The way out, 
then, is to recognize that our primal interaction with the world is directly meaningful, 
that we are not disembodied minds in a chaotic nature, but embodied beings who 
skillfully cope with their surroundings.  And this is possible because there are not two 
terms—physical/mental or inner/outer—but a unitary phenomenon, being-in-the-world, 
which is prior to, and ultimately a condition for the intelligibility of, such intellectualist 
conceits.  “[O]ur body is not an object for an ‘I think’, it is a grouping of lived-through 
meanings.” 140   One of Merleau-Ponty’s radical achievements is to ground our 
knowledge of the world in our embodied negotiation of it.   
 The last predicate could have been taken right out of The Body in the Mind.  Indeed, 
Johnson sees himself as advancing (in both senses) Merleau-Ponty’s agenda, 
specifying and systematizing the bodily bases of meaning.141   He rejects the notion of 
an objective reality—a feature of “objectivism”—and intellectualist mainstays like a 
priori concepts and mental images.  Yet despite these and other facets of his project that 
appear to pit him against intellectualism, I contend that he is in fact closer to Kant than 
                                                
139 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London!; New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 40. 
140 Ibid., 177. 
141 Mark Johnson, “Merleau-Ponty’s Embodied Semantics—From Immanent Meaning, to 
Gesture, to Language,” Eurameri-Ca 36, no. 1 (2006): 1–27. 
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Merleau-Ponty, that his notion of embodiment is ironically intellectualist, and that his 
approach suffers accordingly. 
 The key aspects of the intellectualist model are central features of Johnson’s 
philosophy.  As shown above, he explicitly posits a meaningless world precisely to 
highlight the basic, indispensable work that image schemas perform: 
 
Without them [i.e. image schemata] our experience would be an undifferentiated 
mush.142  
 
What makes experience intelligible, in fact what makes it experience at all, are image 
schemas. In other words, they do the same kind of work that Kant’s schemas do, 
namely they mediate our knowledge of the world.  This much is made plain by Johnson, 
whose use of the term “derives from its original use as it was first elaborated by 
Immanuel Kant.”143  But whereas Kant’s structures of imagination were a priori, 
Johnson wishes to derive them from the very experiences they supposedly structure, 
resulting in the paradox outlined above.   
 Like Kant’s schemas, Johnson’s are abstract, indeed abstracted from our early, 
embodied experiences.144  In the most basic sense, then, they represent the world.  And 
like classic mental representations, they are applied in specific situations to structure 
them.  But how?  Again no account is provided.  The problem of appropriate 
                                                
142 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 206. 
143 Ibid., 24. 
144 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 24, xiv., 24. 
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application is apparently not recognized by Johnson, who just assumes the relevant 
schema is activated when it is relevant: 
An actual COMPULSION schema exists as a continuous, analog pattern of, or in, a 
particular experience of cognition that I have of compulsion.  It is present in my 
perception of a jet airplane being forced down the runway…or (metaphorically) in my 
felt sense of being forced by peer pressure to join the PTA.  The schema proper is not a 
concrete rich image or mental picture; rather it is a more abstract pattern that can be 
manifested in rich images, perception, and events.145 
 
In virtue of which features of these experiences does COMPULSION get summoned?  
How does this actually happen in real time?  The problem is not just that no account is 
given, but, as Dreyfus argues, no account could be given.  Of the innumerable features 
of even the simplest experiences, the selection of the right ones to subsume under the 
right schema would seem to be impossible.  The experience would already have to be 
understood as an instance of the schema.  For all his attention to embodied meaning, 
Johnson pays little attention to its necessarily taking place in time. 
 The intellectualist problem of incorrigibility shows up for Johnson once a schema 
or metaphor (i.e. image-schematic projection) is applied.  As argued above, because 
image schemas, or their projections, constitute our experience and knowledge, there can 
be no way of recognizing if the wrong one was applied.  By collapsing experience and 
schema—essentially arguing that all experience is schematized—Johnson denies the 
underlying experience against which a schema or metaphor could be checked.  
                                                
145 Ibid., 2. 
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  Here, then, is the critical difference between Johnson’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
versions of embodiment: for the former, it is not our actual, situational, specific 
embodied maneuverings in the world, but their generalized, abstract structure, that 
grounds meaning.  This crucial step of mediation leads to the various intellectualist 
difficulties raised above.  For Merleau-Ponty, embodied coping happens in each and 
every situation and is not governed by representations, schematic or otherwise.  
“Movement is not thought about movement, and bodily space is not space thought of 
or represented.”146  On this account, as Dreyfus puts it, “the best ‘representation’ of our 
practical understanding of the world turns out to be the world itself.”147   Embodiment, 
for Merleau-Ponty, entails the embedding of knowledge (conceptual as well as 
practical), not as abstract structures in the mind but in the body’s unmediated being-in-
the-world.  For Johnson, embodiment provides the raw material, as it were, for the 
schemas that actually make experience intelligible, along the intellectualist model.   
Johnson’s characterization of his project as “putting the body back into the mind” 
perfectly captures the problem.148    
 
   
 
 
 
                                                
146 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 159. 
147  Dreyfus, “Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science,” 132.  See also Dreyfus, 
“Intelligence Without Representation – Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation: 
The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation.” 
148 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, xxxvi. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Analysis and/of Performance: Chopin Op.28, 1 & Brahms Op.119, 1 
 
Music is what I am when I experience it. 
- Thomas Clifton1 
 
 
 An experimental hypothesis: Let music be defined by the experience of its 
performance.  Let the description of that experience be called “music analysis” and its 
conceptualizing “music theory.” Let the following score be a set of instructions for 
making music, not music itself, a recipe, not a dish.  Let us taste and talk of the dish.  
Let the following observations be an invitation to the experience they try to articulate. 
 
 
 
Example 1. Chopin Op.28, 1, mm.1-42 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Thomas Clifton, Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1983), 297. 
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 Claudio Arrau3 consistently stresses the tenor line4  (i.e. G3-A3 in mm.1-3) by 
strongly accenting the first of those notes in each measure.5   This accent pushes one in 
the direction of hearing these as downbeats. Indeed, in some performances, for 
instance Jeanne-Marie Darré’s,6 the measure is effectively shifted forward a triplet 
sixteenth for much of the piece, so that the bass notes (i.e. C2 in m.1, B1 in m.2) are 
heard as anacruses and the meter as a fairly normal triple, with G4 and A4 as beats 2 
and 3.  Allowing the last notes of each measure to linger over the following bass notes 
and softening the latter normalizes this triple feel further.  It is precisely these two 
mutually reinforcing factors, treated oppositely by Arrau, that prevent his version from 
slipping into this triple feel, namely his sharp curtailing of the end of each measure, 
and the stress he gives each bass note.  The former disallows what would be a proper 
third beat and the latter reasserts the low bass note as downbeat.  The result is a rich 
metric ambiguity wherein the downbeat can shift both between the bass note and the 
first tenor note and everywhere in between, depending on, among other factors, those !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Frédéric Chopin, Preludes, Op.28, in Friedrich Chopin’s Werke, Band VI (Leipzig: Breitkopf and 
Härtel, 1878): 1. 
3 Claudio Arrau, Claudio Arrau in Concert, Vol. 1: Chopin 24 Preludes Op. 28, Schumann Symphonic 
Etudes Op. 13, recorded 1960, Appian APR 5631, 2001, compact disc.  
4 My use of “tenor,” “alto,” and “bass” in this discussion is for registral-referential purposes and 
is not necessarily meant to imply a vocal quality.  
5 I make no claims whatsoever about these performers’ intentions.  These authors are dead, in 
the Barthesian sense.  I speak only of my experience with these sound recordings.  If at times 
my language (“Arrau stresses, Sokolov suggests, etc.) appears to betray that stance, it is only 
to avoid cumbersome phrases like “It appears to me that something seems stressed here in 
Arrau’s recording” etc. The focus is not on what a performer tries or means to do, but the effect 
that is created for me. It is not their experience I am trying to get at but mine.  
6 Jeanne-Marie Darré, Chopin: Preludes Op. 28, Fantasy in F minor, Op. 49, Berceuse Op. 57, OVC-
8092, 1995. 
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just outlined.  It can be “in between” in at least two ways, what we might call “both” 
and “neither.”  In the former, it acts as a kind of rubato, in the way a pianist or classical 
guitarist might separate the bass from melody for expressive or practical purposes.  
Somewhat paradoxically, though unproblematically, both notes are heard as “the 
downbeat” despite their temporal dissociation.  In the latter, the downbeat is somewhere 
in the duration between bass and tenor but cannot be fixed. 
 This ambiguity and tension, a result of a complex web of melodic, durational, and 
accentual factors, opens up significant expressive possibilities, not least of which a 
keenly felt agitato as metric disquiet.  In addition, because each measure can present 
any of the above options (i.e. bass as downbeat, tenor as downbeat, “both,” and 
“neither”) as well as shades thereof (e.g. “bass as slightly early downbeat,” “almost 
both,” etc.), patterns can emerge across consecutive and even non-consecutive 
iterations of the gesture.  For example, in Arrau’s performance, m.1, because of the 
marked accent on G3 along with a fairly soft C2, leans more towards bass as anacrusis 
and tenor as downbeat.  In m.2, the downbeat shifts slightly closer to the bass note, in 
m.3 slightly more, and by m.4 it is solidly on the downbeat. The bass thus  “catches up” 
to the downbeat over the first four measures, and this progression shapes the opening 
4 bars in several ways.  As a tentatively completed process (i.e. the bass “caught up”, 
and Arrau’s suddenly loud E2 in m.4 enhances this feel), it lends a certain closure to 
this segment (or even identity as a segment): m.4 is felt as something of a goal, perhaps 
even as the resolution of a (now retroaural) metric ambiguity.  This in turn teleogically 
shades the C5 in m.4: it is now something we reach, or, we might say, it is heard as a 
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locally culminating .7  This aspect of mm.1-4’s shape and energy ramifies forward as 
well, and in ways that a different(ly shaped) mm.1-4 simply could not.  Perhaps most 
palpably, as a 4-bar antecedent, specifically, this 4-bar antecedent, it affects what kind 
of consequent we will get, what mm.5-8 will be able to do, in what field of potential and 
expectation it will act. 
 All of the above pertains largely to just one aspect of how this motive moves.  Of 
the many more, let us return to the issue of line.  We can say more than “Arrau stresses 
the tenor line,” for there are many types of stress and many types of line.  For one, the 
metric variability influences its rhythmic articulation inversely to how the bass note is 
heard.  Specifically, the first tenor note of each measure can be downbeat, second 
triplet sixteenth, and “in between” in the many ways outlined above.  The differences 
among these possibilities are important, even constitutive.  Simplifying somewhat and 
dealing with just two of these options, landing on the downbeat lends a certain stability 
to the line, whereas landing just after sharply syncopates it.  A downbeat G3 and a 
syncopated G3 carry two different kinds of energies forward, affecting how they move 
to the second note (i.e. A3 in mm.1, 2, and 3, if indeed that is where they move) and 
consequently its relationship with that note.  Simplifying again, the latter, catapulted 
by the syncopation, begs or depends on the second note (in the way syncopated notes 
often seem to seek a “landing”) whereas the former, already rhythmically stable, moves 
more freely to the second note.  We might say that the former G3 leans or leads more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 To feel this, imagine (aurally) instead if Arrau had waited until m.5 to allow the bass to catch 
up, thus creating more of a 5 measure arc, at least in this parameter.  Notice how the C5 now 
partly loses that sense of culmination.  With m.5 as a kind of goal, the first four measures now 
together lead up to it.  This in turn makes them a different kind of 4 measure group and 
antecedent, which of course affects the consequent, and the shape of the 8 measure phrase.   
8ˆ
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to the second note than the latter.  These are not the same lines just metrically 
displaced, but different lines.  
 What happens to the right hand notes when the tenor line is stressed?  For Arrau, 
though there is a fairly distinct upper line (i.e. G4-A4 in m.1, 2, and 3) from the outset, 
it is partly clouded by the flourish that wraps up each measure’s gesture.  To an extent, 
even the tenor A3 gets swept up in this flourish, partially connecting the tenor and alto 
lines in their joint culmination.  As a result, the alto line is heard not so much as a kind 
of echo of the tenor line but as something that joins it.  In this way, the lines, though 
also separate, are united in a single gesture, and one that becomes more distinct over 
mm.1-4).   
 The fairly sharp curtailing of m.1’s gesture separates it somewhat from m.2’s, 
affecting the relationship between m.1’s A3/4 and m.2’s G3.  What might have been an 
upper neighbor figure is turned instead into a new kind of escape tone.  That it 
resolves by step instead of leap, as the textbook definitions have it, does not detract 
from the sense of its having been “left hanging.”  As a result, measure 2 acts as a kind 
of “retaking” a “second attempt” of sorts.  Measure 3’s A3/4, on the other hand, 
connects more clearly with measure 4’s B4, highlighting the - - -  ascent.  In this 
regard, Arrau’s first four measures work as a 2+2, with perhaps the first 2 acting as a 
kind of 1+1.  Earlier argued for a sense of simply “4” due to the bass’s “catching up” to 
the downbeat.  But these seemingly conflicting accounts need not present a problem.  
Experience is multivalent, and each of these trajectories ramifies forward.  
5ˆ 6ˆ 7ˆ 8ˆ
! 127!
 Like Arrau’s, Ivo Pogorelich’s8 motives play with metric ambiguity, but of a 
different sort, and with different causes and effects.  Like Arrau, he curtails the gesture 
at the end of each measure, only more forcefully.  This almost violent truncation 
(evidenced and emphasized by the audible pedal lifting in m.1 and 4), along with 
denying any triple feel, distinctly shapes this gesture, which bursts forth each measure 
only to be suddenly cut off at its dynamic peak.  Unlike in Arrau, the tenor line is 
effectively inaudible as such—m.1’s G3 is simply part of the arpeggio—and though the 
alto notes are more pronounced, they don’t form a distinct line as much as they are 
subsumed by and within the unified gestalt of this explosive gesture.  We hear the A4 
at the end of mm.1-3 as a culmination of the entire upward sweeping gesture, not 
simply, or even at all, as the continuation of G4.  That is to say that for Pogorelich, the 
primary work the alto notes do here is not linear or melodic as much as purely energetic, 
acting as a kind of ricochet of and in each gestural outburst.  His gesture is tighter and 
shorter than Arrau’s and most others, not only because of its speed, but because it has 
fewer distinct parts (e.g. less pronounced bass note, unpronounced tenor line, etc.).  
One of the effects of this shaping is to weight the gesture towards its end where it 
dynamically peaks and where the sudden, strong silencing of it confers a further, 
retroactive accent.  Along with Pogorelich’s relatively soft, unassertive bass notes, this 
forces the downbeat to fall somewhere between the bass note and the next triplet 
sixteenth.  But this does not, like in Arrau, make the bass note sound like an anacrusis.  
Because of the way each gesture is hastily curtailed, almost interrupted by the next 
impatient gesture, the effect is still that of the bass note coming too soon, but not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Ivo Pogorelich, Chopin: Preludes, Deutsche Gramaphone 429227, 1990, compact disc. 
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quantifiably early (as a specific kind of anacrusis), just vaguely, indeterminately early. 
If for Arrau the bass note chases down the downbeat, here it hastens it, eagerly 
overtaking it in each measure.  This metric tension, the effect of the gesture 
breathlessly interrupting and overtaking itself is a key part of the energy Pogorelich 
imbues these measure with, ramifying forward in many ways, and lending a particular 
kind of agitato to his performance. 
 Another effect of Pogorelich’s shaping is to connect A4 so tightly to the unified 
gesture that is it heard neither as upper neighbor nor escape tone to G4, but as 
essentially consonant.  In other words, if for Arrau m.1 presents a C-major chord with 
a move to an non-harmonic tone, Pogorelich’s performance erases that difference.  
There is no move away from an initial sonority.  Rather, the sonority contains A4.  His 
A4 is an added sixth (and in m.2, an added 9th).   
 Because of the way Pogorelich separates these tightly and fairly uniformly shaped 
gestures, and because its very energy seems to take precedence over a sense of line, 
there is a feeling of these first four measures as a kind of 1+1+1+1.  This is not to say 
they are completely disconnected.  Certainly we still feel the harmonic progression that 
links them.  But they are not connected in ways that Arrau’s is.  Instead, there is a 
sense of a gesture, another gesture, one more, and a fourth.  
 If for Pogorelich the alto notes, subsumed by the larger gesture, do not become a 
distinct line, and for Arrau the tenor notes work as a line, then for Grigory Sokolov,9 
not only do the alto notes become a line, but a distinctly melodic one.  To be sure, this 
is aided by the slower tempo, softer volume, and register of the line (compared to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Grigory Sokolov, Chopin Preludes Op. 28, recorded 1990, Opus 111 30-290, 1999, compact disc. 
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Arrau), all of which are more conducive to hearing it as melody.  But it is also that 
Sokolov allows the second alto note (A3 in m.1-3) to linger and so separates this voice 
from the activity below that, with the possible exception of m.1, we don’t hear the 
tenor doubling A4 (m.1-3) or C4 (m.4).  The liberties he takes with the lengths of both 
alto notes opens up expressive possibilities not present in either previous recording.  
Whereas in m.1 G4 is longer than A4 (roughly how it is scored), in m.2 and 3 they are 
equally long, and by m.4 C5 is perhaps even longer than B4, ringing well into the next 
measure.  This is not to say that we hear durations empirically.  What we hear in this 
case is a change in weighting between the notes, and thus a change in the meaning of 
their evolving relationship.  Specifically, whereas in the first measure the brief A4 is 
subsidiary to G4, in the next two measures it acts more as a continuation of the G3, an 
equal partner. By m.4, B4 is very much subsidiary to C5.  This in turn brings out the 
line G4-A4-B4-C5 (mm.3-4), as a connected ascent, whereas in many other recordings 
(e.g. Pogorelich) the B4-C5 acts more as the “next” or “fourth” motivic dyad.  
Alternatively stated, the even weight Sokolov gives the A4 in m.3 allows a stronger, 
melodic connection to arise with m.4’s B4, bringing to the fore the line from G4 to C5 
and with it perhaps a feeling of 2+2 for the first four measures.  Though we can say 
more than “2+2,” for there are many ways 2+2 can work.  In this case there is sense of 
introduction to the first two bars—a somewhat tentative “ramping up”—followed by 
the first real push forward.  This is generated by a fairly sudden loudening and then 
crescendo in m.3-4, which lends an intensity to m.3’s G4-A4 and a retroaural calmness 
to those of m.1-2. And yet, because the rhythm and shape of m.2 and m.3 are so 
similar, there’s an undeniable continuity, further aided by the E3-F3-E3 line which 
connects m.2’s V7 to m.3’s I.  (In many other recordings where there is more of a 
! 130!
separation between these harmonies, this is not the case.  Instead, there is a sense that 
m.3 is a “second” m.1 and not necessarily a resolution of V7, making that dominant 
point more backward than forward.)   In short, there are ways in which Sokolov’s 
mm.1-4 works as 2+2 and others in which it works as 4.  But this is not a problem as 
much as a source of complexity.     
   While Arrau and Pogorelich present a more or less unified, coalesced (if not fixed) 
motive from the beginning, Sokolov’s dramatic “ramp-up” (i.e. the typical acceleration 
that begins phrases) has the effect of presenting a gestural emergence.  Alternatively 
stated, while all three performances start more slowly than they eventually become, 
Sokolov’s goes beyond a simple acceleration—where we here essentially the same 
gesture only climbing to normative speed—to show the gesture in formation.  It is not 
only his more exaggerated “ramp-up” but the particular way he introduces the motive 
in the first measures, that suggests this becoming.  After a quiet opening C2, he rolls the 
octave G’s, the relatively pronounced E3 flowing therefrom.  Out of this largely 
unmetered arpeggio—it is unclear at the outset if it is in fact an arpeggio or a broken 
chord—emerges the G4-A4 melody.  In other words, the effect of Sokolov’s fairly free 
playing of the opening notes is to create not a solid accompanimental figure but a more 
impressionistic milieu out of which a melody arises.  It is not until a few measures in 
that the motive, the relationship among its parts, solidifies.  Namely, the arpeggio 
tightens and becomes regular, if not exactly discernible, so that that the gesture is 
essentially in three parts (arpeggio-alto note-alto note), possibly even heard in three.  
Hence the suggestion of a motivic coming-into-being.  
 Metrically, Sokolov’s relatively amorphous first measure denies a clear grouping, 
but the equal weighting of alto notes in m.2-4 suggests more of a triple feel (like 
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Darré’s), with the bass note as beat 1 and the alto notes as beats 2 and 3.  This almost 
waltz-like feel and the emerging separation between arpeggiated accompaniment and 
melody enables, or is simply part of, Sokolov’s distinctly song-like rendition  
 These three performances realize their motives differently in nearly every way.  
The same notes are imbued with varying energies, disparate internal and intra-motive 
relationships, divergent metric feels, etc. and are thus not at all the same notes.  If 
motive is as motive does, these motives are simply different motives (or, at the very least 
they are motivated differently).  As I have demonstrated, these differences are not 
relegated to its local shape, though that is already significant, but ramify forward in 
countless ways, affecting the entire piece.      
 
 
 
 
Example 2. Brahms Op.119, no.1, mm.1-810 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Johannes Brahms, Vier Klavierstücke Op.119, in Johannes Brahms: Sämtliche Werke, Band 14 
(Leipzig: Breitkopf and Härtel, 1926-77): 163.    
! 132!
 
 
 The famous ambiguity of this passage arises, I would argue, only as a result of an 
entrenched score-based approach.  Depending on how an analyst circles it, cuts if up, 
connects the dots, he or she gets different structures.11  Yet if we abandon the 
assumption of textual authority and take performance as constitutive, not only does 
textual ambiguity dissolve into performance possibilities, but those possibilities, as 
actualized in performance, are more complex and subtle than a theoretically-driven 
segmentation allows for.   To say that the descending thirds “conceal underlying root 
progressions by fifth” is to offer a solution perhaps to a question of compositional 
design, not necessarily one of music as heard.12  This is not to deny a relationship 
between the score and the sound, but rather to emphasize that they are distinct 
phenomena, and that their relationship is not necessarily evident. 
 Thus the passage above is not necessarily more “ambiguous” than the Chopin 
before it, even though from a textual-analytical standpoint the latter submits more 
readily to harmonic parsing.  Granted, the falling thirds introduce a certain harmonic 
indistinctness, but no greater than the metric indistinctness of the Chopin.!  In both 
cases, as in all cases, performers and listeners try to make musical sense of what they 
are given.  Therefore the task here is no different from any other passage, namely to 
try to faithfully describe that sense and its making. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See, e.g., Candace Brower, “Paradoxes of Pitch Space,” Music Analysis 27, no. 1 (2008): 87–
91.               
12 Steven Rings, “The Learned Self: Artifice in Brahms’s Late Intermezzi,” in Expressive 
Intersections in Brahms: Essays in Analysis and Meaning, ed. Heather Platt and Peter H. Smith 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 36. 
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 Markus Groh,13 like many others, highlights the opening F#5 with both volume and 
extended duration, though of course neither can be felt until mid-measure when its 
differences from the ensuing notes become apparent.  To an extent, then, he separates 
that soprano line from the rest, ringing the F#5 across the measure so it may connect 
more clearly with the A5 and G5 that follow.  Though this general tack is very 
common, the particular effect of Groh’s move is not.  Because of the relatively slow 
tempo, the deliberate way each successive note is sounded (which together nearly turn 
them into individual beats), the F#5 gets “faceted,” reoriented, as its context slowly 
unfolds.!  Most prominently, as the G4 and E4 appear, the opening F#5 and the D5 
soften, both individually and as dyad.  Perhaps this is simply the effect of a b minor 
chord (F#5-D5-B4) becoming first a G-major-7 chord (with G4) and then an E-minor-
9 chord (with E4), in other words, the F#5 changing from a sterner perfect 5th to a 
lighter major-7th and major-9th (and similarly for the D4 which becomes a minor 7th 
against E4).  This is logical enough but I would argue ultimately unsatisfying 
phenomenologically, as it mistakes the felt experience for a quasi-information 
processing account, the truly temporal for the simply linear.  We do hear, in Groh and 
some others, the change of the F#5 and D5, but it is less distinct, and also more 
specific, than “G-major-7,” and “E-minor-9,” let alone “E-minor-11.”  It seems to me 
that what we hear primarily are not particular chords, but precisely this softening of 
F#5 and D5, and with it a motivating of those notes, as light, slightly vague dissonances, 
to move to resolutions.  It is this faceting, its causes and effect that takes center stage 
here, and is a part of how Groh sets up a quasi-progression in the first two measures. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Markus Groh, Johannes Brahms: The Late Piano Pieces Op. 116, Op. 117, Op. 118, Op. 119, Avie 
2136, 2008, compact disc. 
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 Groh’s F#5 clearly goes to the A5, which is even slightly more stressed.  But what 
is A5’s relationship to the ensuing G5?  In many performances, A5 acts an anacrusis to 
G5, making it more a part of m.2 than m.1 (e.g. Julius Katchen’s, below).  Groh, by 
contrast, highlights the F#5-A5 connection slightly more than the A5-G5 one, 
downplaying it as anacrusis, as belonging to the next measure.  He does this by 
holding onto A5, inserting a mini hesitation between m.1 and m.2.  As we will see 
below, this shaping of the upper line is one of the elements that allows him to fashion a 
V-I motion at the end of m.2.  In other words, only by establishing this pattern—i.e. 
F#5-A5 and G5-F#5 as somewhat separated figures—can the F# at the end of m.2 be 
independent enough to sound like an arrival.  If the anacrusis figure predominates—
i.e. A5-G5 (mm.1-2) and F#5-C#5 (mm.2-3)—the possibilities of suggesting a V-I in 
m.2 are lessened, if not completely denied (as we will see with Katchen). 
 If A5’s linear meaning is fairly clear, its harmonic/intervallic one is not.  To wit, is 
A5 consonant or dissonant?  Answering this question—not by dint of abstract 
theoretical commitment but by attending to its sound—reveals much about how a 
performance shapes mm.1-2, not least of which the harmonic implications, if any.14   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Though, as with so many events I describe as “effects of” or “results of”, whether explicitly 
or not, it works conversely at the same time.  Specifically, the way A5 is played affects how the 
rest of measure 1 is heard just as the way measure 1 takes shape affects how A5 can be heard.  
Just because A5 occurs after the first few notes does not necessarily mean it has less 
determining power.  It is not as if the meaning of the first notes is completely determined and 
then A5 appears.  Rather, the appearance of A5 helps determine the meaning of the first few 
notes, just as the latter helps determine the former.  In a sense this happens at precisely the 
same moment—a co-determination (though here let us have “determine” not imply 
exhaustiveness or finality).  Causation in this sense is mutual, reciprocal.  It is perhaps only the 
exigencies of language, the habits of thought, and an impoverished notion of temporality that 
have us speak as if cause and effect were sharply distinguishable things whose relationship is 
one-directional.  This may be true in physics, but in (musical) experience, effects create causes 
as much as causes create effects.  By “create” I do not mean “bring into existence” in the strict 
sense, but something like “confer identity upon,” “specify,” or simply “identify” (in this new 
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 For Groh, despite the faceting of F#5 into a light dissonance against a somewhat 
inchoate E-minor, there is a sense that this is a leap from the 5th to the 7th of B-minor, 
meaning there remains a feeling of B-minor throughout measure 1.15  This does not 
necessarily contradict its transformation into an E-minor-9 chord (or a vague 
predominant with dissonances).  As emphasized above, that transformation is only 
partial—it is an affordance taken on in measure 1, but not the only one.  What forms in 
measure 1 is both a tentative B-minor and E-minor chord but also neither.  All of these 
meanings, or affordances, are carried forward as potentialities, which can then be 
seized upon variously by ensuing events.16  This rich ambiguity is afforded by Brahms’s 
unfolding of thirds, which flowers in harmonic availability, and of course Groh’s 
realization.  It is the B-minor affordance, that aspect of measure 1’s meaning, that 
makes A5 sound like its 7th.  Its relationship to the E-minor affordance is less clear, for 
though it is not heard as an 11th of that chord, it still is heard in relation to at least the 
E3 itself.  Its relationship is intervallic if not harmonic.  In fact, the way A5 partly 
denies E-minor is partly responsible for the latter half of measure 1 not completely 
becoming E-minor.  And at the same time the suggestion of E-minor prevents B-minor 
from ever fully establishing itself.  These tensions result in the multiple affordances 
under discussion.  A third prenominate affordance is “neither,” i.e. in yet another 
sense, measure 1 is heard as a series of thirds, tout court.  To this extent, A5 is the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
sense).  Thus a cause does not become a cause until its effect evidences it as such.  In this way 
it “identifies” the cause.  It crystallizes it as such, thus “creating” it.    
15 Replay Groh’s performance (actually or in imagination), stopping at A5, and feel where it 
wants to resolve.  Notice how it has that particular feel of a minor chord’s 7th. `  
   
16 This is an advantage of thinking in terms of “faceting,” with its implication of multiple, co-
existing, perhaps related, aspects of a single entity or event.   
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upward extension of this series following its opening descent, thus in an important 
sense, “consonant” in this context. 
 Returning to the question of A5’s dissonance/consonance, we can now say that it is 
both, given we reformulate the meanings of the terms.  It is dissonant in two senses: as 
a 7th of a tentative B-minor (a dissonant note but within the consonance of a chord) 
and as a vaguely tense interval against E3.  It is simultaneously consonant as another 
third in a sonic milieu of thirds and as part of the unified B-minor-7th sonority.  All of 
these aspects make up A5 and contradiction results only if the theoretical question of 
its identity is thought of as an either/or problem in need of a definitive resolution.  But 
experience is large; it contains multitudes.  What might be a contradiction in theory is 
simply experiential multiplicity. 
 Groh’s stress of G5 imbues it with a relative urgency and, more globally, lends an 
insistence to measure 2, perhaps as a “retaking” of measure 1.  His launch of G5 (aided 
by the slight delay after A5, as if coiling, winding up) helps activate, mobilize the 
emerging dominant-7th (G5-E5-C#5-A4).  At some point during this emergence 
(probably with the introduction of the C#5, but certainly by A5), G5 becomes a 7th, 
having not started as one.  Carrying forward the affordance of B-minor-7 in measure 1, 
G5 (and the ensuing E5) sounds like the beginning of a iv-chord, a fairly typical 
opening move.  Somehow it does not carry forward the E-minor-7 affordance as a 
continuation of sorts, perhaps because of the interruptive A5.17  However it begins, by 
mid-measure it more or less crystallizes as a dominant-7th, with the prominent 7th (G5) 
leaning towards resolution.  We do not get the hint of a D-major resolution until F#4, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Note also that although the “thirds, tout court” affordance, though still present in mm.2-3, is 
quieted as the dominant asserts itself.   
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which in turn suspends G5 (not as a 9-8 but a 4-3 suspension over the implied D-
major), adding even more gravity to it for an instant before it resolves to F#5 over D4.  
Groh’s slight ritard on F#4 and D4 allows this to feel like a resting point, however 
temporary.  As such it plays a crucial role in allowing it to sound like a progression at 
all.  Yet that resolution, that cadence, and even, by extension, the whole progression 
have an air of provisionality, tentativeness.  In the familiar punctuation terms, this is 
not a period or even a semicolon, but a kind of comma.  Several factors contribute to 
this effect, most prominently its metric weakness, brevity, and Groh’s soft playing, all 
rendering it almost parenthetical.  And although it is not heard distinctly, the sustained 
E5 and C#5 add haziness to the cadence.  But it is also the provisionality and 
tentativeness of the progression itself, the way the first measure remains somewhat 
vague and indistinct, and the way harmonies emerge faintly rather than announce 
themselves.         
 Hence the root motion by fifth, at least in mm.1-2.   Though I hope to have shown 
how inadequate that label alone is in the face of this complexity.   
 Groh’s fashioning of this progression out of mm.1-2 ramifies forward and 
backward.  For one, it makes a segment of sorts out of mm.1-2, albeit only a semi-solid 
one, given the tentativeness described above.  Measure 3 thus has the opportunity to 
be a semi-beginning, to start something new and respond to this past.  And this is 
precisely how C#5 partly works, thanks also in part to the accent it gets.  “Partly” for 
two reasons: Groh holds onto measure 2’s D4 across the bar line so that for an instant 
it is heard along with C#5, and although measure 2’s F#5 is in many ways effectively 
separated from the ensuing C#5, they are still aurally continuous.  These factors liaise 
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between the “progression” of mm.1-2 and m.3, underscoring the provisionality of the 
progression by making its border fluid, and making m.3 only a semi-beginning.    
 Given the pattern of descending thirds established by mm. 1 and 2, m.3 is quickly 
heard as an iteration thereof, perhaps at first as a sequencing of the entire mm.1-2 
group (i.e. there is a projection of mm.3-4 for an instant).  This is yet another 
ramification of Groh’s mm.1-2.  Though technically (i.e. purely notationally) it turns 
out to be an imitation of m.2, for several reasons it is for the most part not heard as 
such.  Whereas m.2’s harmonic directionality was instigated by G5’s becoming a 
tritone (with C#5) and then also a 7th of a dominant (A), m.3’s C#5, as a (major) major 
7th (D4) (or a perfect fifth, if it is heard first in reference to F#4), has hardly the same 
pointing potential.18  Additionally, Groh’s shaping of the end of the measure and its 
continuation into m.4 shades what might be an implied G-major chord strongly toward 
a first inversion E-minor.  With the G-major chord affordance already downplayed by 
the lack of a referential dominant, Groh’s connecting of the G3-B4 dyad with the 
ensuing E5—accomplished both by allowing the dyad to ring into m.4 (so one hears a 
full E-minor6) and turning B4 into an anacrusis to E5, itself accomplished with a 
crescendo beginning on the dyad—further denies G-major in favor of E-minor6.  The 
same factors—the sustaining of the dyad and the crescendo—creates a metric hiccup, 
so that for an instant the G3-B4 dyad sounds slightly like a downbeat against which E5 
is thrown into syncopation.  This effect is afforded by Brahms’s “waiting” a sixteenth 
to introduce C#3 rather than having it land on, and assure it as, the downbeat of m.4.  
The suggestion of G3-B4 as a downbeat is also amplified by C#3’s arrival on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 If we rewrite C#5 as C5, m.3 almost surely becomes an imitation of m.2 with parallel V-I 
movement. 
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second sixteenth, which, along with G4-B4, make for what sounds like a strong beat.  
It is not until the next sixteenth, with the arrival of an undeniable, agogically 
grounding V6/4 that accentual regularity is restored.19 
 Groh’s crescendo into the V6/4, his firm announcement of a true bass line—notice 
how C#3 feels like the introduction of a new voice, not a continuation of m.3’s G3—
resolutely steers what was so far a somewhat vague and ethereal harmonic milieu 
towards an unambiguous, conventional cadence.  C#3 even comes early, preceding G4-
B4 by an instant in its eagerness.  The difference in character between mm.1-3 (minus 
the last sixteenth) and m.4 (plus the previous sixteenth), along with the crescendo and 
increased harmonic and melodic activity that shapes the latter, is such that m.4 is 
nearly interruptive.  The minor cadence retroaurallly confirms mm.3-4’s E-minor6 (as 
iv6 in B-minor), normalizing the progression iv6-ii∅7-V6/4, and also makes sense of 
Groh’s starting the crescendo on the G3-B4 dyad, thereby bringing out this larger 
progression.   The decisive drive towards a B-minor cadence may even retroaurallly 
cast a minor shadow on mm.1-4, perhaps partially resolving the potential modal 
ambiguity (“it was minor all along”).  Then again, and at the same time, the way m.4 
clashes with mm.1-3, almost overrules it, suggests a tension between them, possibly 
casting mm.1-2 (and 3?) as contrastingly major.  In this way, mm.1-4 has the feel of 
3+1.  Groh’s creation of the progression out of mm.1-2, however, suggests 2+2.  Both 
are suggested and carried forward. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 I want to stress that it is not the case that the temporary metric upsetting is “corrected” by 
the return to the normative stress pattern, “revised” so that it is now understood as a “mistaken 
impression.”  That momentary ambiguity is a positive phenomenon.  
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 Sviatoslav Richter20 opens much the way Groh does, with an accented F#5, a 
quieter descent underneath, and a “one-note-at-a-time,” moderate tempo.  His almost 
startling F#5 is even more pronounced than Groh’s, sounding like a bell across the 
measure and over its trail of thirds.  Surprising, then, that the same kind of faceting 
does not happen to his F#5 (and D5).  Instead of the softening of Groh’s F#5, 
Richter’s F#5 is less affected by its emerging harmonic context, partly due to the 
almost insistent independence its attack and relative volume lend it.  Perhaps most 
importantly, Richter holds the pedal through each measure, resulting in an almost 
atonal sonic residue.   Whatever the cause(s), the effect is significant.  For whereas 
Groh’s faceting of F#5 catalyzes the progression he makes out of mm.1-2, Richter’s 
shaping to an extent denies that affordance.  This is not to say that F#5 is not heard at 
all as a 7th or 9th, only that that impression is faint, not primary like in Groh.  This is 
also not to say that a progression is necessarily precluded—Richter does in fact fashion 
a faint V-I in m.2—only that it will necessarily have a different shape and energy than 
Groh’s.  
 The descent in m.1, after the slightly stretched F#5, is almost mechanically even, 
and the sustain of each note is made more salient by the pedal.  Along with the 
unhurried tempo, these aspects yield a homogenous, misty cascade.  That Richter 
allows it to sustain well into the next measure not only further negates the affordance 
of a distinct chordal change (predominant-7th to V7), but gives the impression of one 
hazy cascade supplanting another.  Additionally, the evenness of Richter’s playing to an 
extent subdues harmonic directionality.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Sviatoslav Richter, Out of the Later Years, Vol. 1, recorded 1991-93, Live Classics LCL471, 
1997, compact disc.  
! 141!
 And yet, the implication of a dominant harmony persists—the outlining of the 
tritone G5-C#5 is too strong to deny, though it has hardly the same pull or indexical 
salience as Groh’s.  Though Richter’s G5 rings across the measure, it gets lost in the 
mist, suddenly relegated to the background just after E5’s onset.  (Groh’s G5, by 
contrast, is catapulted across the measure, never losing its primacy.)   Richter’s subtle 
ritard and diminuendo on the last sixteenth of the measure, however, manages to call 
attention to G5’s resolution to F#5 over D4.21  There is doubtless some kind of 
harmonic arrival, but for several reasons it is not as assertive or clear as Groh’s.  Most 
prominently, Richter audibly sustains E5 and C#5 well into m.3, providing not only 
harmonic counterindication but undermining the moment’s punctuation as a harmonic 
arrival.  More broadly, the mist Richter creates in m.2, by now established as a motive 
in its own right,22 again sustains halfway through the next measure, weakening the 
cadence as a point of arrival.  Richter’s connecting of the F#5 with the ensuing C#5 
further undercuts the cadence.  While C#5 receives a renewed attack, implying its 
commencing of something new, the anacrusis-downbeat figure  is undeniable.   Thus 
Richter also downplays a clear mm.1-2 segmentation in favor of a more fluid, 
motivically rather than harmonically driven, grouping of mm.1-3.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Notice how Richter’s arrival on D-major happens on beat 3.5 of m.2, while Groh’s occurs on 
beat 3. While Groh’s F#4 implies a D major arrival over which G5 is momentarily suspended 
(as a 4-3 over an implied D), Richter’s F#4 belongs instead to the vaguely dominant harmonic 
mist of m.2, though more nebulously than as a 13th.  So it is not until the last sixteenth of the 
measure, with F#5-D4, that D-major is suggested. Richter’s G5 is not suspended.  That his 
resolution occurs on the last sixteenth, as if an afterthought, makes it weaker than Groh’s, 
whose entire measure 2 moves towards a more clearly announced D major.   
22 In other words, Richter fashions a motivic event out of these descending thirds and one 
whose distinct rhythm can be felt.  Specifically, as the mist emerges halfway through each 
measure and fades halfway through the next, it cuts across the measures, perhaps even 
generating a shadow meter behind the more obvious one.   
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 Enhancing that feel, measure 3 proceeds, as the two before it, steadily and evenly.  
The dynamic envelope is familiar.  C#’s attack is enough to separate it harmonically 
from the D major suggestion at the end of m.2 (perhaps implying iii for the first half of 
m.3), though the harmonic mist of m.2 remains until around F#4, meaning both 
dominant (E5, C#5, A4) and tonic (A4, F#5, D4) shadows persist behind m.3’s C#5 
and A4.  Harmonically, the opening of m.3 is a richly ambiguous juncture.   
 Much like in Groh, what at first appears to be a 4-3 suspension over a G chord on 
the last sixteenth of m.3, is quickly recontextualized, thanks to the connecting E5 of 
the next measure, as more likely E minor in first inversion.  The connection with E5 
produces a similar metric hiccup, where for a moment G3-B4 feels like a downbeat.  If 
the effects are similar, their causes are different.  Whereas Groh pounces on the B4 
and E5, creating a sudden change in register, texture, and harmonic clarity and 
rhythm, Richter naturalizes it, making it proceed more smoothly from mm.1-3.  This 
move is of a piece with Richter’s overall steadiness and regularity.  Groh’s interruption 
is Richter’s continuation.  As a result, Richter’s C#3 and F#3 in m.4 are felt to come 
from m.3’s G3, creating the line G3-C#3-F#3-E3-D3-G3 etc., making m.4’s C#3, 
played softly, somewhat subordinate to the following F#3.  In contrast, Groh’s 
unmistakable stress on C#3, both loud and early, announces it as a new line in a new 
register, suggesting C#3-F#3-E3-D3 as the operative line (perhaps even as an 
overlapping imitation of the soprano’s B4-E5-D5-C#5 in mm.3-4). 
 Though both performances grow louder in the fourth measure, underlining the 
sense of cadential arrival, the types of arrival and cadence they achieve differ 
substantially, owing proximately to their shaping of the second half of the measure into 
the downbeat of m.5, and globally to their harnessing of the musical energy up to that 
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point.  Richter sustains the crescendo through to m.5’s downbeat (i.e. the arrival on i6), 
in fact hastening the last two beats of m.4.  Though the immediate or obvious goal of 
this buildup is the downbeat of m.5, the extended follow-through of the climax is such 
as to encompass beats two and even three of the measure.  One effect of this is the 
suggestion of an “overshoot,” that the energy of the cadential approach and arrival was 
so great as to propel the music beyond the tonic to VI.23 The ramifications of this move 
for the shaping and segmentation of mm.5-8, both in themselves and in relation to 
mm.1-4, will be considered below. 
 Groh does not crescendo through m.4 as much as he abruptly changes volume, 
beginning with the B4 of m.3.  This new dynamic plateau sustains through beat 2 of 
m.4 as Groh ritards.  Slowing down in the midst of this dynamic intensification at first 
only amplifies the goal-directedness.  But this is short-lived, as Groh decrescendoes on 
beat 3, to a degree putting the brakes on the teleological march.  This slightly deceptive 
dynamic move highlights the coincident slightly deceptive harmonic move from V6/4 to 
V4/2.  As if pulling, even shying, away from that initial drive, there is a sense of 
resignation to Groh’s quiet arrival on i6, emphasized by the marked hesitation before 
reaching the downbeat of m.5.  His move to the still quieter G-major chord on beat 2 
still acts as a kind of perpetuation of the cadence—given the patent elision and quick 
harmonic change, it is difficult not to hear it as part of the cadence24—though not, like 
in Richter, as spillover energy, but as an afterthought.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 One could imagine that if Richter had not decrescendoed slightly after the first beat of m.5, 
the arrival, the goal, could indeed have been the G chord on beat 2 (and/or 3, depending on 
how it’s heard). 
24 The move to VI, which gets the weight of syncopation and duration, can almost make the 
cadence sound deceptive (in the textbook sense), as if the i6 were parenthetical.  This is truer 
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 Groh’s and Richter’s substantially divergent, in some ways opposite, treatments of 
this phrasal hinge create substantially divergent senses of how the phrases (i.e. mm.1-4 
and 5-8) work and relate to each other, and even what the phrases are.  Given 
Brahms’s overlap of thematic and phrasal groupings—that is, m.4 harmonically 
culminates a four-measure phrase while simultaneously beginning a two-measure 
sequence (mm.4-5, 6-7)—this juncture is particularly consequential.  Richter’s 
insistent drive right through the cadence highlights the mm.4-5 pair.  The sudden 
loudening and quickening of m.4, especially sudden after the almost mechanically even 
mm.1-3, further establishes it as a beginning even more than an ending.  Groh’s sudden 
loudening and quickening in m.4 sets up a similar possibility, but his easing off on the 
last beat of that measure to some degree upsets it.  Despite his resigned subduing of 
the cadential decisiveness—and in a way, because of it—measure 5 becomes something 
new, a beginning.  This is not to say that Groh denies the mm.4-5, mm.6-7 grouping 
(he does it in his own way, see below), only that at first the mm.1-4, mm.5-(8?) 
segmentation predominates.  It is only by mm.6-7 that this new segmentation becomes 
clearer and retroaurally solidifies mm.4-5 as a connected figure.  Richter, in contrast, 
highlights the mm.4-5 connection as it happens.   
 Richter’s driving through m.4 into m.5, the sureness of his advance, downplays the 
m.4/5 (and mm.1-4/5-8) boundary and the affordance for contrapuntal and melodic 
deception at the cadence.  His decisiveness confers an inevitability on this move, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
in Groh, due to the quiet, resigned i6, than in Richter, for whom the i6 is a more decisive arrival.  
In this way—by downplaying the i6 as arrival—Groh, we might say, creates a cadence that is 
both authentic and deceptive.  It goes to i and VI.  
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overshadowing, if not eliminating, the potential for surprise or upset expectation.  One 
does not even sense that A#4 was hanging, whereas in Groh that lack is made palpable.    
 Perhaps the most prominent difference between these two performances and that 
of Julius Katchen25  is tempo.  Tempo differences alone, however, can generate 
fundamentally different music, not just the “same piece” sped up or slowed down. 
Motives, lines, progressions, and phrases coalesce in different ways, on different scales, 
depending on their pace, a simple example being how to how a quick enough ¾ can 
begin to sound as if “in 1.”  But it is not just groupings that change in relation to speed, 
though that is already significant, but the very nature of the groups’ content.  
Simplifying and generalizing considerably, in the first few measures of the Brahms, at 
slower speeds, like Richter’s, there is a one-note-at-a-time feel, a sense that the tactus 
might even be each sixteenth note.  This allows each note to go to the next:  F#5 moves 
to D5 and then to B4 etc., despite their sustains.  To an extent, it is heard as a line as 
well as n arpeggiated chord.  Or rather, we can suppose a continuum between line and 
arpeggiated chord, with slower performances leaning more towards line (at least at the 
outset).  At faster speeds, like Katchen’s, we now have “and”s between beats, which, 
along with the sheer pace, stresses the arpeggiated chord effect and effectively denies 
the possibility of linear movement between notes.  F#5 begins to float above its 
arpeggiated tail.  And because the measures are simply shorter, it can connect more 
vividly to A5 and the ensuing G5.  This is not to deny the presence of that larger line 
for slower tempi—certainly both Groh and Richter vivify it—just its relative 
prominence and availability.  It should come as no surprise that larger spans and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Julius Katchen, Brahms: Works for Solo Piano, Recorded 1962, London/Decca 430053-2, 1990, 
compact disc. 
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connections are afforded more when they span less time and, conversely, that certain 
shorter-range phenomena are made less realizable.  One of these appears to be the 
intimation of harmonic change.  In other words, because of the harmonic indistinctness 
of mm.1-2, it may simply require time for harmonic areas to begin to coalesce out of 
the relatively undifferentiated milieu.  
 Though generally quicker, Katchen’s tempo is somewhat elusive at first.  Notice 
the lilt established in measure 1, most prominently the E4, which seems to come early, 
almost cutting off the G4.  One effect of this unevenness is to draw a different kind of 
attention to the sixteenth note level, which has been made less stable (or more 
dynamic) than it typically is.  Whereas in most performances the cascading sixteenth 
notes are fairly regular—even if accelerating or decelerating, they still act as a 
consistent rhythmic/metric underpinning—Katchen’s surprises to upset this 
predictability.  Thus measure 2, played fairly even, feels even, almost a corrective to or 
stabilization of m.1’s irregularity. Yet m.3 resumes the lilting, almost swung sixteenth 
note feel.  Measure 4 again feels straight, or straightened out, as it marches towards the 
grounding cadence.  Though subtle, this rhythmic flexibility, the play between straight 
and almost swung sixteenth notes, suggests a new 2+2 pattern, mm.2 and 4 responding 
to the elasticity of mm.1 and 3.  Another effect of Katchen’s rhythm is to differentiate 
the cascades of mm.1 and 2 in a unique way.  Measure 1 has five descending thirds and 
measure 2 six, yet Katchen’s playing—specifically the even F#4 and D4 of m.2 now 
contrasted with or responding to the curtailed G4 into E4 of m.1—makes palpable that 
lengthening, that “extra” sixteenth.  Measure 2 now gains a sense of extension, perhaps 
even answering a question posed by m.1.   
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 More locally, m.1’s early, almost interjecting E4 promotes itself as it demotes the 
truncated G4.  Syncopated or lilting pairs of notes tend to add weight to the first of the 
pair, not only because it is longer, but because of the way the shortened note trips into 
the next extended one, making it strong.   This local weak-strong pattern affects 
grouping, character, and even harmonic implications.  Measure 3’s lilt draws attention 
to C#5, F#4, and B3 even more than a straight rendition would.  Katchen’s lilt here is 
light, playful, even song-like, intensifying by contrast measure 4’s determined cadential 
drive. 
 Katchen’s upper line, unlike Groh’s, is characterized by an anacrusis gesture.  His 
F#5 does not go to A5 as much as A5 leads to, or trips into the ensuing G5.  Similarly, 
while G5, ringing across the measure, certainly falls, if not resolves, to F#5, the more 
salient connection is between that F#5, as anacrusis, begging m.3’s C#5.  The B4-E5 
figure of mm.3-4 then comes as no surprise, whereas in other performances that 
connect it in this way—specifically those whose upper lines more directly connect F#5 
to A5 and G5 to F#5 etc.—it shows up as a new rhythmic idea.  This articulation of the 
line helps deny the harmonic implications realized in Groh, or even Richter.  In 
particular, the potential for a quasi-cadence on D at the end of measure 2 is all but 
precluded by the prominence of the F#5-C#5 pickup-downbeat figure, which pulls 
attention away from the potential moment of resolution and toward the ensuing 
downbeat.  Katchen’s lingering on D4 into m.3 also connects F#5 to C#3 and m.2 to 
m.3.  Groh’s and Richter’s realizations of varying degrees of cadence is enabled, in 
part, by their marked pauses near the end of m.2, which slightly separate it from m.3.   
The metrically weak third beat of m.2 is thereby lent enough weight to support such a 
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harmonic move.  Katchen’s m.2, on the contrary, moves assuredly to m.3.  His F#5 
belongs more to m.3 than m.2.  
 If Katchen does not achieve the kind of progression and cadence that Groh and, to 
a lesser extent, Richter does, neither does he altogether avoid harmonic implications. 
Harmonic availability here is on a continuum.  If for Groh the first two measures 
faintly suggest two harmonies in each, Katchen’s more or less cohere as single entities.  
His E4 is more a part of the entire cascade of m.1 than Groh’s, which signals a 
nebulous chordal transition, a second thing, even an opposing thing.  And even more so 
for m.2, which in Groh and, to a lesser extent, Richter vaguely splits into V and I.  If 
there is an opposition in Katchen, it is between rather than within m.1 and m.2.  Measure 
2, already a second thing, an answer to m.1 responds to m.1 harmonically/intervallically 
as well..     
  Katchen’s descending thirds establish a logic of their own, an appreciable pattern 
that needs no further context or explanation.  To an extent Katchen makes the entire 
cascade consonant.  Because Katchen’s A5 acts more as a pickup to m.2 than a 
continuation of F#5, the larger move from m.1’s F#5 to m.2’s G5 predominates.  
Measure 2’s thirds thus feels higher than m.1’s, upping its ante as it were, but also, 
with its return to F#5 (felt as a return here more than in Groh and Richter, where it is 
primarily heard in the context of D major) and its F#4-D4 (responding to E4), 
concluding the response to an extent, intervallically if not harmonically.  The second 
cascade encompasses the first: measure 2 comes over the top of m.1 (with A5-G5) and 
also closes it by going underneath with F#4-D4.  Measure 3 then performs triple duty: 
it is a third thing, a second second thing, given its parallelism with m.2, and more faintly, 
the potential beginning of a second mm.1-2.  Heading into m.4, then, there are at least 
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three grouping trajectories: 1+1+1, and 1+2, and 2+1 (of 2?), of which the latter is 
weakest.  In contrast, notice how Groh’s cadence at the end of m.2 effectively 
precludes the first two of these in favor of the third, though that simplistic label belies 
crucial differences in that general segmentation’s genesis, character, and projective 
potential between the two performances.  These are not the same “2+1”s.  If for no 
other reason, they carry different energies forward because of the very presence of the 
other grouping potentials and their relative pulls.  A 2+1 shaded by a 1+2 is already 
different than a fairly similar 2+1 shaded by 1+1+1.  Even two similar 2+1’s each 
shaded by 1+1+1’s can differ substantially depending on the kind of 1+1+1, the ways it 
interacts with the 2+1, and the relative weights of the two groupings in question. 
Katchen’s and Groh’s grouping trajectories diverge also because of the type of “2” they 
fashion.  Whereas Groh is largely the result of the progression he intimates, Katchen’s 
arises from the various ways m.2 responds to m.1, as described above.  More simply, 
Groh’s is harmonic while Katchen’s is intervallic.  Additionally, Groh’s “2” implies a 
sub-segmentation of (1+1) + (1+1) due to the harmonic bifurcation described above, 
while Katchen’s 1’s come across as indivisible.  In all the ways they differ as “2”’s they 
project different “2”’s.  They move forward with different pasts.  
 Katchen’s melody is set apart by and stressed with volume (and duration for the 
opening F#5) but is also simply more prominent as a result of his quicker tempo.  Even 
with all the interest and subtlety in his deployment of the sixteenth-note trails, that 
activity is still subsidiary to the upper line (they are still “trails”), which drives the 
phrase.  Not only does the melody connect more saliently, but relationships between 
sixteenth notes across measures become more conspicuous.  Measure 2’s F#4-D4 more 
clearly responds to m.1’s E4.  Granted, this is also aided by E4’s distinction and the 
! 150!
resulting sense of m.2’s extension, as discussed above.  But their sheer proximity also 
makes the link across these measures more palpable, simply more audible. 
   In m.4, Katchen drives through the cadential approach beginning with the lower 
line’s C#3.  Indeed, that line’s appearance seems to spur the crescendo and accelerando 
of beats 1.5 through 3.5.  (It is specifically that line, not the upper G4-B4, which 
remain fairly quiet.) Though mm.1-3 are relatively quick and the tripping quality of 
the line slightly propulsive, they are nonetheless light, allowing m.4’s initial push to 
stand out in contrast, perhaps even come as a surprise (though not as much as Groh’s).  
Unlike both Groh’s and Richter’s, Katchen’s E5 sounds like a downbeat—i.e. there is 
no metric hiccup or sense of syncopation—for two reasons:  he does not emphasize the 
G3-B4 dyad on the last sixteenth of the bar and the anacrusis-downbeat figure has 
already been established.  In Groh and Richter, the newness of the pickup figure, 
along with their stress on G3-B4 throws E4 into syncopation.  Katchen keeps the 
middle voices in the background in m.4, unlike Groh and Richter, who dip into some 
of the repeating B4’s to suggest a compound melody, both suggesting B4-E5-B4-D-C#.  
If only in terms of their constituting notes, these lines diverge.  Though the difference 
is slight, Groh’s and Richter’s version creates a greater melodic rhythm acceleration 
(along with the harmonic rhythm one) toward the cadence, also connecting the pickup 
B4 with the subsequent B4’s.  As neither performance makes a motive out of the 
pickup-downbeat possibility in mm.2-3 or mm.3-4, this perhaps makes sense of the 
new figure by contextualizing it as the beginning of a compound melody.  For 
Katchen, on the other hand, that figure has already been firmly established.  
 Katchen’s C#3-G4-B4 triad on beat 1.5 is technically slightly late, but feels 
perfectly consistent with the lilting that has suffused mm.1 and especially 3.  It follows 
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directly from the swung beat 3 of m.2.  Here it intensifies the landing on V6/4, which 
arrives early.  Together with the “late” C#2, this makes beat 1.5 especially quick, 
further stressing the cadential 6/4 arrival.  The move to V4/2 is just as decisive at first, 
but a sudden ritard and decrescendo around beat 3.5 at first seems to stall the forward 
drive.  Yet after the resounding F#5 arrival on m.5 and the accompanying resumption 
of the quicker tempo, that seeming hesitation or even derailment sounds more like a 
launching gesture, a small pre-climax ritard. This seeming retreat ends up acting 
instead as an anticipation of a bigger event, the slow stretching of the catapult.  
Notwithstanding this mini-propulsion, Katchen’s buildup and climax is still slighter 
than Richter’s and Groh’s.  The latters’, though crucially different in the ways 
described above, both have a marching quality, a ponderousness (even through Groh’s 
pulling away).  Katchen’s, on the other hand, rushes more than it drives; it is less 
demonstrative.  This is perhaps simply a result of the difference in tempo, but perhaps 
also that Katchen’s crescendo in m.4 is less dramatic and shorter-lived than either 
Groh’s or Richter’s, which is lent more weight and stress as a result.    
 Katchen’s treatment of the cadence is perhaps closer to Richter’s propulsion than 
Groh’s resignation, but also markedly different in several respects, most critically its 
line and tempo.  The alternate treatment of these parameters ramifies well beyond their 
contrived boundaries.   Katchen’s privileging of the top line throughout mm.1-8, in 
particular the piercing F#5 that rings across m.5, obfuscates the middle voices in m.5, 
which, along with a quieter G3, so obscures VI as to nearly deny that harmonic 
affordance completely.  The move to VI is faint at best.  Contrastingly, Richter 
announces VI as clearly as he did i6.  Though he lands assuredly on F#5, it fades 
quickly, giving way to the parallel third motion in the middle voices and the decisive 
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move to G3 and VI.  F#3 does not sustain long enough to muddy the harmonic waters.  
There is even a sense that his F#5 goes to the subsequent E5, forming the line F#5-E5-
D5-C-A#-B.  Granted, this is a strong, perhaps unavoidable affordance for any 
performance: E5 has to come from somewhere on its way to D5 and F#5 is the logical, 
perhaps only, possibility.  Even for Katchen, whose reigning and sustaining F#5 is 
made distinct from the activity below as any, the F#-5-E5-D5 line is still present, albeit 
faintly.  Richter, on the other hand, exploits this linear (and in turn harmonic) 
affordance, giving it priority in the measure.   
 Partly due to Richter’s stress on beat 2, VI is felt to arrive on that beat, the last two 
sixteenths acting as a lower neighbor embellishment.  Katchen more or less reverses 
this weighting, subduing the middle voices from beats 1.5 to 3 and then reasserting the 
last two sixteenths.  Given Katchen’s underplaying of the VI affordance, however, the 
meaning of his move is not simply the reverse of Richter.  Whereas Richter’s last two 
sixteenth pairs point backwards as ornaments of VI, Katchen’s point forward as an 
extended anacrusis of m.6, a move consistent with with his shaping of mm.1-4 and the 
accentuation of the pickup-downbeat figure throughout.  Groh’s VI is as clear, as 
present, as Richter’s, but it is a different VI.  Because of the resignation of the cadence 
it is an inward move, an interior subdominant.  Richter’s, as an overshoot of tonic, acts 
as an expansion, something beyond the tonic.  
 The differences in post-cadence tempi between Groh and Katchen on the one hand 
and Richter on the other bear significantly on grouping, inter-phrase relationship, and 
overall trajectory.  While the former performances resume the pre-accelerando, pre-
crescendo tempo (i.e. mm.1-3) at m.4, beat 3 (Groh) and m.5 (Richter), Katchen 
resumes the accelerated tempo and nearly the volume of m.4 just after the galvanizing 
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hesitation of m.4, beat 3.5.  As a result, Groh’s and Katchen’s dynamic intensifications 
around the cadence (despite other differences outlined above) feel just that way—
temporary dramatic escalations at a phrasal juncture.  Their return to the previous 
tempo and volume is a return to the opening phrase’s dynamic milieu, a suggestion that 
m.5 is another m.1.  Which is not to say a repeat of m.1 but a second m.1, a paired or even 
complementary phrase beginning.  This in turn underlines the relationship between 
mm.1-4 and mm.5-8 as an antecedent-consequent one.  Measure 5’s connection to m.1 
is thus animated.  Namely, the F#5-E5-D5-C5-B4 line can be heard as, reminds one of, 
responds to, or fleshes out, the opening F#5-D5-B4 descent.  It may even be the same 
F#5 that has returned.  This is aided by Richter’s particular paying of the opening, 
especially the one-at-a-time feel and the sense that F#5 goes to D5 etc. as much as it 
hovers above.   Katchen, however, takes the new tempo and runs with it.  Thus his 
buildup in m.4 is felt to launch not just m.5 but the whole phrase beginning on m.5, 
which in turn feels mostly new.  It is not a return to, or paring of, m.1 or the antecedent, 
but an extension or continuation.  It is not a momentary buildup at the end of the first 
phrase as much as the commencement of a new movement forward.   Not only is the 
sense of antecedent-consequence downplayed, but m.4 now adheres to mm.5-8 
perhaps as much as it does mm.1-3.  Now mm.4-8 has an identity; it is the part of the 
passage that grows, that moves forward, that expands.  This also emphasizes (and is 
emphasized by) the mm.4-5 grouping (though by different means than Richter) and its 
pairing with mm.6-7.  Richter too suggests the mm.4-5/6-7 grouping, but because of 
his return to the original tempo at m.5, mm.4-8 is not connected as such.     
 As described above, Groh also connects mm.4-5 and mm.6-7 but more retroaurally.  
His greater separation of m.4 from m.5 at first emphasizes the phrasal juncture.  But 
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his nearly identical playing of m.6 (and the last sixteenth of m.5)—with the same 
crescendo ritard—immediately recalls m.4 (and the previous sixteenth).  Even though he 
plays m.7 differently than m.5—more assertive, less resigned—the pattern is 
established.  Granted, Brahms does most of the work here; a performer would have to 
go out of his or her way to undermine the mm.4-5/6-7 pattern.  But even if the pattern 
itself is unavoidable, the way it is made explicit and the work it does are, as always, 
variable.  That Richter establishes mm.4-5 as connected right away, Groh only 
retroaurally, and Katchen somewhere in between, is already a significant difference.  
What they each do with it, how they make it work, differentiates them even further.   
 Groh not only plays m.4 and m.6 similarly, but both their respective pickup 
sixteenths as well.  This is perhaps a trickier task in m.5 than in m.3—m.5’s B4 must 
act as both the culmination of the passing/lower neighbor figure (C#5-A4, F#4-A#4) 
and an anacrusis to m.6.  Granted, m.3’s B4 also points backward as the resolution of 
C#5, but as that event is more distant than the figure that immediately precedes m.5’s 
B4, the double duty seems more manageable.  Groh accomplishes this (m.5) with a 
subtly louder final sixteenth, not too loud to separate it from the previous figure, yet 
loud enough to insinuate its pointing forward to m.6’s downbeat.  In fact, it is only the 
B4, and not the G4, that is louder, despite the more or less equal weighting the 
previous thirds received.  This helps fashion the anacrusis figure and also connects it 
with m.3’s, where Groh similarly stressed B4 while keeping G3’s volume consistent 
with the preceding falling thirds.  A less pronounced version of the syncopation/metric 
hiccup he fashions at the m.3/4 boundary occurs here as a result.  Less pronounced for 
two reasons: there is no surprise and there is no bass note on beat 3 followed by a rest 
on the downbeat to mislead.   
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 Groh’s dynamic shaping of m.4 and m.6 are nearly indistinguishable if taken in 
isolation.  Both begin with a galvanizing crescendo off the pickup accompanied by a 
slight hastening, then a ritard without decrescendo on beat 3.  (Measure 6’s ritard may be 
ever so slightly more pronounced.)  Yet their effects are vastly different, even opposite, 
owing locally to how their ensuing downbeats are played and globally to the phrase 
and pattern trajectories at play.  Above I argued that Groh’s subdued arrival on m.5 
lends an air of resignation to the entire gesture, retroaurally shading m.4’s ritard as 
hesitant, tentative.  His decisive arrival on measure 7, however, underscored by a 
further volume increase, makes m.6’s approach into an anticipatory, catapult-like ritard 
climax much like Katchen’s mm.4-5, only more dramatic.  Measure 7 climaxes where 
m.5 anticlimaxes, yet both are prepared in the same way.26   
 Measure 7 rolls forward with the new energy of the climax, but the downbeat of 
m.8 halts its forward drive.  Again a certain hesitation is evinced and Groh proceeds as 
if hesitantly through to the end of the phrase, decrescendoing as he ritards.  If my 
language here appears to ascribe more narrative agency than usual it is because Groh’s 
clear dynamic shaping maps so well onto Brahms’s play with patterns, making 
(dramatic) sense of those patterns in this particular way.! I have already noted how the 
mm.4-5/6-7 pattern cuts across the 4+4 phrase trajectory.  Measure 8 then presents a 
new, patterned iteration of m.7, potentially upsetting an expectation of a third iteration 
of the two-measure pattern.  Groh’s play with dynamics and speed, the alignment of 
his patterns—crescendo/accelerando then ritard versus decrescendo/ritard—with Brahms’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 To hear this, imagine aurally if Groh had reversed these treatments and how that changes 
the ways mm.1-4 and mm.5-8 interact, how the mm.4-5/6-7 pattern is reimagined, and how 
m.8 now affords different gestural/dramatic possibilities.  
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suggests the narrative drama I’ve outlined.  Thus the opposite treatments of m.5’s and 
m.7’s downbeat, despite (but really because of) the almost identical playing of their 
approaches, suggests hesitation/resignation and embrace/climax respectively.  
Together they suggest that mm.6-7 is a second attempt at mm.4-5, and given the climax 
on the former, a “successful” one.  Measure 8, particularly its second half, is met with a 
decrescendo and ritard similar to that of m.5 and the affective result is again one of 
tentativeness, a resistance, perhaps, to the “early” m.8 and its premature (in this 
respect) culmination of the phrase.   
 One effect of his slowing of m.8 is to call greater attention to its dissonances, 
(especially after the particularly consonant m.7), in particular the sonority on m.8, beat 
3 and the distantly lingering G5 over the F# dominant on the last sixteenth.  Groh’s 
slow movement through this measure bespeaks effort, a sense that this chromatically-
aided wrangling back to minor was not easily achieved.  Context is key here: without a 
nearly celebratory, clearly major m.7 and the string of D-major chords (from m.6, beat 
2 through m.8, beat 2) there is no affordance for the last beat’s hesitation and effort.  
And without the play with and ambiguity between D major and B minor throughout, 
foregrounded more in Groh than Katchen and Richter (recall his fashioning of a quasi-
arrival on D and the way m.4 pulls us back to B minor), the move back to minor would 
lack this salience.   
 Case in point, Richter’s m.8 is similar to Groh’s but evinces nothing like its drama 
because his context, his trajectories, and his setting up of affordances differ 
substantially.  First, Richter achieves less of a cadence at m.2, thereby establishing less 
of an opposition between D-major and B-minor.  Second, his driving through the 
cadence at mm.4-5 and the parallel treatment of mm.6-7 does not introduce the sense 
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of resignation.  Richter is never surprised.  Though this does not preclude such a 
gesture for m.8, the hesitation will necessarily mean something different.  It will not 
have the same past to respond to.  Richter’s m.8 differs from Groh’s for a more 
indigenous reason as well.  He starts his decrescendo/ritard on the downbeat, whereas 
Groh begins his only midway through the measure.  For Groh this only heightens the 
sense of surprise at the belabored turn to minor. (Groh almost leads us to expect A-
major as the final chord of m.8.)  For Richter, this eases the transition back to B-
minor.  The initial slowing down at m.8 prepares it to an extent, not specifically (as if it 
now implies F#) but as possibility of a change.  Richter’s G5 is even fainter than 
Groh’s, practically inaudible, again subduing the sense of effort.    
 Of course Richter is not responding to Groh, only being made to in my analysis, 
and it would be a mistake to think of his performance in terms of what it does not do.  
The above is only to underscore, by way of contrast, how Groh sets up his m.8.  
Richter highlights the patterning of mm.4-5/6-7 by playing them similarly, the latter, 
even louder and slightly faster, acting as an intensification, an upping of the ante of the 
former.  This longer-range, two-tiered dramatic heightening reaches its peak on the 
downbeat of m.8, which simultaneously begins its steady denouement.  To an extent, 
the steadiness of the denouement naturalizes the harmonic turn to B-minor, easing that 
transition.   
 Katchen, like Groh, climaxes on m.7, with a similar propulsive crescendo/ritard in 
m.6.   Like Richter, his mm.4-5/6-7 suggest an escalation, that the second iteration is 
more than the first, exceeding it.  In the context of the larger escalation (mm.4-8 over 
mm.1-3, see above) this local escalation is even more salient.  By the time he reaches 
m.8, though, the denouement is underway, and the extended, gradual coming down 
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naturalizes the end of the phrase.  There is little to no sense of surprise or thwarted 
expectation.  This is also a result of Katchen’s general prioritizing of the top line so that 
the A5(m.7)-G5(m.8)-F#5(m.9) line, which he strongly connects, makes sense of 
and/or obscures the turn back to minor.  Just as mm.1-4 is driven by the line F#5---
A5-G5---F#5-C#5---B4-E5, with a strong anacrusis-downbeat feel, mm.4-8 is driven 
by the line E5-D5-C#5-F#5---E5-D5-C#-A5---G5, where E5-D5-C#5 works as an 
extended, but similarly propulsive pickup.  As noted above, Katchen separates the top 
line in mm.5-8 from the parallel thirds beneath, enabling (or resulting in) the clarity of 
this linear drive.  Measure 8’s G5 does not echo as a now-dissonant vestige over the 
last harmonic turn as much as it continues to take center stage despite it.  Katchen 
makes it act as F# dominant’s minor 9th.    
 
* 
 
 The goal of the above analyses is threefold:  first, to demonstrate the viability, 
communicability, and interest of first-person descriptive accounts of music experience; 
second, to exemplify the phenomenology I develop in the following chapter; and third, 
to illustrate how this kind of analysis can interact with music theory.  As the first is, in 
the end, for the reader to decide and the second to be considered at length in chapter 4, 
I offer a few thoughts, by way of conclusion, on the third. 
 I submit that attending to the complexity of experience and the subtleties of 
performance and taking both not as incidental to but constitutive of the phenomenon 
of music allows for the challenging and honing of our traditional theoretical categories 
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and labels in several important ways.  First, it serves as a reminder that the structures 
of music theory (e.g., interval, line, progression, motive, phrase, etc.) do not exist on 
the page but are created in performance.   A line is not a line until it is connected as 
such, a progression not a progression unless it is made to progress.  Moreover, the 
relationship between score and sound is not one of the implicit being made explicit. 
Performance does not simply realize or not the structures posited by music theory to 
inhere in notation.  As I have shown, different performances can suggest not only 
divergent, even opposing structures, but structures, patterns, and trajectories 
unforeseeable from a consideration of the score alone.  For instance, the metric 
ambiguity that pervades many performances of Chopin’s prelude and the various 
melodic, contrapuntal, phrasal, motivic, and harmonic ramifications of its treatment are 
not evident in the score.   
 Second, even where performance suggests structures that roughly correspond to 
theoretical ones (e.g. Chopin’s mm.1-4 as an antecedent or the collection of notes in 
each measure as the basic motive), individual actualizations will always be more 
specific and complex than our abstract labels.  We can speak of different trajectories 
an antecedent can imply, different ways a 2+2 subdivision can work, and nuance our 
categories accordingly.  Those categories can, in turn, speak more sensitively to 
specific situations.   
 More generally, variability in performance calls into question the status of some of 
our most basic claims.  To wit, if it is true that different performances can realize 
fundamentally different, even opposing structures, trajectories, and gestures, out of the 
“same” music, what does it then mean to say that certain structures simply exist in 
certain pieces?  Returning to the opening measures of the Brahms intermezzo, what is 
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the status of the standard claim about these opening measures, namely, as mentioned 
above, that they conceal root progressions by fifth?  What if that is only one possibility 
afforded by the score?  Moreover, what if that affordance when vaguely realized by a 
performer like Groh, is so distant from that label “root progression by fifth” that its 
usefulness in this situation is questionable? 
 My aim, however, is neither to dismiss these concepts and labels nor deny their 
reality—certainly I have made abundant use of them throughout—but to put them into 
dialogue with experience, thereby refining them.  To be sure, these concepts are 
always operating in our experience, if implicitly, but they need not determine our 
experience.  There is always an excess of felt experience over and above the categories 
we assign and subsume that experience under.  By paying attention to that excess, in 
fact testing our categories against our felt experience, we can make those categories 
say more, do better justice to specific situations.  We can introduce continuums into 
otherwise stable categories, make finer and finer discriminations among them, even 
create new ones.  In short, our terms and labels could become the beginning of 
analytical discussion rather than its conclusion.  Shifting the focus from object to 
event, I submit, ultimately enriches out understanding of both.   
 
 !
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The “Flow of Experiences” and the “Experience of Flow” 
 
 
In the natural attitude, I do not have perceptions, I do not posit this object as beside that one, 
along with their objective relationship, I have a flow of experiences which imply and explain 
each other both simultaneously and successively. 
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty1 
 
What is clear to me now that was not clear before is that structure as such, frozen structure, is 
a myth, or at least a limiting case. 
- J.J. Gibson2 
 
Our solution is a new understanding of how things “are,” not only objects, but also their 
processes which are generating their structures. Nothing is only objects. There are no objects 
alone. They are the implicit intricacy that implies a sequence of events in which each next event 
brings a fresh implying. 
- Eugene Gendlin3 
 
 
 
 The following is an attempt to take (musical) experience seriously.  To neither read 
reified structure back into the processes that intimate it nor insert process back into 
those structures in a misguided retrofitting. To recognize the temporal, emergent, and 
processive neither as incidental to experience nor as some intermediate stage in the 
ultimate fixing of meaning, but as an experiential norm, simply the way things are.  To 
take “meaning” as verb rather than noun and to insist that it is not the product, 
endpoint, or goal of ongoing experience but the process itself, the condition of ongoing 
experience’s intelligibility.  To resist for a moment the human drive toward 
                                                
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London!; New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 327.  Emphases are original unless otherwise noted. 
2 James Jerome Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Hillsdale (N.J.): Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 87. 
3 E. T. Gendlin, “Process Generates Structures: Structures Alone Don’t Generate Process,” 
The Folio 23, no. 1 (2012): 11. 
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hypostatization, abstraction, and structuring that is incessant, powerful, indispensable, 
and often ingenious, but ultimately fictitious, a convenient untruth.    
 Music is both special and not.  It is an experience like any other.  Thus translation 
or adaptation of some pure experiential model to music should not be necessary—in 
fact, perhaps the opposite.  Music experience is experience, but because of its 
perceived specialness—its infamous ephemerality and seeming inconcretion4—music 
can also be a model of process and passage, those basic aspects of all experience.  In 
other words, everything happens “in time,” even the most abstract conceptualization.  
Nothing escapes (temporal) experience.  But because music has come to represent 
temporality itself5—perhaps partly because it, unlike poetry or painting, determines the 
time it takes to perceive it6—it is the most glaring, stubborn example of process and 
ephemerality.  We can exploit this misconception.  Traditionally thought of, even 
denigrated, as an exception, we may now use it as the paragon of a new rule.  We may 
turn this historical shortcoming into an advantage, transform this pejorative into a 
virtue.   
 Toward this end, I follow, and coordinate, three thinkers—Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, J.J. Gibson, and Eugene Gendlin—in the formulating of “momentum,” my 
                                                
4 See Christopher Hasty, “The Image of Thought and Ideas of Music,” in Sounding the Virtual: 
Gilles Deleuze and the Theory and Philosophy of Music, 2010, 1–22. 
5 For example, Husserl famously took the perception of a melody to be a paradigmatic case of 
time-consciousness.  Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 
(1893-1917), trans. John Barnett Brough (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1980).  Bergson and James also paid special attention to the perception of melody.  Langer 
famously claimed that “music makes time audible.” Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form: A 
Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953), 110. 
6 Though poetry and painting obviously take time to perceive, the time it takes is up to the 
perceiver, not the perceived.  Moreover, because a poem and a painting seem to appear all at 
once, it is easy to fool ourselves into thinking that their perception does too. 
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word for the flow of ongoing experience.  Yet already that language implies that there 
is experience and it has a flow, that there is some essential, transcendent content or 
structure that is then “unfolded” in time,7 much like a score is thought to be “realized” 
in performance.  My point will be that flow is not ancillary to but constitutive of 
experience, that if there is structure, it is the flow itself.  What things mean is 
inextricably tied up with when they appear.  The meaning of events is not just time-
sensitive but time-determinative.  Time is not “t,” one parameter among others, but a 
condition of all others.  In short, the flow is already a meaning. What these thinkers 
give us, inter alia, is a way to think about process as constitutive of meaning, to recognize 
flow as essential to our skillful coping in the environment.  As music exists in the 
environment, I will ultimately argue that our skillful coping with it, our absorption in 
musical flow—momentum—is a basic, grounding musical meaning.   
 My approach is phenomenological, both specifically and generally.  Specifically, I 
incorporate particular ideas and insights from these three thinkers.8  Generally, I adopt 
the stance of phenomenology, the spirit of its inquiry.  This is not a copout but 
squarely in the tradition.  Phenomenology (at least the Merleau-Pontian variety) may 
in fact be less a strict system than it is a certain posture, an attitude.  To the question 
                                                
7 This is precisely the problem with and why we default to using the metaphor “unfold in time,” 
which implies a structure, an essence, that is all there, only folded up.  Time simply unravels it.  
This ill-begotten metaphor shows just how deep the structuralist bias runs, namely that even 
our conceptualizations of temporality and process are fundamentally spatial. 
8 This is not to say that I consider Gibson, or that he considered himself, a phenomenologist, 
only that his thought can be profitably understood in that light.  Gibson was apparently 
unaware of Merleau-Ponty’s work until later in his career, though he recognized a deep 
sympathy in their thinking.  See John T. Sanders, “Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, and the 
Materiality of Meaning,” Man and World 26 (1993): 299–300.    
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that opened Phenomenology of Perception, “What is phenomenology?,” Merleau-Ponty 
conceded: 
 
It may seem strange that the question has still to be asked half a century after the first 
works of Husserl.  The fact remains that it has by no means been answered…. 
…the opinion of the responsible philosopher must be that phenomenology can be 
practiced and identified as a manner or style of thinking, that it existed as a movement 
before arriving at complete awareness of itself as a philosophy…We shall find in 
ourselves, and nowhere else, the unity and true meaning of phenomenology.9 
 
Nearly four decades later, Thomas Clifton considered the same question in his preface 
to Music as Heard:  
 
But this question was asked by Merleau-Ponty in 1945 in the preface to his 
Phenomenology of Perception, when Husserlian phenomenology was already about 
forty years old.  If it has not yet been answered by either Husserl himself or subsequent 
phenomenologists, then I myself respectfully decline to answer it, at least in formal 
terms.  To be sure, some idea of what phenomenology is will be revealed by the way it is 
used, but the main emphases here is how one thinking phenomenologically, and on the 
sort of phenomenological thought that can be communicated.  The same option was 
taken by Virgil Aldrich in his Philosophy of Art.10 
                                                
9 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, vii-viii.    
10 Thomas Clifton, Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1983), vii. 
 
165 
 
Three decades later, I can do no better than echo these sentiments and try to do them 
justice. 
 I begin with a joint consideration of Merleau-Ponty and Gibson and subsequently 
demonstrate connections with Gendlin.  Once this picture of experience is sketched, I 
focus on and flesh out the role of temporality in these systems of thought, building 
toward my notion of “momentum.”  Finally, I turn to musical experience and its 
analysis. 
 
* 
 
 Though Merleau-Ponty and Gibson ostensibly studied visual perception, their 
inquiries took them well beyond the traditional boundaries of that term, or rather, their 
radical rethinking of “perception” necessitated a widening of the term to encompass 
body, action, environment—in short, being-in-the-world.  Their broadening of 
“perception,” in other words, was precisely the point.  Abandoning the centuries-old 
dogma that perception is essentially the mental (inner) configuration of brute sense 
data (outer), Merleau-Ponty and Gibson contended that what we perceive, in the first 
instance, are not raw sense data or even objects as such, but an already meaningful 
environment that “affords” (Gibson) or “solicits” (Merleau-Ponty) opportunities for 
action.  Thus perception came to be understood by both not as a sensation-based, 
essentially passive faculty, but a holistic bodily behavior, indeed the foundational 
condition of our being and acting meaningfully in the world.  “Perception is not a 
science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position;” 
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Merleau-Ponty argued, “it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is 
presupposed by them.”11 Resisting the strict subject/object, organism/environment 
dualities, they sought not only to place man in the world, but to understand him as 
being of the world.12  Thus Gibson spoke of the “mutuality” and “reciprocity” of the 
unitary “organism-environment,”13 and Merleau-Ponty, in his later work, of chair, the 
substance that constitutes and connects both man and world.14  What might seem a 
mystical or metaphorical claim—indeed, for an entrenched dualist it would have to 
be—is instead practical and realist.  As John Sanders put it, underlying both 
approaches is “an argument to the effect that what is out there—what we respond to—is a 
function, to an important degree, of us.”15  Merleau-Ponty and Gibson show that the 
very intelligibility of the world must rest on our prior and primal communion with it.      
 Despite some important differences, their thinking on these matters is 
remarkably similar, especially considering they were developed in isolation from one 
another.16  In addition to the common influence of Gestalt psychology, this is perhaps 
also due to their identification of the common enemy outlined above, what Charles 
                                                
11 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xi. 
12 Note on M-P’s chair.   
13 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 8. 
14 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969). 
15 Sanders, “Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, and the Materiality of Meaning,” 289. 
16 Sanders, “Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, and the Materiality of Meaning.”  Though the affinity is 
often remarked upon by contemporary phenomenologists and ecological psychologists, 
Sanders’s account, substantial but still brief, is the only one that takes that affinity as its 
subject.  See also Harry Heft, “Affordances and the Body: An Intentional Analysis of Gibson’s 
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 19, no. 1 
(1989): 1–30. 
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Taylor called the “meditational epistemology,” or the “Inside/Outside [I/O] picture.”17  
Both reacted against prevailing empiricist and behaviorist dogmas, rejecting stimulus-
response-based, causal, and mechanistic explanations of perception, and, equally, 
rationalistic or mentalistic make-ups for the former’s shortcomings.  In many ways, 
their projects are most naturally understood in this light, for their trenchant critiques 
of the dominant approaches to perception already imply central features of their 
positive accounts. It is precisely this rhetorical maneuver that structures much of 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.18  In exposing aspects of the phenomena in 
question that traditional approaches necessarily miss or cannot explain, he outlines 
essential aspects of his alternative, corrective approach. His positive account, in other 
words, is the obverse of his critique.  Gibson’s disavowal of traditional theories—the 
dualism of mind and body, mental and physical—came gradually and took the form of 
a personal conversion: his early work (The Perception of the Visual World (1950)) 
proceeded largely on the cornerstone assumption of traditional psychology.19  Only 
later, with The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966) and The Ecological Approach to 
Visual Perception (1979) did he, rejecting his earlier approach, offer his groundbreaking 
new paradigm.  I will therefore begin with their critiques.   
 As Merleau-Ponty sees it, the study of perception has traditionally been plagued by 
                                                
17  Charles Taylor, “Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 26. 
18 This is also the strategy I have attempted to emulate in this dissertation.  In chapters 1 and 2 
I argued that Lakoff & Johnson’s “embodied realism,” though certainly an advance over 
classic intellectualist/rationalist epistemologies, falls prey to a core intellectualist trap: namely, 
positing meditational schemes to configure a brute sensorial “outside.”  
19 Edward S. Reed, James J. Gibson and the Psychology of Perception (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1988), 3. 
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the twin “prejudices” of “empiricism” (e.g. Berkeley, Hume) and “intellectualism” (e.g. 
Descartes, Kant).  While the former takes sensations as the basic units of perceptual 
experience, the latter understands perception as a function of, or simply nothing other 
than, thought or judgment.  Though in key respects at odds with one another, 
Merleau-Ponty shows that these approaches are deeply related and commit some of 
the same fundamental errors.  Perhaps most importantly, both “take the objective 
world as the object of their analysis”20 and, by assuming this “ready-made world,”21 
take perception as another fact in the world rather than the primal disclosing of a 
world in the first place.   
 Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of empiricism rests on two charges: descriptive 
inaccuracy and theoretical incoherence.22  First, the notion of a pure, determinate 
sensation “corresponds to nothing in our experience.”23  I do not ordinarily perceive 
discrete, context-free sense data or qualia (say, “red here now”) but things (including 
their invisible backsides), people, events, and their affordances, indeed an entire 
“horizon of significance.”24  What I perceive is neither reducible, nor stands in causal 
relation, to the bare physical input that impinges on my retina, as most any optical 
illusion evinces.  To account for the order and meaning of perception over and above 
the bare sensory input (e.g. something so basic as a figure’s edges, or that a 
background persists behind a figure), the empiricist postulates the principles of 
                                                
20 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 30. 
21 Ibid., 241. 
22 Taylor Carman, “Between Empiricism and Intellectualism,” in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, ed. 
Rosalyn Diprose and Jack Reynolds (Stocksfield [UK]: Acumen, 2008), 44–45. 
23 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 3–4. 
24 Ibid., 523.  This is to say, following Husserl, that consciousness, being “intentional,” is 
always consciousness of something.   
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“association” and memory by which the mind groups sensations into meaningful 
perceptions.  But such accounts only beg the question for, as Merleau-Ponty points 
out, “the unity of the thing in perception is not constructed by association, but is a 
condition of association.” 25   The empiricist cannot, in the end, reconstruct the 
“intentionality” of perception—i.e. that consciousness, as Husserl said, is always 
consciousness of something—from the non-intentional, context-less atoms of sense 
data.26  
   The “intellectualist antithesis” posits that perception essentially involves thought 
or judgment.  Though it appears to make up for various empiricist faults, for instance, 
replacing a passive perceiver with an active one, it nonetheless falls prey to the same 
errors.  For one, intellectualism still subscribes to the “constancy hypothesis”—the 
supposition of an isomorphism between stimulus and sensation—precisely to 
demonstrate the need for judgment, in the form of conceptual schemes, categories, etc.  
Now, however, the bare sense data is interpreted or even constituted by attention and 
thought to effect perceptual meaning.  But if the stimulus remains fixed, then 
“attention remains an abstract and ineffective power, because it has no work to 
perform.”27 Attention, conceived of as a searchlight, has no part to play, for instance, in 
the move from perceptual indistinctness to distinctness, for there was nothing confused 
in the stimulus to begin with.   Aside from the problems it inherits from empiricism, 
intellectualism, by binding judgment to sensation, fashions new ones.  Because 
                                                
25 Ibid., 19–20.  Taylor Carman, “Sensation, Judgment, and the Phenomenal Field,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge, 
UK!; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 57. 
26 David R. Cerbone, “Perception,” in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, ed. Rosalyn Diprose and 
Jack Reynolds (Stocksfield, UK: Acumen, 2008), 124–26. 
27 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 32. 
 
170 
“judgment is everywhere pure sensation is not—that is, absolutely everywhere,”28 
intellectualism ends up denying the very distinction between sensation and judgment 
that ordinary experience plainly manifests.  Moreover, if perception simply is 
judgment, then perception becomes incorrigible.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “if we see 
what we judge, how can we distinguish between true and false perception?”29  Most 
troubling, intellectualism appears to deny the phenomenal appearances underlying the 
judgments we supposedly make about them.30  “The result,” Merleau-Ponty concludes, 
“is that the intellectualist analysis eventually makes nonsense of the perceptual 
phenomena which it is designed to elucidate.”31   
 Gibson’s critique of traditional approaches is less a dismantling than a dismissal, 
though his diagnosis mirrors Merleau-Ponty’s: 
 
The simple assumption that perceptions of the world are caused by stimuli from the 
world will not do.  The more sophisticated assumption that perceptions of the world are 
caused when sensations triggered by stimuli are supplemented by memories will not do 
either.  Not even the assumption that a sequence of stimuli is converted into a 
phenomenal scene by memory will do.  The very notion of stimulation as typically 
                                                
28 Ibid., 39. 
29 Ibid., 40.    
30 Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty (London!; New York: Routledge, 2008), 57–58. 
31 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 39.  For a discussion of the relevance of Merleau-
Ponty’s critique of intellectualism for more recent cognitivist enterprises, see Hubert L 
Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1992) and Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen (Cambridge, 
UK!; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129–50. 
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composed of discrete stimuli has been abandoned….Not even the current theory that the 
inputs of the sensory channels are subject to ‘cognitive processing’ will do.32  
 
Most of Gibson’s support of these claims is implied in his new theory, but his 
occasional explications are as incisive as they are succinct:  
 
The error lies, it seems to me, in assuming that either innate ideas or acquired ideas must 
be applied to bare sensory inputs for perceiving to occur.  The fallacy is to assume that 
because inputs convey no knowledge they can somehow be made to yield knowledge by 
“processing” them.  Knowledge of the world must come from somewhere; the debate is 
over whether it comes from stored knowledge, from innate knowledge, or from reason.  
But all three doctrines beg the question.  Knowledge of the world cannot be explained 
by supposing that knowledge of the world already exists.  All forms of cognitive 
processing imply cognition so as to account for cognition.33 
 
 
For both thinkers, then, the problem begins by assuming a world as science describes 
it then charging perception with the task of reconstructing that world.  Simply put, this 
is the wrong world to be explaining.  Thus Gibson crucially distinguishes between the 
“world” and the “environment,” or synonymously, between “physical reality” and 
“ecological reality:”   
 
                                                
32 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 238. 
33 Ibid., 253. 
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The world of physical reality does not consist of meaningful things.  The world of 
ecological reality, as I have been trying to describe it, does.  If what we perceived were 
the entities of physics and mathematics, meanings would have to be imposed on them.  
But if what we perceive are the entities of environmental science, their meanings can be 
discovered.34  
 
An “environment,” that which surrounds (environ) the organism and in fact implies it 
(just as an organism implies an environment 35 ), shows up as always already 
meaningful.  When this is taken into account, when we begin to describe the pertinent 
reality, the question of our knowledge of that world becomes far less complicated.  
Traditional epistemology has claimed that what we are aware of is not the world out 
there, but subjective representations in our minds.  Gibson’s solution to the basic 
epistemological problem is to place knowledge in an environment that is already 
meaningful to a perceiver with whom it has coevolved, indeed because they have 
coevolved.  It is striking how simply this maneuver obviates the need for the 
convoluted and ultimately incoherent mechanisms of intellectualism (or what Gibson 
equivalently calls “mentalism”):  “Instead of postulating that the brain constructs 
information from the input of a sensory nerve, we can suppose that the centers of the 
                                                
34 Ibid., 33. 
35 “The fact is worth remembering because it is often neglected that the words animal and 
environment makes an inseparable pair.  Each term implies the other.  No animal could exist 
without an environment surrounding it.  Equally, although not so obvious, an environment 
implies an animal (or at least an organism) to be surrounded.  This means that the surface of 
the earth, millions of years ago before life developed on it, was not an environment, properly 
speaking.  The earth was a physical reality, a part of the universe, and the subject matter of 
geology…We might agree to call it a world, but it was not an environment…   The mutuality 
of animal and environment is not implied by physics and the physical sciences.”  Ibid., 8. 
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nervous system, including the brain, resonate to information.”36 
 In place of a processing account, Gibson offers a theory of “information pickup.”  
Information, on this account, is not something to be sent and received, transmitted 
across some channel.  “The environment does not communicate with the observers 
who inhabit it”; rather, “the world is specified in the structure of the light that reaches 
us, but it is entirely up to us to perceive it.”37  More specifically, the “ambient optic 
array” offers the perceiver information about the environment as well as herself: 
  
The optic array changes, of course, as the point of observation moves.  But it also does not 
change, not completely.  Some features of the array do not persist and some do.  The 
changes come from the locomotion, and the nonchanges come from the rigid layout of 
the environmental surfaces.  Hence, the nonchanges specify the layout and count as 
information about it; the changes specify locomotion and count as another kind of 
information, about the locomotion itself.  We have to distinguish between two kinds of 
structure in a normal ambient array, and I shall call them the perspective structure and the 
invariant structure.38 
 
Crucial to Gibson’s notion of perception, then, is locomotion, the movement of the 
observer.  As he asserts, “[o]ne sees the environment not just with the eyes but with 
                                                
36 James J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1966), 267. 
37 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 63. 
38 Ibid., 73. 
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the eyes in the head on the shoulders of a body that gets about.”39  Perception is 
exploratory, the perceiver a “self-tuning system” that “hunts until it achieves clarity.” 
And because perceptual clarity is inherently beneficial, “the pickup of information is 
reinforcing.” 40   
 The tight, reciprocal connection between perception and action, and indeed the 
entire theory of ecological optics, culminates in Gibson’s notion of affordances.  The 
perceiver does not simply register the variant and invariant structure of the 
environment, but also, and concurrently, what the environment “offers the animal, what 
it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.”  Thus an apple affords, among other 
things, nourishment, throwing, but not sitting, a tree shelter and climbing, a fire 
warmth or danger, etc.   Gibson’s radical claim is that affordances, “the values and 
meanings of things” are directly perceived.41  “The theory of affordances implies that to 
see things is to see how to get about among them and what to do or not do with them.   
If this is true, visual perception serves behavior, and behavior is controlled by 
perception.”42  As something that exists as a fact in the environment but for a perceiver, 
affordances transcend and undermine the usual subject-object duality: 
 
                                                
39 Ibid., 222. 
40 Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, 271.  Gibson here references the earlier 
work of Woodworth on the “reinforcement of perception.”  It is no accident that in the last few 
decades, much promising work has been done on simulated, feed-forward networks.  See 
Hubert Dreyfus’s discussion of Walter Freeman’s networks in Dreyfus, “Intelligence Without 
Representation–Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental Representation: The Relevance of 
Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 4 
(2002): 374–77. 
41 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 127. 
42 Ibid., 129. 
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[A]n affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if 
you like.  An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us 
to understand its inadequacies. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of 
behavior. It is both physical and psychological, yet neither.43 
  
 The interdependence and reciprocity of body and world44 is central to Merleau-
Ponty’s project as well.  Indeed, perception itself is reimagined as their original 
connectedness, our primal openness onto the world.  It is this background sense that 
he calls the phenomenal field—neither an “inner world” nor a purely external reality—in 
which the unity of perceptual objects is sensed as “a whole charged with immanent 
meaning.” 45  I see not just that cardboard box (and certainly not its objective 
measurements) but also its heaviness.  The bottom looks stressed.  It may even already 
feel heavy to me if I’m meant to lift it.  I sense its backside, its three-dimensionality, 
though I cannot technically see it.  This is partly to say that the initial grasping of a 
perceptual situation is synesthetic.  Considering a red woolly carpet, Merleau-Ponty 
maintains that “this red would literally not be the same if it were not the ‘woolly red’ of 
a carpet.”46  It is only on the basis of this prior, gestalt, contextualized meaning that the 
derivative notions of sensation and judgment are even intelligible.  Only when I step 
back from this normal, engaged perception and explicitly focus on individual qualia 
that the notion of discrete sensations (e.g. “redness”) arise.  And only in a derivative 
                                                
43 Ibid.  See also Reed, James J. Gibson and the Psychology of Perception, 293–94. 
44 Merleau-Ponty’s “world” corresponds to Gibson’s “environment.” 
45 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 66–67. 
46 Ibid., 5. 
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analytical posture can I conceptualize what I see.    
What is lacking, among other things, in the traditional approaches is the 
situatedness and embodiment of perceivers.  Thus Merleau-Ponty stresses the 
inherently perspectival nature of perception, a “view from somewhere” rather than the 
spurious “view from nowhere” that philosophy and psychology (and science) typically 
assume.47  This perspective is a function not just of our necessarily seeing from some 
particular physical position, but, more deeply, our particular bodily skills and 
orientation, what Merleau-Ponty calls the body schema.  Thus intentionality, the about-
ness of perception, is subtended by what Merleau-Ponty calls motor intentionality, the 
inherent directedness and significance of bodily movement.  When I reach for the 
coffee mug, for instance, “[f]rom the outset the grasping movement is magically at its 
completion.”48  I do not just launch my arm in its general direction and then logically 
figure out how to pick it up.  Rather, my hand readies itself at the moment my arm 
moves toward the mug, and specifically for this mug, with its specific dimensions, 
material, and expected weight.  I will have a physically different grasp if it is full and I 
am grabbing it to drink than if it is empty and I am clearing the dishes.  It is not just 
my arm and hand, however, but an entire bodily readiness, a fact revealed most 
saliently when I misjudge a situation.  The awkward jolt of my body when I lift the box 
I mistook as heavy attests to this bodily readiness.  The significance, the very meaning 
of the mug or the box, including what it affords, resides in my movements with respect 
to it.  In this way, knowledge of the world is embedded in our bodies in a completely 
non-cognitive (i.e. non-representational) fashion.  Yet it is not just in our bodies, but 
                                                
47 Carman, Merleau-Ponty, 8–14. 
48 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 119. 
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our bodies in the world—hence the unitary “being-in-the-world” (etre au monde, echoing 
Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-Sein).  As Charles Taylor emphasizes, this kind of knowledge 
resides in neither subject nor object, but in the very interaction of a coping organism 
and its environment: 
 
My ability to throw baseballs can’t be exercised in the absence of baseballs.  My ability 
to get around this city, this house, comes out only in getting around this city and 
house… 
…We might be tempted to say that it doesn’t exist in my mind, like my theoretical 
beliefs, in my “head,” but in my ability to move that I have in my whole body.  That 
understates the embedding.  The locus here is the ability to move-in-this-environment.  
It exists not just in my body, but in my body-walking-the-streets.49 
 
 
Perception, inextricably linked with action, involves, or simply is, our entire 
orientation toward and within the world.  Yet it would be a mistake to think that 
perceptions arrive fully determinate.  For Merleau-Ponty, the process of perception 
integrally involves the clarification, the very determination of, the perceptual scene and 
its significance.  As Taylor Carman has it, [p]erception…involves the organism in a 
constant fluctuation between states of tension and equilibrium, and the very unity of a 
perceived object amounts to a kind of solution, or anticipated solution, to a 
problem….”50   The figure in the distance is blurry so I squint and move toward it.  I 
                                                
49 Taylor, “Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture,” 33–34. 
50 Carman, “Sensation, Judgment, and the Phenomenal Field,” 57. 
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can’t quite hear you so I rotate my ear in your direction or even cup it.  Our body, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, “is not an object for an ‘I think’, it is a grouping of lived-
through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium.”51  We continuously strive to 
achieve what Merleau-Ponty calls a best grip (meilleure prise) on/in the environment: 
 
[M]y body is geared onto the world when my perception presents me with a spectacle as 
varied and as clearly articulated as possible, and when my motor intentions, as they 
unfold, receive the responses they expect from the world. This maximum sharpness of 
perception and action points clearly to a perceptual ground, a basis of my life, a general 
setting in which my body can co-exist with the world.52 
 
This optimality gives rise to norms that guides my perception and action, lending them 
direction—in short, (motor) intentionality.53  Best, or Maximum grip, in other words, 
implies normativity, and its achievement in particular situations—e.g. how far to stand 
from the painting to see certain of its details best, the best lighting to see the true color 
of this scarf—leads our behavior.   
 Merleau-Ponty stresses the mutuality of this interaction.  It is not that I react to an 
inert environment.  Rather, as Dreyfus puts it, “one’s body is simply solicited by the 
situation to get into equilibrium with it.”54  Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the intentional arc 
sheds light on this phenomenon of solicitation.  Dreyfus, whose phenomenology of skill 
                                                
51 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 177. 
52 Ibid., 292. 
53 Carman, “Sensation, Judgment, and the Phenomenal Field,” 70.  
54  Dreyfus, “Intelligence Without Representation–Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental 
Representation: The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation,” 378. 
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acquisition fleshes out and exemplifies the idea, defines it as “the tight connection 
between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are 
‘stored’, not as representations in the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the 
solicitations of situations in the world.”55  What we learn from our successes and 
failures in the world (as gauged by maximal grip) literally changes the way the world 
appears to us.  The expert chess player sees a different board than I do.  The 
professional chef hears more in that particular sizzle than I do.  And I hear more in it 
now than I once did.  That “same” sound is now different to me; now it tells me more 
about temperature and cooking progress.  It now solicits my actions in a more refined 
and appropriate way: that particular hiss beckons me to turn down the temperature.  It 
is not that I hear a sound then add on some internally stored memory to make sense of 
it, as the intellectualist supposes.  Rather, the sound itself contains what I have learned.  
As Dreyfus puts it, “what the learner acquires through experience is not represented in 
the mind at all but is presented to the learner as a more and more finely discriminated 
situation, which then solicits a more and more refined response.”56  Merleau-Ponty’s 
intentional arc thus obviates the need for an account of memory (or at least this kind of 
situational skill memory) as stored information, and indeed makes better sense of how 
our past affects our present generally: 
 
                                                
55 Ibid., 367. 
56 Ibid., 373.  For a discussion of how the phenomenon of solicitation is neither causal nor 
rational but involves the non-dualistic phenomenon of motivation, see Mark Wrathall, “Motives, 
Reasons, and Causes,” in The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Mark B. N. Hansen 
and Taylor Carman, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge, UK!; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 111–28. 
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[t]he life of consciousness—cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life—is 
subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us our past, our future, our 
human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in 
our being situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings about the 
unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility.57 
 
 Merleau-Ponty’s solicitations and Gibson’s affordances name essentially the same 
process, both notions capturing, if slightly differently,58 the essential mutuality of 
organism-environment interactions.  And the process described by the intentional arc 
can apply equally to affordances, which are fixed across neither time nor space.  
Experience and culture shape and change what counts as an affordance.  Learning, for 
Gibson as for Merleau-Ponty, entails the progressive discrimination and refinement of 
affordances, and is not stored in the brain but in the way the environment’s very 
appearance changes for an organism. 
 Pervading the argument of both thinkers is a common strategy, one that allows 
them to truly overcome a Cartesian dualism so deep that, as Mark Wrathall notes, “it 
often constrains even the ways in which it is rejected.”59  For instance, attempts to 
reconcile the mental (mind) and physical (body) still depend on the fundamental 
                                                
57 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 157. 
58 For example, Gibson stresses the evolutionary origin of affordances.   Additionally, Merleau-
Ponty’s term emphasizes the way I am beckoned to action, whereas Gibson’s focus is more on 
opportunities for action.  Gibson held that an affordance exists in the environment whether or 
not the perceiver is aware of it, whereas solicitations, as the term implies, do not occur outside 
of a solicitee.  See Hubert L. Dreyfus, “The Return of the Myth of the Mental,” Inquiry 50, no. 
4 (2007): 356–57 and Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Response to McDowell,” Inquiry 50, no. 4 (2007): 
375.  See also Reed, James J. Gibson and the Psychology of Perception, 310.    
59 Wrathall, “Motives, Reasons, and Causes,” 111. 
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dichotomy, and thus reinforce rather than dissolve the split.60  Even forms of monism 
that explain one element in terms of the other implicitly acquiesce to the positing of 
only two substances, mental and physical.  Merleau-Ponty’s and Gibson’s approach is 
more radical.  By refusing not only the division of mind and body but the presumption 
of two fundamental kinds of phenomena from the outset—indeed demonstrating that 
the very intelligibility of such a view rests necessarily on their primal indivision—they 
find a “third term” irreducible to the physical or mental.61  Our foundational form of 
existence—our being-in-the-world—is describable in neither causal nor rational terms.  
Our relationship with a reciprocally constituting environment is far more complex, our 
most basic understanding of both it and ourselves residing not in one or the other, but 
in their very interaction.  And integral to that interaction is the organism’s tuning to or 
resonance with the environment, the perpetual equilibration, the striving for a maximal 
grip within the world.  One of Merleau-Ponty’s and Gibson’s achievements, then, is the 
introduction of a new genre of phenomenon—embodied perception—that shatters the 
dualistic picture.62      
 Merleau-Ponty and Gibson are logical enough to bring together, but their 
resonance with Gendlin is slightly less obvious. 63   Though influenced by 
                                                
60 This is essentially my argument against Johnson’s project at the end of Chapter 2. 
61 Wrathall, “Motives, Reasons, and Causes,” 112. 
62 See Taylor, “Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture”; Sanders, “Merleau-Ponty, 
Gibson, and the Materiality of Meaning.” 
63 Ironically, Mark Johnson makes the connection, though I would argue that the connections 
he makes between their and his philosophy are questionable.  Mark Johnson, “Merleau-
Ponty’s Embodied Semantics—From Immanent Meaning, to Gesture, to Language,” Eurameri-
Ca 1 (2006).  Though cf. Eugene Gendlin, “Reply to Johnson,” in Language Beyond 
Postmodernism: Saying and Thinking in Gendlin’s Philosophy, ed. David Levin (Northwestern 
University Press, 1997), 168–175 for Gendlin’s critique of Johnson’s project (also discussed in 
chapter 2).   See also E. T. Gendlin, “Crossing and Dipping: Some Terms for Approaching the 
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phenomenology, Gendlin’s thought is eclectic and idiosyncratically original.  Yet, as I 
aim to show, understanding some of his central insights in light of M-P’s and Gibson’s 
offers mutual illumination.   
 Gendlin’s long-running and multi-faceted project has essentially one aim, outlined 
in his major work, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: 
 
Besides the logical dimension and the operational dimension of knowledge, there is also 
a directly felt, experiential dimension.  Meaning is not only about things and it’s not only a 
certain logical structure, but it also involves felt experiencing.  Any concept, thing, or 
behavior is meaningful only as some noise, thing, or event interacts with felt 
experiencing.  Meanings are formed and had through an interaction between 
experiencing and symbols or things…  
…The task at hand is to examine the relationship between this felt dimension of 
experience and the logical and objective orders…what are the functions of felt 
experiencing in our conceptual operations and in our observable behavior?”64      
 
By “experiencing” (or “felt sense,” or “implicit intricacy”) Gendlin means “that partly 
unformed stream of feeling that we have every moment,” 65 that “felt apperceptive mass 
to which we can inwardly point.”66  It is “raw” and sometimes nebulous, yet highly 
                                                                                                                                            
Interface between Natural Understanding and Logical Formulation,” Minds and Machines 5, no. 
4 (1995): 547–60. 
64 Eugene T Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological 
Approach to the Subjective (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 1. 
65 Ibid., 3. 
66 Ibid., 27. 
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specific and concrete.67  Gendlin shows us how to find it: 
 
First, feel your body.  Your body can, of course be looked at from the outside, but I am 
asking you to feel it from the inside.  There you are.  There, as simply put as possible, is 
your experiencing of this moment, now.  But we need to remain with that global feel of 
your body.  Let us “divide” it a bit, although no hard and fast division into parts is really 
possible.  Let us create a few aspects of it.  We do this with symbols.  The symbols will 
be my sentences below: 
Perhaps you feel some tension, or perhaps you feel east.  These words (“tension,” “ease”) 
give certain qualities and specify aspects of your present experiencing.  Let us fashion 
another, different sort of aspect: how does your chest feel when you inhale? 
Nor need we remain with entirely present descriptions.  You will have an equally 
present felt meaning…in the sense that you will have the felt meaning now, if I ask you: 
how do you generally feel before a meal when you haven’t eaten for a long time? (You 
feel hunger—using the word to refer to your inward sense of it.)  Or recall the way you 
feel after you have filled your stomach, the heavy satiation.  Boredom, that strained 
impatient deadness which hurts in quite an alive way, often is another aspect you can 
specify in experiencing.68 
 
Gendlin highlights several key features of this inner experiencing.  It is not this or that 
particular feeling (e.g. hunger, boredom, some emotion, etc.) that he wishes to identify, 
                                                
67 Ibid., 11. 
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but the ongoing, ever-present “concrete mass” that “is ‘there’ for us.”69  Though we may 
attempt to reach in (what he calls “direct reference” and later “dipping”) and symbolize 
parts of it, it is inexhaustible—“we can put only a few aspects of it into words.”70  
Relatedly, it is infinitely explorable: “any datum of experiencing—any aspect of it, no 
matter how finely specified—can be symbolized and interpreted further and further, so 
that it can guide us to many, many more symbolizations.  We can endlessly 
‘differentiate’ it further.  We can synthesize endless numbers of meanings in it.”71   
 Felt meaning operates not only in the realm of the physical, psychological, and 
emotional, but even in the most abstract forms of cognition: 
 
We cannot even know what a concept “means” or use it meaningfully without the “feel” 
of its meaning.  No amount of symbols, definitions, and the like can be used in the place 
of the felt meaning.  If we do not have the felt meaning of the concept, we haven’t got the 
concept at all—only a verbal noise.  Nor can we think without the felt meaning…. This 
felt experiencing, not verbalizations, makes up all but a small part of what we think…72 
 
My grasping of any concept or word resides in the felt meaning that is associated with 
it.  (Think “IV chord” and find that meaning in your body—there it is).  The moment 
when I “get” the meaning of that word or idea or what you are saying is the moment of 
connection with my felt sense— “Ah, I have it now.”  What it is that I understand in 
                                                
69 Ibid., 11. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 16. 
72 Ibid., 5–6. 
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these moments is what Gendlin calls the “implicit intricacy,” always more than our 
symbolization can capture.73      
 Though experiencing undergirds nearly all thought, its role in cognition is most 
apparent in “breakdown” cases.  The “tip-of-the-tongue” phenomenon, for instance, 
shows felt meaning at work: it (the felt sense) knows I know what I cannot now recall, 
can accept or reject possibilities, and leads us to the recall. (That “place” we inwardly 
focus on and explore in those moments to find the word or name is our felt sense of 
it.)74   Yet it would be a mistake to think of this process as one of the implicit simply 
being made explicit.  Rather, explication changes what was implied: 
 
When we seem to find what “was” there, we have actually moved further.  We do not 
need a false equation.  No equation is possible between the implicit and the explicit.  
What matters is the way in which the next step follows from (continues, carries forward, 
makes sense from) what preceded it.75 
 
 Felt meaning inherently exceeds our symbolizations of it.  Our categorizations, 
conceptualizations, etc. of experiencing always leave a remainder.  But this fact needn’t 
lead us to postmodern despair.  We need not, in Gendlin’s view, be imprisoned in the 
                                                
73 E. T. Gendlin, “The New Phenomenology of Carrying Forward,” Continental Philosophy 
Review 37 (2004): 141.  See also Eugene Gendlin, “How Philosophy Cannot Appeal to 
Experience, and How It Can,” in Language Beyond Postmodernism: Saying and Thinking in Gendlin’s 
Philosophy, ed. David Levin, 1st ed. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 21 
for an enumeration of the many functions of the implicit. 
74 Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, 75–76.  For the specific, systematic ways 
experiencing functions in cognition, which is beyond my   
75 Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, xiii.  This is from Gendlin’s 1997 Preface to 
the new edition.   
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apparently fixed forms and categories of language.  The remainder, the “excess” can be 
tapped, employed, thought with.  This brings us to the heart of Gendlin’s project: 
 
We can develop a new mode of language and thinking which enters, and speaks from, 
what is more than conceptual patterns (distinctions, differences, comparisons, similarities, 
generalities, schemes, figures, categories, cognitions, cultural and social forms . . . . . ), 
although these are always inseparably at work as well. For example, "more than" is a 
pattern, but here it says more than the pattern. 
Language brings patterns and distinctions, but what it says exceeds them. A new mode of 
language can turn to advantage what has long seemed a problem: the incapacity of the 
conceptual patterns to control, contain, or capture an unavoidable so-called "excess."76 
  
Gendlin’s “. . . . .” represents the excess, in many ways our embodied situatedness, the 
implicit intricacy of situations over and above the generalities of categories and 
concepts.   
 The way to speak and think with the “more” is to think and speak from the implicit 
intricacy, “to speak and think with the way words can exceed their conceptual structure even 
while employing that structure.”77  In this way, namely by “crossing” words and 
situations,78 “we can let words acquire new uses in our situation here....” 
 
                                                
76 Gendlin, “How Philosophy Cannot Appeal to Experience, and How It Can,” 3. 
77 Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, xvi. (from the 1997 Preface) 
78 Gendlin, “Crossing and Dipping.” 
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We can say that the situation gives the word a new life. A situation changes itself in response 
to the words, and this change is their meaning. The situation absorbs the words that are 
spoken in it…. 
What these words say is also happening to them here; they say what they make happen. 
They say how they work.79 
 
This way of thinking and speaking involves the carrying forward of the felt sense to the 
next action or symbolization.  I carry forward the “. . . . .” from my first attempt at 
verbalizing this notion or feeling into my second, and it carries forward from there, 
always bringing a “fresh implying.”80  Thus an experiential feedback is effected, and by 
attending to my experiencing of the situation, I am led to finer and finer continuations 
of the “. . . . .”: 
       A . . . . . opens into an intricacy of many potentially separable strands. If we 
articulate even just a few of those, we move beyond the traditional schemes and 
alternatives. This will of course also involve alternatives, but it need not be the same 
ones/ This is a major feature of experiential differentiation. The next step is more 
demanding and precise than can be derived from the conceptual forms and distinctions 
we had at the previous step. Even one small experiential detail can overarch and 
overthrow the very distinctions that have led to it.81 
 
* 
                                                
79 Gendlin, “How Philosophy Cannot Appeal to Experience, and How It Can,” 8. 
80 Gendlin, “Process Generates Structures: Structures Alone Don’t Generate Process,” 3. 
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 Having outlined central pieces of these three figures’ thought and drawn some 
connections among them, I turn now to the picture of temporality that is suggested by, 
if not always made explicit in, their thinking.  Specifically, I further explore Merleau-
Ponty’s maximal grip, Gibson’s notion of locomotion, and Gendlin’s carrying forward.  
 Temporal process is built in to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of perception at the most 
fundamental level.  Perceptual sense does not consist of discovering determinate 
meanings, as traditional approaches posited.  Rather, it is the ongoing determination of 
sense, its perpetual clarification, that grounds meaning.  Our striving to attain a best 
grip on a situation is not a deficiency or accident of our existence but the very basis of 
our sense-making.  And because situations constantly evolve, our attaining of maximal 
grip is perpetual.  In a way, Merleau-Ponty’s art gallery example can be slightly 
misleading: 
 
For each object, as for each picture in an art gallery, there is an optimum distance from 
which it requires to be seen, a direction viewed from which it vouchsafes most of itself: 
at a shorter or greater distance we have merely a perception blurred through excess or 
deficiency. We therefore tend towards the maximum of visibility, and seek a better focus 
as with a microscope.82    
 
For the purposes of illustration, this example is somewhat simplified.  Granted, 
perhaps at first I am drawn to a view of the whole painting, but my coping with it 
                                                
82 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 352. 
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surely does not end there.  Gaining that initial clarity allows me to notice more aspects 
of it, to be solicited to inspect it further.  New opportunities, new grips becomes 
available as a result.  I am suddenly drawn to a detail in the top right corner and thus 
solicited forward, my head drawn up, all the while adjusting for lighting and the 
various contingencies of the situation.   And this new grip affords yet further 
affordances for perception and action.  Maximal grip is thus both teleological and 
endless.  The very act of getting into equilibrium with a situation reveals new aspects 
of the situation that solicit me to get a new grip.  This is no accident, for, as Merleau-
Ponty explains, my acting in a situation changes the way the situation shows up for 
me.  He demonstrates this dynamic “dialectic of milieu and action” with a description 
of a skilled football player: 
 
For the player in action the football field is not an “object,” that is, the ideal term which 
can give rise to an indefinite multiplicity of perspectival views and remain equivalent 
under its apparent transformations….  The field itself is not given to him, but present as 
the immanent term of his practical intentions; the player becomes one with it….It would 
not be sufficient to say that consciousness inhabits this milieu.  At this moment 
consciousness is nothing other than the dialectic of milieu and action.  Each maneuver 
undertaken by the player modifies the character of the field and establishes in it new 
lines of force in which the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the 
phenomenal field.83 
 
                                                
83 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1963), 168–69. 
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The situation evolves as a result of our acting to get into equilibrium with it, so that as 
long as we are coping in a situation, it necessarily changes.  Maximal grip, then, is a 
continuous act, not a discrete occurrence.  Moreover, it is not continuous in the sense 
of sequential—i.e. a sequence of discrete events—but, more deeply, in the sense that it 
is processual through and through.  Merleau-Ponty’s talk of the football player’s 
“maneuvers” and their effects on the field as if they were distinct points in a chain of 
events is, I would argue, a contrivance to illustrate the dialectic of milieu and action.  
The individuation of maneuvers is more the product of later analysis and the 
exigencies of language than it is a phenomenological reality.   In absorbed, skillful 
coping, there is only maneuvering, a flow of inseparable actions and a consequently 
continuously changing field.  The football player does not make a discrete move and 
then ascertain how the phenomenal field has shifted.  Rather, the phenomenal field 
shifts along and continuously with his moving.   The feedback loop is continuous. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s notion of optimality sheds further light on this phenomenon.  
Dreyfus guards against a cognitivist (i.e. intellectualist) interpretation that would 
understand it in terms of mental representations. 
 
Merleau-Ponty is clear that for this movement toward maximal grip to take place, one 
does not need a representation of a goal. Rather, acting is experienced as a steady flow 
of skillful activity in response to one’s sense of the situation. Part of that experience is a 
sense of whether or not coping is going well. When one senses a deviation from the 
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optimal body–environment gestalt, one’s activity tends to take one closer to an optimal 
body–environment relationship that relieves the “tension.”84 
 
As Merleau-Ponty writes, “to move one’s body is to aim at things through it, it is to 
allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any 
representation.”85  An optimal body-environment gestalt, i.e. maximal grip, is not given 
at the outset as an explicit goal.  And yet we find our way there by sensing movement 
toward or away from equilibrium.  As Dreyfus puts it: 
         
[A]lthough absorbed coping has conditions of satisfaction, these are conditions of 
improvement that consist in moving so as to lower a tension, not so as to achieve an 
already-represented success, and that, since such conditions of improvement cannot be 
known by the agent in advance of his feeling satisfied, they cannot be represented as a 
future state of success that governs or guides the agent’s current movements.86 
 
Thus the process of attaining a maximal grip is guided by our sensitivity to changes in 
the situation, whether the grip is getting better or worse.  Sensitivity to change 
involves, or simply is, sensitivity to the flow of ongoing experience, a flow that is 
irreducible to a series of discrete moments mentally compared.  
                                                
84 Dreyfus, “Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science,” 137–38.    
85 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 160–61. 
86 Hubert L. Dreyfus, “The Primacy of Phenomenology over Logical Analysis,” Philosophical 
Topics 27, no. 2 (1999): 6–7. 
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 In these ways, perceptual meaning is irreducibly temporal, not just in the trivial 
sense that experience happens in time, but in the deeper sense that meaning is a 
function of the flow of experience.   Its sense is bound up with its flow. 
 The registration of change is central to Gibson’s account of perception as well.      
Perception does not even properly begin before locomotion: 
 
[W]hat we see now…turns out to be at most a peculiar set of surfaces that happen to 
come within the field of view and face the point of observation.  It does not comprise 
what we see.  It could not possibly be the basis of our perception of the environment.  
What we see now refers to the self, not the environment.  The perspective appearance of 
the world at a given moment of time simply what specifies to the observer where he is at 
that moment.  The perceptual process does not begin with this peculiar projection, this 
momentary pattern.  The perceiving world begins with the pickup of invariants.87 
 
Change is in fact so crucial to ecological reality that Gibson replaces the physical 
world’s notions of “time” and “space” with change and persistence.  What is directly 
perceived are not the abstract units of space and time but the reciprocally related 
invariants and variants of the environment.88 [need Gibson citation] 
 The pickup of environmental persistence and change does not occur in separable 
instants that are later assembled together but as an irreducible flow: 
 
                                                
87 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 254. 
88 Ibid., 12–15.Reed, James J. Gibson and the Psychology of Perception, 283–87. 
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The act of picking up information, moreover, is a continuous act, an activity that is 
ceaseless and unbroken.  The sea of energy in which we live flows and changes without 
sharp breaks.  Even the tiny fraction of this energy that affects the receptors in the eyes, 
ears, nose, mouth, and skin is a flux, not a sequence…  Hence, perceiving is a stream…. 
Discrete percepts, like discrete ideas, are ‘as mythical as the Jack of Spades.’89 
 
Similarly, resonance with or attunement to the environment is ongoing, achieved not in 
discrete instances but in the flow.   
 For Gendlin, the creation of meaning is an emergent aspect of experiencing.  His 
carrying forward, like Merleau-Ponty’s maximal grip, involves the determination of the 
indeterminate, a movement toward sense.  Consider his description of the poet looking 
for the next line: 
 
 The poet reads the written lines over and over, listens, and senses what these lines need 
(want, demand, imply . . . . .). Now the poet's hand rotates in the air. The gesture says 
that. Many good lines offer themselves; they try to say, but do not say—that. The blank 
is more precise. Although some are good lines, the poet rejects them. 
 That . . . . . seems to lack words, but no. It knows the language, since it understands—
and rejects—these lines that came. So it is not pre-verbal; Rather, it knows what must 
be said, and knows that these lines don't precisely say that. It knows like a gnawing 
knows what was forgotten, but it is new in the poet, and perhaps new in the history of 
the world. 
                                                
89 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 240. 
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Now, although I don't know most of you, I do know one of your secrets. I know you 
have written poetry. So I can ask you: Isn't that how it is? This . . . . . must be directly 
referred to (felt, experienced, sensed, had, . . . . . ).  Therefore, whatever term we use for 
such a blank, that term also needs our direct reference. 
 The blank brings something new. That function is not performed by the linguistic forms 
alone. Rather, it functions between two sets of linguistic forms. The blank is not just the 
already written lines, but rather the felt sense from re-reading them, and that performs a 
function needed to lead to the next lines. A second function: If that stuck blank is still 
there after a line comes, the line is rejected. Thirdly, the blank tells when at last a line 
does explicate—it releases. 
 Between the subjective and objective sides there is not a relation of representation or 
likeness. The words don't copy the blank. How can a set of words be at all like a blank? 
Rather, what was implicit is changed by explicating it. But it is not just any change. The 
explication releases that tension, which was the . . . . . .  But what the blank was is not 
just lost or altered; rather, that tension is carried forward by the words. Of course the 
new phrases were not already in the blank. They did not yet exist at all. When they 
come they are much more than the blank was, but not just different, either. Just now, 
my phrase "carrying forward" worked as a term to say this relationship… 
I have also used some terms to speak of this subjective side. I said that a felt sense is a direct 
referent, that its implicit meaning is not copied by, or equal to its explication, but rather 
carried forward by explication. 
 
Here Gendlin elucidates a feedback loop between the subjective (“felt sense”) and 
objective sides (linguistic forms).  The poet senses the next line and tries to symbolize 
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it, carrying the felt sense forward, ad infinitum.  The meaning partly resides in the very 
way one step leads to another, in other words, its flow.   
 But it is not just the searching poet who partakes of this behavior.  We all do, or at 
least can, all the time. 
 
Applying concepts elicits an experiential feedback.  We can let our next step of thought 
come from this experiential feedback, rather than only from the concept.  We can think 
with both conceptual and experiential steps, a “zigzag” which employs both powers.  It 
can make new sense and lead us to modify our concepts, rather than being confined in 
them or ending in mere contradictions.90  
 
For all three thinkers, then, temporal process is the ground of experiential meaning.  
Part of what it means to attain a maximal grip, resonate with an environment, or carry 
forward a felt sense, is to be absorbed in the flow of experience.  Flow is a condition of 
meaning. 
 A particular view of memory follows from, or goes hand in hand with, this 
privileging of process and flow.  Understanding process as a fundamental phenomenon 
implies a continuity between past and present that traditional accounts of memory— 
which presume that past experience is stored or retained and then recalled and 
brought to bear on the present—turn into a derivative phenomena.  It is no surprise, 
then, that Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, and Gendlin all reject this picture.    
                                                
90 Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, xvii. 
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 Gibson does so by way of challenging the very distinction between past and 
present: 
 
The division between present experience and past experience may seem to be self-
evident.  How could anyone deny it?  Yet it is denied in supposing that we can 
experience both change and nonchange.  The difference between present and past blurs, 
and the clarity of the distinction slips away.  The stream of experience does not consist 
of an instantaneous present and a linear past receding in the distance; it is not a 
‘traveling razor’s edge’ dividing the past from the future…  There are attempts to talk 
about a ‘conscious’ present, or a ‘specious’ present, or a ‘span’ of present perception, or a 
span of ‘immediate memory,’ but they all founder on the simple fact that there is no 
dividing line between the present and the past, between perceiving and remembering.  A 
special sense impression clearly ceases when the sensory excitation ends, but a 
perception does not.  It does not become a memory after a length of time.  A perception, 
in fact, does not have an end.  Perceiving goes on.91  
 
Any clear separation of past from present denies the basic continuity of experience.  
Gibson is led to an initially startling conclusion: 
 
Evidently the theory of information pickup does not need memory.  It does not have to 
have as a basic postulate the effect of past experience on present experience by way of 
                                                
91 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 253.  For more on the problems with the 
“specious present,” see Sean Kelly, “The Puzzle of Temporal Experience,” in Cognition and the 
Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement, ed. Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 208–40. 
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memory.  It needs to explain learning, that is, the improvement of perceiving with 
practice and the education of attention, but not by an appeal to the catch-all of past 
experience or to the muddle of memory.   The state of a perceptual system is altered 
when it is attuned to information of a certain sort.  The system has become sensitized.  
Differences are noticed that were previously not noticed.  Features become distinctive 
that were formerly vague.  But this altered state need not be thought of as depending on 
a memory, an image, and engram, or a trace.  An image of the past, if experienced at all, 
would be only an incidental symptom of the altered state.92 
 
Previous learning is brought to bear on the present not by virtue of some mental act 
but by its framing of the very significance of present perception.  The past is embedded 
in the organism in the form of its altered orientation and sensitivities to the 
environment.  It is already present, influencing what features of the current 
environment, which affordances, can be noticed.  Merleau-Ponty expresses a similar 
idea when he asserts that “the fate of an excitation is determined by its relation to the 
whole of the organic state and to the simultaneous or preceding excitations.”93   
  Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc, discussed above regarding learning and skill 
acquisition, suggests a congruous view.  Dreyfus in fact borrows a word from Gibson 
when he defines it as the way “past experience is projected back into the perceptual 
world of the learner and shows up as affordances or solicitations to further action.”94  
The past is not represented in the mind and added to present experience but shows up 
                                                
92 Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, 254. 
93 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 15. 
94 Dreyfus, “Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science,” 132. 
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in the way the world now appears to me.  In his critique of the empiricist appeal to 
memory, Merleau-Ponty shows that memory in fact cannot be recalled by the present 
experience unless it is already understood in light of those experiences.  Thus the only 
way previous experience can affect the present is if the latter is grasped from the outset 
in the terms of the former.  The past is not separate from who we are; we carry it 
forward to every present experience.  Merleau-Ponty writes:        
 
The past, therefore, is not past, nor the future future. It exists only when a subjectivity is 
there to disrupt the plenitude of being in itself, to adumbrate a perspective, and 
introduce non-being into it. A past and a future spring forth when I reach out towards 
them. I am not, for myself, at this very moment, I am also at this morning or at the night 
which will soon be here, and though my present is, if we wish so to consider it, this 
instant, it is equally this day, this year or my whole life. There is no need for a synthesis 
externally binding together the tempora into one single time, because each one of the 
tempora was already inclusive, beyond itself, of the whole open series of other tempora, 
being in internal communication with them. 
 
 Though Gendlin does not discuss memory explicitly, in a sense he does not need to, 
for the past’s role in the present is built into the notion of carrying forward.  The past is 
made present precisely by carrying it forward.  In the perpetual feedback loop of 
thought and experience, the flow or trajectory of the “zig-zag” plays a constitutive role 
in what the next “move” can be.  Recognizing the continuity of experience as a ground-
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level phenomenon obviates the need for a mentalistic account of memory by 
implicating it, always and already, in the present.  
 
 
* 
 
With momentum, I aim to capture the essential flow of experience that is both its form 
and the ground of its meaning.  Momentum implies trajectory, path, an irreducible 
continuity that is not the result of some later synthesis but the very basis of 
intelligibility.  Any analysis of it into a sequence of “now”’s is only possible on the basis 
of its prior indivisibility.  A momentum is meaningful only as a flow.  Thus even each 
conceptually isolated instant contains the past and already implicates a future.  Each 
moment implies, speaks to, contains, evinces (. . . . . ) its entire temporal horizon.  It is 
its past forever becoming present and projecting into the future.  Thus momentum 
implies accumulation, a perpetual gathering of sense.       
 My use of the term derives only vaguely from physics.  As Gibson demonstrated, 
the world of the physicist is not the environment as lived.  I mean to describe a human 
momentum, one that is not determined mathematically but by the ongoing coping of an 
embodied being.  We are not determined by these trajectories of meaning only oriented 
by them.  Our momentum does not negate our agency but invests it with immanent 
meaning.   
 Crucially, unlike the Newtonian cause and effect that governs physical momentum, 
this momentum involves the perpetual feedback loop between organism and 
environment, action and milieu described by Merleau-Ponty.  Causation here is not 
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linear but circular.95  That is to say that the meaning of events, even of particular 
perceptions, is bound up the flow of which it is a part.  Momentum puts a name to the 
“flow of experiences which imply and explain each other both simultaneously and 
successively,” (and I would add retrospectively).  The meaning of what just happened 
shapes what next happens, but is also shaped by it.  Events in the flow are mutually 
constitutive, helping to make ever more determinate the indeterminate.  Momentum is 
the striving toward maximal grip, the carrying forward of the felt sense.  It is the 
always emerging intertwining nexus of significances and as such, a basic way we make 
sense of our experience.   
 My claim is that meaningful engagement with music is fundamentally momental, 
that musical sense emerges in the flow, or better, simply is the flow.  The experience of 
flow is already a meaning.  My analyses in chapter 3 are an attempt to describe the 
momentum of my experience with several performances. 
 It would be naïve, however, to assume that the act of description stands outside of 
the experience it describes or, relatedly, that the process of explication is neutral, 
producing an equivalent of what was implicit.  This realization led Merleau-Ponty to a 
key distinction between his conception of phenomenology and Husserl’s: 
 
If we were absolute mind, the [phenomenological] reduction would present no problem. 
But since, on the contrary, we are in the world, since indeed our reflections are carried 
                                                
95 “[T]he relations between the organism and its milieu are not relations of linear causality but 
of circular causality. Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 15. 
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out in the temporal flux on the which we are trying to seize…there is no thought which 
embraces all our thought.96   
 
Phenomenology is thus a radical kind of reflection in that it takes into account the very 
act of reflection.  One consequence is that a complete description is impossible.  For 
Merleau-Ponty, “[t]he most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the 
impossibility of a complete reduction.”97 
 Gendlin’s project rests on the same insight.  In a sense, this recognition is a 
foundation of his philosophy, which shows a way to harness the interaction between 
words and felt sense.  Speaking of the relation of concepts and experience, he writes: 
 
Of course, one cannot stand outside this relation in order to conduct such an 
examination.  The relations to be examined will obtain in the very process of examining.  
Experiencing will play some of its roles in the process of speaking about—and with—
them.  This philosophy is therefore constantly reflexive.  It can say what it says only as 
what it talks about also functions in the very saying.  And since it tells how the 
experiential side always exceeds the concepts, this also happens in the concepts right 
here.  The functional relationships and characteristics set forth in this book are 
themselves specific ways in which their own formulation can be exceeded.98 
 
                                                
96 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, xv. 
97 Ibid., xv.  See also Ted Toadvine, “Phenomenology and ‘Hyper-Reflection,’” in Merleau-
Ponty: Key Concepts, ed. Rosalyn Diprose and Jack Reynolds (Stocksfield [UK]: Acumen, 
2008), 17–29. 
98 Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, xii. 
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Gendlin’s very explication of his philosophy is necessarily an instantiation of itself, 
making a virtue of language’s effect on the experience it describes.    
 Description, then, is not reconstruction.  Words change the experience they 
reference, they carry experiencing forward in particular ways.  Description carries the 
experience forward, and the meaning of that experience can be said to reside in the 
way it was carried forward.  But of course examining and explicating that relation will 
constitute a new carrying forward.  Experience never stops; we cannot stand aside and 
observe or describe it objectively.  Describing experience is itself a new experience.  
But this does not entail that experience forever eludes us, that we are incapable of 
capturing some aspect of it.  Rather, the very way it carries the experience forward is, 
or becomes, part of its meaning.  The perpetual carrying forward, what I would call 
the momentum of experience, is part of its meaning.   
 In so many words, what I have tried to do in my analyses (chapter 3) is articulate 
the momentum of my experience with those performances.  Coming to terms (literally) 
with my experience involved an extended back and forth—Gendlin’s “zig-zag”— 
between listening (experiencing) and articulating, then checking those words against 
the feeling to see what resonated, then allowing that to carry forward to a new feeling, 
then a new word, and on and on.  This might seem unsystematic or even haphazard in 
that I chose this rather than that word here and that altered the thread of the analysis.  
And indeed it is.  It may be improvised, but it is not random, for if I have done it well, 
then at the very least, it is real, it is a set of experiences that really happened, united by 
an ongoing thread of experience that was sincere, honest, genuine.  In this way it is 
just like life, which is essentially improvised.  Way leads on to way.  The path is not 
arbitrary but consequential.  It is true that if I began those analyses now, from the 
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start, they would take different, perhaps remarkably different, paths and forms. This is 
precisely the point.  It is not repeatable.  Then again, neither is experience, though we 
go to great lengths to make it seem so by reifying it into repeatable concepts.  But this 
stability, this permanence and transcendence of concepts, is a myth, albeit a useful one.  
The unrepeatability of experience could either be denied by a reductive analysis or 
embraced by an expansive one.  An analysis that itself is unrepeatable.  If music is 
process, then shouldn’t its analysis be as well?  
 To show this process at work, I analyze a small part of my analysis, attempting to 
trace the path of that carrying forward.  Of course I cannot stand outside of that 
experience and comment on it neutrally.  There can be no true seizure, only a new 
carrying forward.  But this does not render analysis, or this meta-analysis, useless.  By 
dipping back into the experience (and its analysis, and its experience, and its analysis), 
and carrying new things forward, aspects of what “was” there implicitly can be 
explicated.  It can illuminate precisely by making new experience and thought from it.  
This is a process as endless as it is rich.   
 In a way, then, I am treating my earlier writing as a performance and analyzing it 
as I analyzed the Chopin performances.  Whereas the former was an attempt to speak 
of the momentum of the my experience with the Chopin performance, here I will 
attempt to speak of the momentum of my analysis.  This is thus an attempt to trace the 
momental thread of the analysis itself, how one feeling led to a description which led to 
a feeling, etc.  There are two major differences, medium and intention.  The first is 
music, the second writing.  The first made no attempt at capturing the intention of the 
performer, the second necessarily does.  Part of the meta-analysis involves my memory 
of how it went and came about.  Of course that memory will be changed as I write 
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about it here, but such is memory.  Memory happens in the present.  It is carried 
forward.  Let us carry forward this carrying forward.  
 I begin, as I did with the Chopin, at the beginning.  I specifically did not know 
where the analysis would take me.  There was no plan, no outline, no list of essential 
points to hit.  I tried to let it take its own course.  Here I will try to illuminate that 
course and how/why it happened the way it did, though this trying will of course take 
its own course.  There could equally be a meta-meta-analysis.    
 A true meta-analysis would begin well before I started writing the analysis, 
perhaps with my selection of the three recordings from the many I heard.  Or it could 
begin with the birth of this project or, for that matter, my birth—the momentum of 
experience stretches back infinitely.  For present purposes, I can say that these three 
recordings seemed to select themselves by compelling me.  Each, and in different ways 
“pricked” me, as Barthes might put it.  For Barthes, who thought of his project in 
Camera Lucida as a “casual phenomenology,”99 most photographs stirred in him only a 
lukewarm, general way, what he termed “studium:” 
 
The studium is that very wide field of unconcerned desire, of various interest, of 
inconsequential taste: I like / I don't like. The studium is of the order of liking, not of loving; 
it mobilizes a half desire, a demi-volition; it is the same sort of vague, slippery, 
                                                
99 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 20. 
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irresponsible interest one takes in the people, the entertainments, the books, the clothes 
one finds “all right.”100 
 
But occasionally, “in this glum desert, suddenly a specific photograph reaches me: it 
animates me, and I animate it.”101  This “second element will break (or punctuate) the 
stadium:” 
 
This time it is not I who seek it out…it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots 
out of it like an arrow, and pierces me….This second element which will disturb the 
studium I shall therefore call punctum; for punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole – 
and also a cast of the dice.  A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me 
(but also bruises me, is poignant to me).”102   
 
Barthes’s language suggests a special sort of solicitation, a salient affordance for 
further exploration.  He feels called by the photo; it “animates” him.  The punctum 
thus begets an “expansion”:  “However lightning-like it may seem, the punctum has, 
more or less potentially, a power of expansion…when, paradoxically, while remaining 
a ‘detail.’ It fills the whole picture.”103   
 
                                                
100 Ibid., 27. 
101 Ibid., 20. 
102 Ibid., 26–7. 
103 Ibid., 45. 
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For these reasons, I began with a “punctum,” hoping it would animate the music and 
me and lead to an expansion, a carrying forward. 
 
Claudio Arrau consistently stresses the tenor line (i.e. G3-A3 in mm.1-3) by strongly 
accenting the first of those notes in each measure. 
 
Why “stresses”?  I needed it (or need it now) to mean “stress” (emphasize, 
highlight, . . . . .) but also something slightly opposing.  It is not that “the line” is simply 
there and he emphasizes it.  Certainly the affordance is in the score and in a general 
sense a performer can “bring it out” to varying degrees.  But each of those realizations 
will differ in as many ways as they resemble each other.  They are each created in a 
unique context, and will in fact help fashion its context.  So Arrau both creates and 
stresses.  Is this not a contradiction?  I would argue that it is rather a paradox, a 
tension to a sense beyond itself, rather than a contradiction, which reveals nonsense.  
What I mean by this paradox feels clear—I am in fact using these two words, indeed 
their friction, to point to that sense.  (This is one way we use words to say more than 
their patterns, forms (. . . . .) can usually say.)  What that sense is would take some 
explication, a further carrying forward, but one aspect it reveals now is the tension, 
right at the outset of my analysis, between score-based and performance-based 
language, an ontological uneasiness.   
 “Stress,” then, was partly a concession to the usual way of talking about music.  So 
is “tenor line.”  Once I’ve introduced the idea of “line,” that will partly guide my 
analysis.  It will carry forward into my discussion of the Arrau’s “alto line,” and how it 
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is not really a line, or at least a different kind of line.  And how Pogorelich’s gesture to 
an extent erases the sense of line.  And how Sokolov makes his line particularly melodic.  
Though my use of “tenor” was meant for registral purposes, did it perhaps still lead me 
think more of vocal qualities?  Is that how I came to understand Sokolov as “melodic”?   
However it came about, it allowed for a fruitful consideration and refining of “line.” In 
other words, it immediately became clear that in the face of the complexity of 
performance, this concept falls short.  Hence my preliminary attempt to carry “line” 
forward, to begin to explicate the implicit intricacy of the feeling that resonates with 
that word when we describe an event with it.  
 
This accent pushes one in the direction of hearing these as downbeats.  
 
 My initial focus on line led immediately to a consideration of its effect on meter.  The 
interaction of line and meter then becomes a concern of the overall analysis, shaping 
how I will approach Pogorelich’s and Sokolov’s performances. “Pushes one in the 
direction of” means “not quite.”  Thus I was led to pay closer attention to Arrau and 
create new distinctions: “in between” and then a sub-distinction “neither” and “both.”  
These represent only a first attempt at coming to terms with a rather complex 
phenomenon. Recognizing a distinction between temporal and phenomenal dislocation, 
however, seems like a productive beginning.  Not every two events that are objectively 
simultaneous are perceived as such.  Conversely, two events need not be objectively 
simultaneous to be perceived that way. What might a phenomenology of simultaneity 
in music look like?    
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 Attending to experience means not only the experience of music but the experience 
of one’s description or analysis of it.  That analysis is a continuation of the experience, 
a carrying forward of its momentum.  One way that experience can be carried forward 
is into a more theoretical discourse, as my abbreviated exercise in meta-analysis began 
to demonstrate.  Because theory (both music theory and conceptualization generally) 
is always implicit in experiencing, it can be explicated.  Theory can arise organically 
from experiencing, emerging naturally from its momentum, and being forged by 
experience, could do perpetually better justice to its complexity.     
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